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PREFACE

This is a case study of a university based educational change
project which sought to radically alter a junior high school in the

v

New York Public School System.

The primary objective of the study is

to illumine the process of change in schools.

As well, the study

represents an effort to determine the extent to which the concepts of

"organizational behavior" and "organizational change" are useful in
explaining the success or failure of educational change projects.

The project under investigation occurred at a critical point
in the history of urban, "inner city," schools

—

after the major

thrust for "compensatory education" had been spent and before "com-

munity control" was raised as the new banner of educational reform.
In one sense, it was caught in the middle: the project sought to
.

avoid the agonizing failure of many compensatory programs, but it

had to proceed without the fully articulated vision of proponents of

y

community control.

In another sense, one which takes note of the

complexities of educational change and the dangers of oversimplification, it provides a microcosm of the dynamic interplay of conflicting

reform impulses and clashing interests that besets urban education in
the 1970’

s.

like
A number of people assisted me in this study and I should

to publicly thank them.

Horace Reed, Professor of Education at the

imporUniversity of Massachusetts School of Education, played a very

\
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/
tant supportive role not only in the researching and writing of
this

thesis but in all my activities at UMass.

His wise words have played

a vital part in many of the formulations and conclusions that
fill the

following pages.
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Ken Blanchard, Associate Professor at the School of

Education, introduced me to the value of theory

and challenged me to

make sense of the Clinic for Learning by approaching it scientifically.

Gerry Weinstein, Professor at the School of Education, helped me to

,

clarify my ambivalencies about white educators and black students.
Jack Hr u ska, Assistant Professor at the School of Education, introduced

me to John Dewey and the philosophical approach to education which has

influenced much of my thinking in this study.

Also, I should like to

pay special thanks to Ann Lieberman, Assistant Professor at the School
of Education, for expressing better than anyone the proud and resolute

credo of the professional educator.
•

Everyone who comes in contact

with her takes away a bit of her enthusiasm and dedication.
In addition, I should like to thank all the persons listed in
the bibliography who assisted me in recreating the Clinic for Learning.

Finally, I should like to thank my wife, whom I courted and

married during the course of this research, and without whom life

would be infinitely more difficult.
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INTRODUCTION

The New York University "Clinic for Learning which
grew out of

another NYU based program of compensatory education called Project
APEX,
was centrally committed to "sharply change a junior high school
in the

middle of the slum into a school of unusual merit in the education of

disadvantaged children."

Supported by the Ford Foundation and the New

•.York City Board of Education, the Clinic staff arrived at Junior High

School £7 in the Bedford-Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn in September,
1966.

There had been introductory meetings with teachers and administra-

tors the previous spring, there had been a summer camp for sixty incoming

seventh graders, there had been a weekend retreat for the entire faculty,

attended by some 60-70 percent of them, and there had been countless work
sessions, planning sessions, strategy sessions between the Project Director
and his staff of from six to ten professors and graduate students. Special

teachers, paid by Clinic funds, had been recruited to relieve some of the

burden on the regular JHS £7 staff.
]

Student teachers, other concerned

undergraduates, even experts from other departments of the university had
been mobilized to attack the problems of education for the disadvantaged.

There were to be six "clusters," (in the first year, the Clinic for Learning focused only on the seventh grade), comprised of one Cluster Coordinator from NYU, one teacher from each of the subject areas each of whom

taught the same classes, one extra ("Clinic") teacher, one community agent,
and as *manv undergraduates and postgraduate personnel as were available.

The Principal of the school, most of the lower administrators, and most
of the teachers were strongly enthusiastic about the Clinic*

1

Expectations

2

were uniformly high.

By January, 1967, approximately one-third of the Clinic staff
had resigned.

By February, nearly half of the regular JHS 57 teachers

had eliminated themselves from the program.
,

In April, a movie about the

school and the Clinic (produced independently but associated in nearly

everyone’s mind with the Clinic effort) was shown on national television
I

depicting the school as a "combat zone."

calling for the ouster of the Clinic.
<

By May community groups were

A compromise solution was reached

and in September, 1967, only two clusters were functioning.

By this time

only eight regular teachers on the JHS 57 staff were involved (out of
about one hundred)

,

and most of the others were blaming the Clinic for

i

the almost unmanageable disciplinary problems of the school.

In November,

i

a front page article appeared in the Mew York Times quoting the Project

Director as saying the NYU team had been through a "shattering" experience, and that they were abandoning efforts to change the school.

The

Community groups continued

two clusters, however, continued to function.
j

to apply pressure.

Sometime in May or June, 1968, most of the Clinic

personnel stopped coming to J.H.S.57*

A team from Hofstra was brought

in to do an evaluation of the Project; two years later they produced a
\

shallow rehash of the project's "failure."

The Project Director has

produced another movie which uses scenes from the earlier film and relies
in part on his experiences with the Clinic.

Except for that, and the

very few and ~ery brief references that can be found in some current education^. books, the Clinic for Learning has been all but forgotten,

thrown on the scrapheap of "compensatory programs that failed."
I

had begun teaching at JHS 57 in September, 1968.

into the life of "the school had been abrupt

—

My initiation

flying chairs, books,

r

3

occasional illiteracy, often a complete lack, of hope for anything more
than drugs and crime, fighting, threatening, disrupting.
now, it was maddening and frightening at the time.

ing was much more successful.
to learn,"

"freedom

I

I

It seems tragic

My second year teach-

was an "innovator,”

I

gave the kids

tried my best to "turn them on."

In my classroom,

I felt things were a little different.

The next year I left JHS 57 to attend graduate school and it was

only then that I learned about the Clinic for Learning, being shown by

*

a friend the reference to it in Charles Silberman's

room .
1)

I

Crisis in the Class-

There were some obviously striking aspects to this discovery:

had taught for two years in a school immediately after a $U50,000

project had left, and I had not even heard of the project;

2)

far from

being a "demonstration school," JHS 57 in my experience seemed to be one
of the most dismally ineffective schools I had ever been in.
I
‘

began a preliminary investigation, speaking with the Director

of the Clinic ‘for Learning, with the District Superintendent of the local

school district, with the Principal of the school, with several adminis)

trators and teachers who had been involved, and

I

project literature that was made available to me.

began pouring over the
Almost everyone

tacted was willing to speak to me at greater length.

I

con-

Emotions still ran

spoke of the
high; what was remarkable was the extent to which people

"bitter," or "infuriClinic experience in personal terms, as"painful," or

ating," or "tragic."

to put
It seemed as if only a very few had paused

struggled for deeper understandthe Clinic experience in perspective, or
ing, or searched for underlying causes.

It was as if when the Clinic

it completely, .and the jangended, most of those involved had forgotten

and frustrations had lain suppressed
ling resentments" and angers and fears

f

u

and dormant for five years.

As nearly as I could figure, there were

three manor explanations for the "failure” of the Clinic, which different

people highlighted differently, but which everyone more or less agreed
on: 1) teachers had been resistant to change due to their '‘entrenched”
;

attitude about learning, and adminstrators had been "intransigent” in

dealing with Clinic proposals for change;

2)

the Clinic staff was inexperi

enced, cloaked in "ivory towerisms," and didn't really understand how a
.

New York City public school functioned; and

3) the

Clinic had failed to

consult the community before coming to JHS 57 and when the community dis-

covered this they expelled the Clinic.
These explanations seemed inadequate.

There were certain assump-

tions which I held about teachers and students at JHS 57, assumptions
forged in the fires of two years' effort to introduce my own miniscule

.

change program, which did not square with these interpretations of the

Clinic’s demise.

There were no teachers, it seemed to me, who were

consciously trying to fail or who would refuse to adopt practises or
.

<7

technioues which they felt would help the students achieve at higher
/levels.

All. or at least most, of the teachers would have preferred to

see JHS 57 as a "school of unusual merit."

And though I knew that teach-

ers as a group were complainers, self-servers, rigidly "practical,"

enmeshed in the trivial rush of daily affairs, with little of the detachment that allows one to be both a participant and an observer in life
processes, and for whom teaching "rewards" had been all but supplanted

by tho^e pecuniary

despite it all,

I

knew they were only people, as

world.
are we all, with their own ^problems and ways of looking at the

somehow
It seemed petty to suggest that the failure of the Clinic was

their "fault," because they "resisted change."

It seemed equally unfair

-5

to "blame" an intransigent administration, which was everyday involved

in crises of all sizes and shapes, and which was responsible to parents,

to the teachers union, to the central administration, to the students,
and to themselves.

Nor was it satisfactory to label the Clinic staff

f

"dilettantish," for nothing came easy in JHS £ 7 and it seemed to me that
to "teach" the teachers how to run a better school was no less arduous

than "teaching" seventh grade Science or ninth grade English: understandP

4

ing the needs of the learner, accepting the values and attitudes of the
learner, identifying the most basic, hence most powerful motivators,

using cautious guidance, cautious evaluation, structured to the situation,
gently pushing to fulfill learning goals.
case.
.

Not a simple task, in either

The facts would show that the Clinic staff was not especially

inexperienced, and to argue that the Clinic failed because they didn’t

"understand the school situation" was satisfactory only on the most
superficial level.
Finally, I was convinced that had the Clinic for Learning result-’^
ed in significantly higher reading scores for JHS

5>7

students, the com-

J

consultation notwithinunity would have been overjoyed, lack of previous
standing.

Many people then and many people today believe that "learn-

Clinic could have
ing disabilities" must be "compensated" for, and if the

done that, the community would have been satisfied.

The fact that the

then, could not be
Clinic became the "enemy" of most community groups,

of the Clinic to involve
explained solely by the failure of the planners

community groups.

with the comThe story of the Clinic's confrontation

make sense if set within the conmunity, it seemed to me, would only

community control that occurred in
text of the city.-wide movement for
the middle and late

1

960 s
’

I

could observe that in September, 1971,

r

6

the newly empowered community school board had brought
a black principal

to JHS 57, had conducted a highly successful nationwide
search for black

teachers, and was beginning to apply pressure directly on the
classroom

level .

These events had followed. the city vide teachers’ strike over

OceanHill -Brownsville, which had followed temporally the Clinic for
Learning.

The implications of this were too strong to ignore.

I

at

-JHS

57*

knew from experience that certain limited changes were possible
I

had had mock trials, done role playings, and arranged

community interviews with my classes.

Mr. Kalina had introduced "human-

istic” exercises into the guidance curriculum.

Mr. Blackett was a highly

successful, in terms of students’ achievements and students' respect, if

highly traditional, Math teacher whom no "educational reformer" in his
.right mind would try to change.

Miss Williams was an extremely bright

and energetic Science teacher who tried valiantly to introduce the in-

quiry approach into Science classrooms.

Mr. Lefkowitz, Social Studies

department chairman, encouraged all kinds of experimentation from his
teachers.

Mr. Fischer brought students to his house on many weekends,
Mr. Zorfass

paid to take them to Coney Island or up the Hudson River.

knew that there was beauty in literature, and he held plays, readings,
exercises to involve his students in literature and in producing their
own

li'ter ature

.

And more.

I

knew that if the school were staffed with

conscientious, imaginative people such as these it would be a different
place.

It hadn't occurred to me that there was no conceivable way that

JHS 57, District 16, New York City Board of Education, 1970, would ever

be staffed with more than a handful of such people.

But

I

held to the

belief that with jproper training, facilities and assistance, more teachers
could be made to function with more creativity, more skill, more enthu-

t

7

siasm, and with more success than previously.

I

thought that the Clinic

Learning, with the sizable financial and human resources which were
available to it, should have had some positive impact on the school,

which would eventually result in increased learnings for the students.

My assumption, then, was that the Clinic could have succeeded in improving the instructional process, and that interventions of this type, or
similar type, are feasible.
In the first stages of investigation, my chief task was recreating

the reality of the Clinic for Learning.

I

found myself more concerned

with "what happened" than "why or how did it happen."

My questions

focused on specific incidents, on personal experiences, and less on in-

terpretations.

But understandably, nearly everyone was eager to express

his own version of why the Clinic "failed" (a conclusion on which most

people seemed to agree)

.

The various explanations only reconfirmed my

earlier skepticism about the shallowness of understanding.

First, many

people had adopted a kind of "personality theory" to explain the Clinic:
Clinic staff people would say to me, there was no way to work with a
J

teacher like Miss

;

teachers would say certain members of the Clinic

staff were incompetent; a high administration official at New York University even suggested that the Clinic would have succeeded if the Project

Director had not been involved.

No doubt personalities were important

in the life of the Clinic, but it seemed clear to me that a study based

have
on personalities would be of little use to anyone, and that I would
expenditures
to fociSs on specific policies and programs and decisions and
i.e. on observable behaviors

—

if the study was to be of any value.

for LearnSecondly, the issue at hand was not why did the Clinic

ing succeed or

‘fail,

but what could we learn from studying it.

To make

1

8

sense of the Clinic for Learning would require integrating the facts and

causes and effects of the Clinic into the body of knowledge which makes

up the disciplines of behavioral and social science.

Format of Study - Sub -Problems
As I proceeded, I came to see that a study of the Clinic could

serve the furtherance of knowledge in a quite profound way.
,

It became

clear that the Clinic for Learning had been based on four hypothetical
propositions, some of which may even rightly be called "theories, " derived from different branches of behavioral science.

Indeed, one who

reads the initial proposal for change, with no knowledge of the outcome,

might well be optimistic about the prospects for success.
to be as true in 1972 as it was in 1966.

that Mario Fantini, chief urban

I

believe this

Surely, it was on this basis

educational officer at the Ford Founda-

tion, Bernard Donovan, Superintendent of the New York City Public School

System, and Daniel E. Griffiths, Dean of the New York University School
of Education, proffered their support to the planners of the Clinic for

Learning.

I

saw that in a sense a case study of the Clinic for Learning

could generate information that would tend to verify or disaffirm or

modify these propositions; the Clinic for Learning in effect could serve
call "the
as a laboratory in which what the Project Director would later
be
collective wisdom of our profession for the past twenty years" could

tested.
$.

field of
Two of the propositions derived from the expanding

developed large"organizational behavior and change/' a branch of inquiry
such names as Warren 0.
ly in an industrial setting and associated with

Bennis, Chris Argyris, and Rensis Likert.

There appeared to be in the

9

past several years a proliferation of efforts trying to make the
theorems and related learnings of this science available to education
institutions.

To the extent that schools and factories were alike in
o
C

their organizational characteristics, it was felt the transfer of knowledge from one field to another would be an advantageous one.

i

Roughly,

the two propositions upon which the Clinic for Learning relied heavily

were
*.

—
—

—

Effective change in organizations
1)
i.e. schools
is
facilitated by the full participation of those most directly involved in the change
i.e. the teachers
in all decision making processes which affect them.

—

The leadership style employed by outside “change agents"
2)
should be characterized by, a.) a concern for the intellectual
and emotional, needs of the clients
i.e. administration, teachers, and students; b.) allowing clients responsibility, challenging tasks, opportunities for maturity; and c.) the creation of a
non-threatening climate which will allow for personal growth (of
teachers). In theoretical terms, this means a high relationship,
and moderately low task leadership behavior.

—

I

A third proposition upon which the Clinic relied is drawn from
-

what might be called the field of "social foundations of urban education," which roughly includes all the writing and research which bear on
J

the problems of education in the "inner city"

—

specifically, the educa-

tion of blacks and Puerto Ricans and other racial minorities.
Although, as I shall demonstrate, this proposition relies less
on hard research findings than on sociological inquiry, it appears in my

experience to be widely agreed upon.

It is:

Parents and community groups in inner cities must be
given broader opportunities to participate in the life of the
3)

scfiool

The correlate upon which the Clinic rested was:
increased
The Clinic for Learning could act as a catalyst for
involvement by parents and community.
3a)

r

50

The final proposition upon which the' Clinic was based is derived
from the broader fields of sociology and anthropology as they relate to

education.

There is a tremendous amount of writing and research which

<

supports this premise:
lj)
If education in inner cities is to be effective, where
it is not now effective, the living conditions around the child,
his total environment, must undergo corresponding changes.

The all-important correllary of this proposition was:
l:a)
The public school can be used as a lever to effect
changes in a child's total environment.

There were other assumptions that impinged on these four.

For

example, that individualized instruction is better than classroom inj

struction; that the traditional role of the teacher is outmoded; that the

curriculum should be "relevant” to the life of the learner; that every
child is oossessed of instinctive curiosity and motivation; that "satura|

ting" the school environment with concerned adults will positively affect
the child's self-image.

And, of course, JHS 57 is not a laboratory,

other things are never "enual," and the data which I hope to bring to

/bear on the above hypotheses will not be conclusive.

However, because

they are such widely and currently held premises, it seems to me that any
attempt to determine their efficacy in an actual situation will stand as
a useful contribution to the expansion of knowledge.

Additionally, not

only will this study be useful in offering evidence to bear on the pro-

positions abo*e, but

I

hope as well that it will be a unique forum from

which dew hypotheses can be generated.
range of
As can be seen, the four propositions reflect a wide
highly controlled
scientific credibility: the first two can be tested in
vociferously, but it
and definitive wavs; the latter two can be argued

f

11

is not likely they will ever be proven or disproven conclusively.

This

amalgam of strictly theoretical and non -theoretical points of view reflects both the panorama of designs that spawned the Clinic for Learn-

<

ing and the various levels on which social change projects can be evaluated. Specifically, this study deals with three levels of educational

change: in the classroom, in the community, and in the society.

To a

1

!

greater or lesser degree, Clinic planners sought to use the public
schools to effect change on all three levels.

Though certainly the levels

are interrelated, I have chosen to evaluate them separately, hoping this

will be instructive for future innovation: it is crucially important,

I

!

believe,9 that educational reformers know precisely what level they are
V

on.

Similarly, the success of educational reform has to be measured in
i

terms of the goals of the reformers.

For this reason, it is important

that the levels of change be kept separate in the reader's mind.

For

example, a reformer who has successfully implemented a new Social Studies

curriculum can hardly be faulted for failing to alter basic economic interrelationships in the society.

At the same time, one who seeks to

fulbuild a "new social order" by using the schools is only partially

Advisory
filled if his efforts result in the formation of a Parents
j

Council
was ineffecBriefly, I shall argue that the Clinic for Learning
in relevant decision making
tive in involving teachers and administrators

counterproductive leaderprocesses, and that they provided sterile and
"

ship.

Clinic would have
Had these tasks been performed skillfully, the

been more successful on the classroom level.

Indeed, the Clinic for

place for students, teachers
Learning could have made JHS 57 a "better"
and administrators.

efforts to
I shall argue that Clinic

build a

f

12

"community school," which could have resulted in
greater community and

parent involvment in school affairs, failed because of
poor planning,
cultural ignorance, and an untouchable school bureaucracy,
as well as

«

certain fundamental political and economic realities that existed
out'

i

side the school.

I shall further

pose the question as to the bare possi-

bility that the Clinic staff, as outside interventionists, could have
'
.

|

|

succeeeded at all on this level.

Finally, I shall argue that the Clinic's

intention of reaping broad social reform evidences a gross mi sunder stand
I

ing of the sociology of American public education, and a false and utopian
*

hope for educational reform in general.
From this, it can be seen that the planners of the Clinic for

Learning possessed for themselves a large vision, so large and unwieldy
that it far outstripped the means at their disposal.

blunted time after time, on each and every front.

Their efforts were

Yet change projects

similar to the Clinic, incorporating at least part of its design, begin

anew every day, and shall no doubt continue as long as there are men and

women who profess to be educators and who abhor social and educational

/
injustice.

Though the Clinic for Learning was a near total failure, it

is my hope to illuminate the travails of the individuals involved, in
t
I

order that we all might draw some meaning from their struggle.

*

:

/

*•*
-

•
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Chapter

1

THEORETICAL SUPPORT FOR AND EVIDENCE THAT
THE CLINIC INTENEED TO RELY ON THE PROPOSITIONS

Proposition #1 - Participation of Teachers in Decision Making
The classic study on subordinate participation in decision
"

making, which highlights most bibliographies in the field of organiza-

tional change, was conducted by Coch and French

pajama factory.

( 1

9U8) in an American

They found that when employees were involved in deci-

sions as to how a new work system would be implemented, their producti-

vity increased and absenteeism and grievances decreased.
studies have reached similar conclusions.

Other industrial

Guest (i960) found that

successful change was a function of increased responsibility for employees

in decisions which affected them directly.

Morse and Reimer (1956) found

that strict directives from superiors tended to reduce the effectiveness
of work groups.

J

Warren Bennis, the chief architect of the concept of

"planned organizational change," stresses that employee participation is
crucial for heightened employee morale, which in turn facilitates adoption
!

of innovative practises.

(1961; 1966.)

Educators have sought to verify these principles in an educational
setting, with less precision in research strategy but equally favorable

results.

Chase (1952) in a questionnaire study involving eighteen hundred

teachers found that "teachers who report opportunity to participate
to be
regularly and actively in decision making policies are more likely

limited
enthusiastic about their school systems than those who report

13

r

11*

opportunity to participate.'*

(p.l*.)

Sharma. (1955) in a similar study

showed that teacher satisfaction was related
directly to the extent of

participation in decision making.

Bridges (196U) found that teachers

preferred principals who involved them in decision making.
i

.

Goodwin

Watson (1967), a leader in the field of planned educational
change, has
found ttat resistance to change is less “if participants
in the change

process have worked together to diagnose a situation and to agree
on a
v

basic problem and to feel it is important"; also "if the goals are
adopted by consensual group decision." (p.23.)
There is some disagreement as to the optimal degree of teacher
involvement.

Some authors believe that participation is necessary

throughout the total change process (Oliver, 1965; Trump, 1967), while

others believed participation should be restricted to specific decisions,
for example, defining the need for change.
1961.)

(National Ele. Principal,

Bridges (1967) has offered two guidelines to aid administrators

in determining which decisions properly involve teacher participation:
1)

the test for relevance, i.e. do the teachers have a high personal

stake and concern in the decision, and

2)

the test for expertise, i.e.

does the teacher have the competence to contribute to the decision mak-

ing process.
3)

Owens (1970) has added a third test for involving teachers:

the test of jurisdiction, i.e. does the teacher have the requisite

authority to implement their decisions.
Advocates of industrial and education change efforts generally
agree on the value of an "outside consultant," although this has rarely

been put to rigorous testing (and is probably indicative of the fact that
"outside consultants" write the books and do the research).
1971; Bennis, 1966: Miles, 1959.)

(Argyris,

It is believed that an outsider can

1

15

effectively set up a "temporary social system," where
employees are less

likely to be impeded by former role expectations, which
can facilitate
the process of "unfreezing" and make subordinate participation
even
more effective.

(Miles, 196k.)
r

I

There is, then, considerable support for involving teachers in
the decision making processes of a change project like the New York

University Clinic for Learning, although there appears to be some disagreement as to the limits of that involvement.
The staff and planners of the Clinic for Learning shared the

concern that participation by teachers in decisions affecting them was
crucial for success.

As the Project Director said later:

The most important breakthrough in the planning stages was
in our heads when we asked ourselves, Well, what exactly should
we do out there? Ron, Stan, Judy
you know we talked 8-10
hours a day working on the question what do you do? And it was
clear no one plan would work. . . We built a cluster system so we
could plan with teachers. Why? Because it's an intelligent
change process. Because people have to be involved in what
they’re going to do. We weren't going to plan anything for
anybody, because we think that won't work. I'm even more sure
of that than before. So we set up a system of planning for
planning.

—

1

/

The first major written communication between the Clinic for

Learning and the regular JHS 57 staff in September, 1966, stressed
that:

The personnel of each cluster under the guidance of the
Coordinator of Instruction will continuously plan all aspects
of the educational program for the children including:
1 . What shall be taught
Who shall teach what and in
2.
*
what context
3. How to involve the New York
University Students and in
what Educational Roles .
Coordinators,
The written statements of introduction of the six Cluster
groups
who were to act essentially as "outside consultants" working with
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of teachers, shew a similar concern for staff involvement in all major
3

decision making processes.

For example, "Let's work it out together on

the basis of what you think should be done, what you think you can do

best, and what we can do to make it possible and effective."

Another

wrote? “The entire curriculum... will be developed by alt the members
of the Cluster, for it is they who are in the best position to make

important cluster decisions."

A third: "The role of each teacher within

the cluster will be developed by the teacher himself.... the standards

devised to determine the success or failure of the cluster... will be

determined by the teachers."

A fourth asked; "Can we, as a team, either

create or adapt procedures or strategies which will optimize our chances
of achieving ([success)?"

Another: "The teachers will individually and

in cooperation with other teachers and specialists construct and apply
any new ideas that evolve."

Another said later: "The Cluster was designed

to give teachers support, to free the environment, to give them a chance
to work on new methods."

Subsequent conversations with these and other

Clinic for Learning staff members indicate that one of the central tenets

upon which the Clinic depended was that teachers should be involved in
all decisions which affected them in a direct way, i.e., all matters

having to do with curriculum, teaching style, relationships with students,
and other classroom activities.

Proposition #2

-

Leadership behavior of outside consultants should be
high relationship, low task.

ft

relied on
In the area of leadership, the Clinic for Learning
industrial setting. Accordprinciples that also had their genesis in an
the process of influencing
ing to most definitions, leadership involves

common goals.
others to strive toward achievement of

(Terry, I960;

f
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Koontz and O'Donnell, 1959*)

Most theorists of "organizational behavior"

argue that there are essentially two dimensions of leader behavior, con-

cern for task and concern for relationship.

Blanchard (1969) defines

"task oriented behavior" as:

*.

The extent to which a leader is likely to organize and
define the relationship between himself and the members
of his group (followers); characterized by a tendency to
define the role which he expects each member of the group
to assume, endeavoring to establish well-defined patterns
or organization, channels of communication, and ways of
getting jobs done. (p. 7iiHe defines "relationships oriented behavior" as:

The extent to which a leader is likely to maintain
personal relationships between himself and the member of
his group (followers); characterized by socio-emotional
support, such as friendship, mutual trust, respect for
followers' ideas, consideration for their feelings, (p.7l?)
Three widely acclaimed books in the early 1960's suggested that

industrial leadership behavior was characterized to a large extent by
a "high task" orientation, and that such behavior not only tended to

diminish opportunities of employees for responsible and meaningful work,

but had a long term negative effect on production as well.

Douglas

McGregor, in The Human Side of Enterprise, fl96o} advanced the now
famous Theory X/Theory Y dichotomy and suggested that if employees were

treated as if they were competent individuals and allowed more freedom
and self
to be self-directing, they would, in fact, become more competent

directing.

Rensis Likert, in New Patterns of Management, ^! 96l> offered

those who were
evidence to show that the most effective managers were
>

shifts in employee

concerned with

l)

productivity and attitudes,

attitudes, and

3)

employees
applying minimum hierarchical pressure on

to increase production.

2)

and
Chris Argyris, in Interpersonal Competence

most management
Organizational Effectiveness, (19621 believed that

practises encourage employees to be obedient, docile,
uninvolved, and
immature; given opportunity for growth, Argyris said,
employees would
grow.

Taken together, these arguments constituted a strong push
for

decreasing the amount of "task" oriented leader- behavior in
industry
and increasing the amount of "relationship" oriented behavior. Roughly,
it could be said that these authors were arguing for more "democratic"

leader behavior and less "autocratic" leader behavior. (See Lewin,
Lippit, and White, 1939.)
Here, as well, educators have made ample use of the theorems of

industrial leadership.

Sinclair (1968) argues that current strategies

for fostering change "challenge the rationality of highly directive

leadership."

"Leadership for the innovative principal," he writes, "is

a process of stimulating and aiding groups of teachers to determine

common objectives and to voluntarily design means for moving toward
their achievement."

(pp.32-3.)

Goodwin Watson (1967) suggests that

effective leadership will encourage "acceptance, support, trust, and
confidence" between members of the work group.

Gross

(1971)

has argued

persuasively that leadership is the "single most important factor" in
determining the success of educational reforms.

Bennis

( 1

96U) contends

that effective leadership for change in any organizational setting requires building "interdependencies and shared responsibility," and "conflict resolution through bargaining."

(p.309.)

The leadership style of the staff of the Clinic for Learning was

characterized by a high concern for relationships.

Numerous statements

by Clinic staff members about the Project Director indicate that he was
"non-directive," had great faith in people's ability to "solve their own
direct
problems," was supportive of others' initiative, and seldom gave
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orders.

One Cluster Coordinator said: "(He)
believes the goodness of
%

•

‘

people will out, in the proper environment...
if only he could free
teachers, who were good, to do some of the good
things they would do if

they were free." 14

leader *"
}

Another characterized him as "a kind of laissez
faire

The structure of the Cluster, it was made clear from
the be-

ginning, was to be administered in a "democratic"
manner.

Preliminary

statements from NYU Cluster Coordinators, along with the previously
cited
,

statements having to do with teacher participation in decision-making
a basic characteristic of a high relationship -low task leader

ment their leadership intention.

—

—

docu-

"As you can see, our Cluster requires

a deep personal commitment to the values of human relationships in a

major social effort."

Another: "What we do, above all, should be as new

and as daring as each teacher can allow himself to be."

As a Cluster,

another wrote, we will "try to implement all those feelings and thoughts
that have been stuck away in the back of our heads."

Another wrote of

the central need for developing "closer relationships" with students and

other teachers.'*

Only one Cluster Coordinator was inclined toward a

slower relationship-higher task leadership style, but he was convinced by
the others to adapt.

Later he said, "The assumption of the others was
.

that you can't ram a program down people's throats; and that the potential for growth was in the teachers."

6

Statements of Clinic planners and Cluster Coordinators indicate
that although they did have specific ideas as to how the school should

change^ there was little tendency to "define role expectations," “establish well-defined patterns of organization," or dictate "ways of getting
jobs done."

That is, there was little evidence that Clinic staff intended

to use high task leadership.

One Cluster leader wrote of thirteen anthro-

20

pological topics which he hoped "by the end of the seventh
grade our students will have inquired into."

But he suggests no group or individual

tasks, no group or individual roles, no pattern of group organization.

After suggesting a number of possible activities, he finishes by saying

teachers will make all the decisions related to their interests and needs.
The introductory statement of another Coordinator indicates great concern
for the child as a person and makes suggestions concerning the inquiry

method of teaching.
going to do in class?

His last paragraph begins: "But what are we actually
the group, he finishes, will decide.

Another

points to the importance of on-going teacher-student dialogue, talks
about various teaching strategies which "can be envisioned," and concludes

with a quote concerning effective teaching.

There is no suggestion that

tasks or roles of teachers be further clarified.

The one Coordinator who

tended toward higher task presented his design for a "language oriented"

Cluster very affirmatively.

The ambivalence of his position is illustra-

c

ted by his concluding paragraph: "The teachers will work together planning
materials, strategies, units of study and programs."

Still another

Cluster Coordinator talks in general about learning and handling children
and his summary conclusion includes: "It is hoped that the Qluster set-

up will enable the teacher to concentrate his effort, assume greater responsibility for his own and fellow students’ behavior."

There is in

this statement one indication of high task behavior: "All teachers in
the Cluster will be given steno books and carbon paper and will be expec-

ted to keep a log of highlights of each day."

In all of the introductory

statements this is the only specific task that is mentioned.

7

must be
Proposition #3 * Parents and community groups in inner cities
life of
the
in
participate
given broader opportunity to
the school.

»
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Proposition #3a - The Clinic for Learning could act as a catalyst
for
increased involvement by parents and community.
In September, 1966, when the Clinic for Learning came to JHS
57,
& controversy was swirling in another part of New York City which re-

soundingly defined the need for community involvement in the public
schools.

Of dourse, parent and community support have always been con-

sidered a prereouisite for effective schooling (Dewey, 1915), but it was

only in the early 1960's that attention was brought to the vast gaps that
separated public school bureaucracies in large cities from their black

and Puerto Rican constituents.

(Schrag, 1967.)

As Michael Katz (1971)

.

has shown, centralization in public education has produced uniformity of
curriculum, standards, hiring, and promotional practises which has almost

totally insulated inner city schools from inner city parents and com-

munity interests.

Now, in the fall of 1966, picket lines ringed Inter-

mediate School 201, demonstrators scuffled with police, while parent
groups demanded the resignation of the principal.
For three years the controversy stirrounding the location, con-

/ struction, and curriculum of I.S. 201 in Harlem had escalated to an unprecendented degree.

Following central board decisions, curriculum was

to stress Negro and Puerto Rican culture, there were to be after school

courses and activities for young people and adults, and "full-time com-

munity relations specialists to encourage closer parent and citizen involvement in the school program."
f

Fantini, et al>(1970, p.5«)

when
The loudest parent demand, however, was for integration; but

would foreit became clear that housing patterns and white resistance
still more power
close all hope of a desegregated school, parents sought
o

exclusively.
over the school that would now serve their children

But

matters, said
authorizing community control over financial and personnel

,
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the central board, would violate state law; and althou^i
the Super-

intendent of Schools assured community groups they could choose a
new
principal, the central board refused to allow it. (Rogers,
1968, p.367.)
In response, parents called a school boycott and for ten days in Septem-

ber, 1966, the new school remained closed.

The controversy reemerged

sporatically over the next several years, but the central issue remained
the same: parents wanted more effective schools; they felt those in power
-

had failed their children.
.

|

A widely read and quoted article appeared in the July 1966
issue of The Urban Review

,

written by a black educator familiar with the

Harlem community, which both analyzed the dynamics of the I.S. 201 confrontation and provided a model for improved school -community relations,

without relying on integration (Wasserman, 1970).

He proposed the estab-

lishment of a "community school," functioning as a community center, and
as an after school center for tutorial work, discussions of community

problems, and various cultural events.

/

He concluded:

What this experimental program offers is the possibility
that, in at least one school in one community, the school
administrators and teachers will be made accountable to the
community, and the community made obligated to them in such
a way that responsibility for successes and failures is
shared. In the process, one can expect the school in the
ghetto to become what schools in more privileged areas are,
a reflection of local interests and resources, instead of a
(Wilcox, 1966, p.12.)
subtle rejection of them.
The article established a paradigm school -community alliance.
The New York State Legislature no doubt had a similar paradigm in mind

when it directed the Mayor of New York in 1967 to establish a committee
to study the feasibility of decentralization.

"Increased commun ity aware-

in the educaness," read the legislative directive, "and participati on
/

ational innovation
tional proces s is essential to the furtherance of educ

r
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and excellence in the public school system of the City of Nev York

8
.

(emph. added.

Later in 1967, the Mayor's committee, headed by McGeorge Bundy, produced
a report on decentralization entitled, significantly, "Reconnection for

Learning."

They wrote, "... in New York the malaise of parents is

v
|

heightened by their increasing disability to obtain redress or response
to their concerns."

9

Their proposals were intended to "reconnect" the

school and the community.

As a result of the Bundy Report, and with

a

added funding from the Ford Foundation, three "experimental districts"
-

•

1

were established to test out the viability of increased community responsibility and control in the educational process.

Without dwelling

on the details of the celebrated confrontation at OceanHill-Brownville,

which pitted forces of community control against the power brokers of
traditional school alignments, it is enough to indicate that the great

majority of educational observers see some form of increased community
involvement in schools not only as beneficial, but inevitable.
et al, 1970: Gittel, 1967: Levin, 1970.)

(Fantini,

In Washington, D.C., Philadel-

phia, Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles, and elsewhere, central school boards
are seeking to make schools more responsive to communities and parents

are demanding decision making powers.

(Miller and Woock, 1970, p.388.)

In 1969, the New York State Legislature passed a bill setting up thirtyone community school boards in New York City with certain limited re-

sponsibilities in the areas of staffing and curriculum development.
is doubtful that the community control issue will end here.

It

The principle

schools
of increased community participation in the life of the public
of sorts in
gained in support through the 1960's, reaching a crescendo

it apparent that
the summer and fall of 1966 in New York City, and making

children and what the
the gap between what communities wanted for their

school system provided, was too wide to ignore.

For many other urban

communities today, the struggle for community control has just begun.
_It was on this basis” that the planners of the Clinic for Learning
advanced community development as one of the/fcentral foci. The;

initial

Project Proposal stated:,
I

The Clinic for Learning will become a community school in the
middle of the urban slumm...
fthe Clinic for Learning] will create
a school and a community involvement that both educates lay people
in the community for better jobs and maximizes the use of their
knowledge, know-how and talent for the education of their children. The parents of disadvantaged children and the urban communities in which they live clearly need more attention from the
school then they now receive. in
10

.1

The first communication between the Clinic and the staff of JHS 57 in
September, 1966, reiterated this intent:
t

We are in the process of interviewing four Community CoordinaWhen selected, these men and women who share insights,
backgrounds and needs of the people in the community will be
the personnel for beginning a new kind of inter-relationship
between the school and the community.^
tors.

A community coordinator was to work with every Cluster, maintain close

contact with parents, planning community activities in the school, and

facilitating parent involvement in the educational process.

A major

communication from the Project Director to the staff of JHS £7 in December, 1966, again placed heavy emphasis on community involvement.

The

community agents, the paper read, "are proceeding step by step toward
relating the efforts of the Clinic and school toward making JHS 57 a com-

munity school.

In the best sense of the word, we are already involved in

ir

many school -community activities."

One of the original community agents

connection between
said later: "Our job was to organize and facilitate the
the community’s interests and the school’s interests."

Looking back

school -community
on the experience, the Project Director saw closer

interaction as a clearly desirable goal, supported by "all the conventional wisdom" of the profession.

y

"Sure," the Project Director said,

"the Clinic was an attempt to use the school system to reach the broader

population.
all

—

We said

—

and

I

don't see this as being controversial at

I

that the school should serve the community""13

Subsequent conversations with other community agents, Clinic personnel, teachers and administrators of JHS 57, and outside observers

indicate conclusively that a large part of the Clinic effort was based
on the proposition that parents and community should be brought closer

into the life of the school.

Proposition

-

If education is to be effective, in a case where it is
now ineffective, the total environment surrounding the
child must be affected in a positive way.

Proposition #Ua - The public school can act as a tool for beginning to
change the total environment.
Since the advent of mass public education in the United States,

through testing and research, it has become virtually axiomatic that a

child's success in school is somehow related to the cultural and familial

influences on his life.

The dimensions and extent of this relationship

are subjects of continuous controversy, but not even scholars of genetics

deny that environment plays a significant role in determing intelligence.
(Jensen, 1969.)

Nor do geneticists, or anyone else, argue that intelli-

school; values,
gence is the sole determinant of "success" in a public
,
and a host of
family support, Deer interaction, "hidden curriculums “

child all affect the
other factors bearing on the total environment of a

life of a child in school.

Throughout the 1960's an immense amount of

students, for whatever readata has shown that black and Puerto Rican

achievement tests as their
sons, do not score as well on standardized

middle -class, mostly white counterparts.

The entire thrust of compen-

satory education has been to improve on this performance by "compensating" for the purportedly "damaging" effects of the environment of lower

class children by providing extra money, programs, and resources.

Re-,

suits in most compensatory programs have been disappointing; at best,

achievement scores have been raised only slightly.

In response, many

observers have pointed out that compensatory education did not take into
account that successful schooling is dependent on more tham ju3t the five
or six hours per day spent in school.

(

New Republic

,

1967.)

Gordon and

Wilkerson (1966) note that most compensatory programs have put sole
emphasis on making the lower class children "fit" the middle class
school, without taking account of cultural differences.

Compensatory

education, in effect, has been competing rather unsuccessfully with the

overall matrix of cultural influences on the lower class child.

Those

who argue for integration rest their case largely on this point:

an in-

tegrated school environment will have a larger impact on an "underachieving" child's total environment, his view of himself and his world, hence

his propensity for success will increase.

As the U.S. Commission on

Civil Rights (196?) has reported:

Yet the evidence reviewed here suggests that efforts to
improve a child's self-esteem cannot be wholly productive in
a student environment (i.a. segregated) which seems to deny
his worth... Thus, the comnensatory programs reviewed here
appear to suffer from the defect inherent in attempting to
solve oroblems stemming in part from racial and social class
isolation in schools which themselves are isolated by race and
(pp. 138-9.)
social class,
a
Numerous research efforts support the thesis that altering

more than just
child's educational opportunity demands attention to

in a school setting.
the individual student-teacher relationship

Miller

f

27

and Woock (1966) point to the writings of Allison Davis and Herbert
*

»•

J.

*

Gans to support four essential value differences between lower class

and middle class youth which bear heavily on the prospects of a lower
class student's success in school:

1)

a different time perspective, with

more emphasis on immediate problems, and less on long range planning or
goal setting; 2) a stronger orientation toward persons and interpersonal

relations than toward more remote "career" or vocational goals;

3)

a

,"weaker" self image, which tends to diminish confidence in one's own

potential and ability; and

1*)

physical agressiveness, a characteristic

product of a lower class reward and punishment scheme which relies more

heavily on physical force.

Oscar Lewis in La Vida has made famous his

theory of the "culture of poverty."

The culture of poverty, in-bred,

self-perpetuating, isolated from the dominant culture, may be found in

capitalist countries, which provide no formal means of organization for

the lower classes.

The culture of poverty is characterized by feelings

of marginality, dependence, and despair; and in many cases, Lewis notes,
these feelings are accurate reflections of reality.

In a culture of

poverty, then, a child's failure to perform well in school is related

to the "failure "of his subculture to "perform" well in the society at
large.

Prom this point of view, it follows that significantly changing

performance levels of children in a culture of poverty involves corresponding changes in the overall relationship of the subculture to the

majority culture.
*

Martin Deutsch (1963) has made popular the notion of "stimulus

deprivation" in lower class homes.

He argues that success in schools de-

normally acquired
pends largely on certain cognitive skills which are not

in lower class homes.

distinguish
Thus, the middle class child learns to

28

shapes, sizes, colors, he learns the art of memorizing, and he learns
i

how to relate to adults as resources to a greater extent than the lower
class child.

Again, it is apparent that affecting the life of the

child in school requires attendance to these "facts of life" in the
child's total world.
Basil Bernstein has shown that lower class families engage in a
"restricted" language pattern.

Ideas are not clarified; imperatives are

not explained; distinctions are not made.

This language pattern, Bern-

stein suggests, makes abstract thinking, which is a sine qua non of
school success, difficult for the child.

Other authors have made similar

observations about the clash between family and cultural values of "dis-

advantaged students," and the largely middle class values according to

which they are often judged inadequate.

(Fantini and Weinstein, 1968.)

All of the authors mentioned share the contention that change in a lower

class child's schooling, if it is to be successful, will be greatly en-

hanced by the elimination of "hidden" value conflicts between home and
school

The planners of the Clinic for Learning were aware of the fail-

ures of compensatory education.

They were aware that the subservient

status of many blacks and Puerto Rican children vis a vis the school was

little more than a reflection of the subservient status of their parents
in the larger society.

As the Project Director wrote in an early com-

munication to the staff of JHS

5>7 ,

"It is important that we have no

illusions about the severity of the problem we face....
slum must be eradicated."

Ultimately the

The planners of the Clinic felt that through

existed in the Bedfordthe public school the culture of poverty that
be affected; that
Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn could in some small way

and economic isolation could begin
the self-perpetuating cycles of social
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to be broken.

between the

The initial project proposal spoke of the obvious link

lower class school

11

and the "lower class community"

i

If, as our society exists today, there is to be any
permanent amelioration of the plight of the impoverished
with, as the final goal, the eventual eradication of the
city slum, education must play an essential role. It has
been documented time and again that in large measure the
inadequate education of the inhabitants of these neighborhoods grievously limits the possibility for a basic improvement in their condition....

,

The typical school in a disadvantaged neighborhood in
many ways reflects the mood that exists in the slum generally. Even well prepared teachers and administrators are
overwhelmed by the pressure of the environment... We believe we can alter these circumstances.
1U

In the major communication to teachers in December, the Project
Director quotes from an article by Oscar Lewis: "It (culture of poverty}

represents an effort to cope with feelings of hopelessness and despair
that arise from the realization by the members of marginal communities

in those societies of the improbability of their achieving success in
terms of the prevailing values and goals."

The Project Director stresses

that no change can take place in the child* s learning possibilities
^without affecting his overall environment.

'-'This

matrix of people,

personalities, and significant factors in the environment including the

mood of the community originally molds the individual and then continues
to sustain him as a functioning person..."

He notes the failure of

compensatory education: "Recent reports from other compensatory education
programs indicate that little, if any, lasting effects in achievement
some very
levels Qf disadvantaged students have been affected, despite

strong efforts in various parts of the country. ...

It is my contention

the childV’^
that we can succeed if we change the setting around

(emphasis added.)
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The Clinic strategy was to affect the total school
environment
by_" saturating" the school with supportive, communicative,
concerned
adults.
T

An altered school environment, they believed, would
have some
—

impact on the total environment of the child.

•?

The original proposal

stressed the use of "preprofessional personnel" -- i.e. undergraduate
i

and graduate students from New York University

—

"in dynamic relation-

ship" with the Clinic staff and the regular JHS 57 staff to change the

school environment and individualize instruction.

In the first com-

munication to the JHS 57 staff in September, under a subheading of
"Major Assumptions Basic to Educational Work in JHS 57," were listed:
|

1.

The discipline, general behavior, reading and general
competence of the students cannot be positively changed
without a great deal of individual attention, both in
class and non-class situations.

2.

Positively motivated New York University students in
association with trained teachers can make it possible
to provide highly individualized quality education for
the Junior High School students.^

The "saturation" strategy was again stressed by the Project in the

December, 1966 memorandum to teachers:

It is our plan to progressively surround the child with
positively oriented people who care about him and his learning, in ways deliberately arranged to make their particular
talents effective with the child.

The Clinic for Learning, in short, was designed not to suffer from
the same oversights as previous compensatory programs.

The intent of

the Clinic was bo deal, in a sophisticated way, with the child as a

whole person in a total environment, not simply as an entity that would
or would not perform well on a standardized achievement test.

t
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^Interview, Project Director, July 16, 1972.
2

Clinic paper, "From Here On..." p.U.
•

3

Clinic paper, "Preliminary Statements of Cluster Coordinators,"
September, 1966.
^Interview, Cluster Coordinator

1,

July 23, 1971.

Clinic Paper, "Preliminary Statements of Cluster Coordinators,"
September, 1966.
^Interview, Cluster Coordinator

2,

August 3, 1971.

7

Clinic paper, "Preliminary Statements of Cluster Coordinators,"
September, 1966.
^McKinney’s, 1967, Session Laws of New York, Ch.l$H.

^Mayor's Advisory Commission on Decentralization of the New
York City Schools. Reconnection for Learnin g. New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1969, p.1.

^Clinic paper, Project Proposal, p.1.
^Clinic paper, "From Here One..." p.£.

y
^Interview, Community Agent

1,

January 28, 1972.

^Interview, Project Director, July

16,

1971.

Ill,

Clinic paper, Project Proposal, pp.1-2.

^Clinic paper, "Perspective at Christmas Time," December,
1966, pp.3-li.
*

^Clinic paper, "From Here On..." p.1.

^Clinic paper, "Perspective at Christmas Time," p.6.

\ \
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Chapter 2

RESEARCH METHODS

When

I determined to write about the Clinic for Learning it was

apparent that the case study wa3 the only research methodology available
to me.
*•

I

had not been involved in the project and the simple matter of

collecting information was an obvious obstacle.

A case study would pro-

vice me, first, with the greatest possible amount of data about the
Clinic, which could then be focused toward specific hypothetical concerns
and used to draw attention to new interpretations and new hypotheses.
As Katz (1953) has written: The case study method is designed to "utilize

to the full the advantage of seeing the situation as a whole and of

attempting to grasp fundamental relationships." (p.75«)

Smith and

Geoffrey (1968) say: "... our observations make us privy to an immense
number of sequences of events.

As we try to shape these into empirical
Gross, et al (1971)

and conceptual order, hypotheses arise." (p.26l.)

adopted the case study approach to permit "in-depth observations of the
several aspects of the dynamics of an effort to institute planned change.

The case study as well would allow me to focus on the more sociological

dynamics which interested me (Propositions 3 and

1*

above)

.

Only by first

recreating the overall seouence of events and interactions could

I

hope

educational "into extract insights which might prove useful to future

no vat or s."
disadvantage.
In using the case" study approach I was at a decided

»

**

J
I
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The rate of teacher turnover at the school was very high and

that few Clinic teachers were left.

I

suspected

The community was transient and I

knew it would be difficult to contact many students or parents who had
been involved.

Thirdly, I had discovered that Some of the Clinic staff

\

members were no longer in New York, and some were out of the country.
Finally, I knew that although I would have access to most of the avail-

able literature that passed between the Clinic and the school, there had
been little effort by Clinic staff to document their experience and much
of the interchange was carried out by phone or private conversations.

This was in the spring of

By chance

I

1

971

had recently finished T. Harry Williams brilliant

biography of Huey Long, which relied on the research technique of "oral
history."

Those who convinced Mr. Williams to adopt this technique "were

concerned with preserving the history of the recent past.... but they

emphasized that to do the job properly, a new research technique would
have to be utilized, the tape recorded interview with persons still living.

Thi s technique was necessary because of the impact of

nology on communications."

modem tech-

In this way, historians could "rescue a

history that would otherwise disappear."

The history of the Clinic for

Learning, as a monumental effort to change American education, it seemed
to me, was already in grave danger of disappearing.

Clinic
An initial search revealed that the principle actors in the
for Learning were still available

those who funded and planned the

*

who were spokesmen for
Clinic, those who adminstered the school, those
(together with my experithe community, and enough teachers and students
JHS 97) to make sense out of
ence working with teachers and students at
\ \

the Clinic.

i

<

suggested to me tnat
The District Superintendent had himself

t

3U
a study of the "Chaos for Learning" would make a good dissertation topic.

The Project Director and the Principal of the school at the time of the
Clinic applauded my intention to study the Clinic.

I felt, then, that

the case study approach buttressed by the techniques of oral history

.

would provide a solid basis for studying the Clinic for Learning.

‘

Data Collection

At the outset, I was given free access to the complete files of
1)

the Project Director of the Clinic for Learning;

intendent of the local school district;

3)

2)

the District Super-

the then Principal of JHS 97

.

(who, in 1971, was principal of a Long Island junior high school); U) the

present Principal (in spring, 1971) of JHS 97 who had been the chief liason between the school and the Clinic.
•

Clinic staff and

As I proceeded to interview, other

97 regular teachers offered me notes, recollections,

.JHS

Clinic handouts, and other written communications they had retained since

the end of the Clinic.

In all, the written material was considerable and

provided crucial insights into the functioning of the Clime for Learning.
I conceived that there were six major groups of people that I

would have to interview in order to complete the study of the Clinic.

They were,

1)

.JHS

ministration of

with the Clinic;

97 teachers who had worked with the Clinic; 2) the ad-

-JHS

h)

9 7 ? 3) the students of

.HJS

97 who had been involved

the complete staff of the Clinic for Learning;

9)

Clinic; and
parents and community leaders who had been involved with the
6)

administraother involved persons, including funding agents, higher

officials at
tors in the N.Y.C. school system and high administration

New York University.
over one hundred questions
In May of 1971, I drew up a list of well
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which covered every conceivable avenue of inquiry.

I

broke this list

down into five sub-lists, each directed at a specific sub-group, teachers, administrators, parents, students, or Clinic personnel.

considerable overlap in a number of areas.

There was

Virtually all of these ques-

tions related directly or indirectly to the four areas which appeared to
me to be crucial

teacher participation, leadership behavior of the

outside change agents, school-community relations, and the goals of the
Clinic, the school, and the parents

although they were not conceptu-

alized as outlined above (see the four propositions above).
In late May, 1971, I was given a regular seventh grade Social

Studies teaching program in JHS 57, and I began interviewing teachers.
I encountered some early difficulties, but not from the teachers.

At the

end of my first week, before I had begun recorded interviews, my notebook,

which contained the five lists of questions and about 25-30 pages of

written notes disappeared.

It reappeared the next day in the hands of

one of my students, my name crossed out, pages of writing and materials

removed without a sign.

Needless to say, it was a setback.

On the first

day of the third week, after completing the first three taped interviews

with teachers, my tape recorder was stolen, along with sixty minutes of
taped interviews.

Another setback.

Fortunately, the enthusiasm and

strong feelings of the teachers buoyed me.

During five weeks in May and

June, I interviewed all the teachers at JHS 57, and several who had left

the school, who had been involved in the Clinic for Learning; nearly
teachtwenty-five teachers, which accounted for about two-thirds of all

ers involved.
interviewHaving lost my questions, I was forced to use another

ing technique.

allowed
Preparation of the question sheets in itself had

me to conceptualize the problems.

After several interviews, struggling
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with makeshift questions, I realized that
ing the interviewee to

"

.the.

prime requisite was allow-

speak his mind," without forcing him into a pre-

arranged conceptual framework.

My first question, then, invariably beC

came, "How did you first get involved or hear about the Clinic?"

The

speed, pattern, and emphasis of the interview was thus determined largely

•

by the interviewee , though
basic areas.

made sure each interview covered the same

I

This interviewing technique was consistent with my inten-

i

».

tion to allow the facts to suggest the conclusions, not the other wav
I

In short, the first theft left me in a somewhat stronger posi-

around.
i

tion.

Since I had access to another tape recorder, the second theft only

damaged my self-esteem (after two years in the school, T thought I knew
the ropes).

In late June and July, I spoke to the principal of the school who

had been the JHS £7 liason with the Clinic, to several other administrators who had been directly or indirectly involved, and to the ex-JHS 57
'

principal who now worked in Long Island.

This latter interview lasted

for three and a half hours.

y
In July and August, I contacted all Clinic planners and top staff

members who were still in New York, about half the total.

The remaining

i

Clinic personnel were somewhat more difficult to locate and get responses
From those who were unavailable for direct interviewing

from.

I

asked

extensive
for and received, from all but one person of significance,

written communications.
*

who were
During the fall of 1971, I spoke to a number of people

was crucial, specifically
only indirectly involved but whose input I felt
Foundation; Bernard
Mario Fantini, then education officer at the Ford
Public Schools; Daniel
Donovan, then Superintendent of New York City
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Griffiths, then Dean of the N.Y.U. School of Education; and Dr. A.

Tauchner, then District Superintendent of the local school district.

During this time, as well as during the summer and throughout the
succeeding year, I contacted a large number of parents and community
'

In February, 1972, I mailed letters to seventy-five students

people.

who had been most involved with the Clinic for Learning.

Unfortunately,

only a small number replied, yet from speaking to these few and reading
the written material available on student attitudes, I was able to get
an adequate reading on student attitudes concerning the Clinic.

I

also

•

i

contacted some fifteen of the most involved parents either by mail or in
person.
In all, I took over twenty-five hours of taped and transcribed

interviews, as well as more than twenty of untaped interview material,
All

and written communications from half a dozen principle characters.

persons whom I interviewed or contacted are listed in the bibliography.

x

Limitations of the Study

There are some obvious limitations to a study of this kind.

This

is not a study of the teaching-learning process, nor a study of how the

public school impinges on or facilitates that process.
(1971

)

has probed masterfully into these areas.

Eleanor Leacock

This is not a study of

research
planned organizational change, although I have borrowed certain

findings from this field.

The Clinic for Learning was not perceived by

neatly into such
its planners in such terms and the facts do not fit
variables.
constructs; there are simply too many uncontrollable

Finally

sense; people's opinions
this study is not "scientific" in any strict
\

i

1

t

closed, the country has
have changed in the five years since the Clinic

#
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changed, black and Puerto Rican communities have changed.

In parts, it

will read more like an historical tract than a scientific
document.

The

evidence, then, which supports my theses is less "rigorous"
or objective
than I would have liked.

But the span of five* years does provide me

with a time perspective not often granted to "project evaluators."

This

has afforded me a chance to place the study into a broader sociological
context, and allowed me to focus on underlying factors which might
escape

one who was "too close to the action."

*

\

v

/

Chapter 3

THE CLINIC FOR LEARNING,

1

966-68

In the early spring of 1966 the Director of the New York Univer-

sity Project APEX was dismissed by the Dean of the N.Y.U. School of Education.

The causes were both personal and substantive.

The Dean, and

some other APEX staff members, felt the Project Director was headstrong

and difficult to work with.

The Director, and others, saw it as a clash

of ideologies: whether to reform the university to accomodate sixty "disadvantaged" students attending N.Y.U. under the auspices of APEX; or, as
the Dean and the others wanted, to mould the students to fit the tradi-

tional \miversity program.

The Project Director argued that bringing

black and Puerto Rican students with general (vs. academic) high school
diplomas to New York University in order to certify them to become teachers in their own communities, and requiring them to undertake the conven-

tional program of study was tantamount to insuring their failure.

APEX

would fail, he warned, because the others were not serious about £nndaThis dissent prompted his removal;

mental change in educational policy.

and from these ruins emerged the Clinic for Learning.
two tenets:
Central to the thinking of the Project Director were

who lived and worked
first, that the "ghetto" "overwhelmed" most people
the outside could have a
there, and only fresh infusions of people from

university students could
positive impact on it’s malaise; second, that
the "ghetto," about "urban
not learn about the "disadvantaged," about
it

i

3?

ho

problems" sit-ting in a university classroom.'

I.f

somehow the university

could merge into or unify with a public school, then not only would there

be a life size forum for university student learning, but the resources
of the university could help transform the school.

The beginnings of

%

such an alliance had been implanted in Project APEX, when twelve APEX

students had been given work-study fellowships in Junior High School 57

for much of the school year 1965-66.

They had helped patrol the halls,

*^

taken disruptive students out of class, performed clerical tasks, and in

certain cases, assisted teachers in lesson planning or teaching.

The

Principal of the school had welcomed the added help and believed the APEX
concept, of preparing blacks and Puerto Ricans to teach in their own com-

munities, was a worthy one.

Teachers and administrators viewed the APEX

students as useful and industrious.

It was a short step, in the Project

Director’s mind, from this kind of collaboration to a more complete kind
in which N.Y.U. and JHS 57 would join together for mutual benefit.

school could be used as a lever to change the university

— by

The

getting

undergraduates and graduates out of the ivory tower; the university could
be used as resource to change the school

—

by providing fresh recruits

to help win the battles for the hearts and minds of ghetto children.
this study.
(jt is this latter prong of intent that forms the subject of

about the effecI found it nearly impossible to accumulate adequate data

thrust of the
tiveness of the teacher training program that was the other

indications that it was
Clinic for Learning, although there were frequent
a unique and successful one^j

hold twelve hundred
Junior High School 57 had been built in 1955 to
of about fourteen hundred^
students: by 1965 there was already an enrollment

p

U1

and it was rising rapidly.

The school stood' at the edge of the Bedford-

Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn, on Stuyvesant Avenue, and by 1955 the

neighborhood had already turned from predominantly Jewish and Italian
to almost completely black.

On the other side of Stuyvesant Avenue some

Italians remained, but by 1965 they had almost all been replaced by new-

ly arrived Puerto Ricans.

The school was about three-fourths black, one-

fourth Puerto Rican, and one percent

Learning arrived.

"

other" in 1966 when the Clinic for

The school was run under the normally tight fist of

a centralized bureaucracy.

Virtually all of the teachers had been assigned

to the school by the Board, some from as far away as the Bronx.

Because

it was not a "good" school, many of the older teachers had voluntarily

transferred out.

Administrators used the school as a stepping stone to

higher administrative positions elsewhere.

Class periods were forty min-

utes long, there were four major subjects.- Science, Math, English, Social
Studies, no electives; lesson plans were to be turned in every week to
’

•

,e

subject supervisors, rollbooks as "legal documents" were checked scrupulously, mid-term tests were mandatory, and final exams, and standardized

reading and math tests; in school, there was "no talking," "no cheating,
"no eating in class," hall passes were (theoretically required) letters
who cut
were sent to parents of children who didn't hand in homework, or

bore the exclass, truancy was rampant, fights were frequent, teachers
supervisors were back
cessive weight of clerical chores, principals and
hut, there was
room cronies, most teachers left exactly at 3:00 p.m....;

not much of a threat (in
job security, the pay was steady, parents we re

fancied themselves to be "reformers.
1965), and very few at any level

1

9

All

school.
told, a fairly typical inner city public
in reading achieve
In the spring of 1965, JHS 57 ranked number 10U

t

h2

ment out of 108 junior high schools in New York City.

This fact caught

the eye of the recently deposed APEX Director, and he began to formulate

his ideas for a "demonstration school in the heart of an urban slum."
He began to assemble a team, initially only himself, his secretary, and
two doctoral student/instructors, one of whom had supervised the twelve

APEX students in JHS 57 for a semester.

Others were quickly recruited:

two experienced teachers who were completing a one year internship with
the NDEA Institute for teachers of the Disadvantaged; two members of the

N.Y.U. School of Education faculty, one of whom had and has since written
several widely read books on inner city education; two other doctoral

students who had been involved with APEX; and, in time, several other

graduate students, university instructors, and others not associated with
N.Y.U. who were simply looking for work.

There was no process of selec-

tion as such; most of the recruits were known by the Project Director,
two responded to newspaper articles, and one was referred to the Director
o

by one of the Professors.
x

The Project Director had almost complete dis-

cretion in determining who would and who would not be included.
As the group was forming and expanding, and after the rudiments
Principal
of the project had been discussed, the Principal and Assistant
of JHS 57 were approached.

First, they were asked, did they think that

could form an alliance
a public school and a committed urban university

that would work for the betterment of all.

to give it a try.
affirmative.

Secondly, was JHS 57 willing

Not surprisingly, the answer to both questions was

Assistant Prin"He fProject Director) is a salesman," the
1

Clinic."
cipal said later, "and he sold us on the

But, sold only

to quarrel about,
general terms, there were few specifics

m

^ower, certain

or specific responsibilities were
ly, or conflicting lines of authority,

143

not-

discussed in

"these

early meetings .

No one would have to give up

anything in a project of this type, and everyone would stand to gain.

The school administration expressed strong support.

"I was darned ex-

cited,” the Principal confessed, "Not excited for any personal glory,
}

but almost more excited than anyone.

Here was an opportunity for some-

thing to be done that was unusual and unique." 2
A proposal for funding, which had been written by the Clinic

staff and modified only slightly by the school administrators, was sub-

mitted to the Ford Foundation in the late spring of 1966.

To the officer

at Ford who eventually awarded the money, "The Project appeared to have
a good chance for s\iccess.

get involved with schools."

We felt it was important for universities to
3

With the sometimes ambivalent support of

the Dean of the N.Y.U. School of Education, the Clinic Director then

approached the New York City Superintendent of Schools seeking approval
and added funding.

The Ford Foundation as well was interested in some

expression of financial support from the New York Board of Education.
On Hay U, 1966, the Superintendent wrote the Ford Foundation "to confirm
"I supported

in writing... my firm advocacy of the Clinic for Learning."

any reasonably projected, innovative process that I thought would improve
the instructional program," he said later.

"The Clinic for Learning

looked
seemed to have a process of staff training and utilization that
to me as if it had some promise to it."

14

By early June, arrangements

the Ford
had been made for a two and a half year grant of $3^0,000 from

of Education, this
Foundation, and an additional $100,000 from the Board

would be recruited by
to pay salaries of several full time teachers who
o

regular teachers
the Clinic to. relieve some of the burden on

these

but owing their allegiance to
teachers, paid by the Board of Education,

I

hh

the Clinic, were called "Clinic teachers.".

i* 1

In June, 1966, a meeting was held in the school library
with the

entire faculty and staff of JHS 97 to determine their receptivity to the
*

The Project Director and the Principal of the school were the

project.

chief speakers, and they displayed a strong commitment to the Clinic for
I

The Project Director stressed the supportive characteristics

Learning.;

of the Clinic model: "What are your needs?" he asked the teachers, "and
l

'.how

can we help meet them?"

The Clinic for Learning, he said, backed by

New York University, would be at the service of the school.

Dental care,

legal care, psychological assistance would be provided; additional personnel would result in smaller classes, fewer discipline problems, in-

dividualized instruction; the brightest children would be given special
|

programs at N.Y.U., teachers would be given college credit for partici-

pating in certain Clinic activities; faculty advisors from N.Y.U. would
come to the school to advise teachers.

The Principal stressed that this

was a unique chance to make a "mediocre" school into an "excellent" one:
"None of us think that JHS 97 is as good as it could be; this is our

chance to make it better."

The Principal did a solid job of selling, and

all of the "key people in the school"
ers, administrators

—

—

respected teachers, union leadi

!

were in favor of the project.

"I think people

caught my enthusiasm," said the Principal, "I tried to sell it hard."'’
As presented, the Clinic for Learning appeared to the teachers
It would mean more help, fewer problems, less

as a gift from heaven.

disturbed" stuchaos in the classroom; it would mean that "emotionally

could condents could get the help they need; it would mean that teachers

centrate on teaching.
solve their problems

The teachers had been told that N.Y.U. would help

—

clerical
class size, more materials, more help with

US

tasks; other than accepting student teachers, there was no hint that any

concessions would be required from them.

Only one Clinic staff member, the one more inclined to be
directive, sensed a discrepancy.

"What he [Project Director] said, and

‘
i

what we are going to do,” said the staff member, "are two different things.'
The Project Director had implied that the Clinic for Learning would only

help teachers do better what they were already doing.

There had been no

*-

suggestion that certain, perhaps most, Clinic staff members felt that
i

teachers should be doing other things, more creative, more imaginative
things; nor had the Project Director expressed his own strongly held be-

lief that once teachers were freed of excessive and trivial bureaucratic
responsibilities, they would of their own volition change their teaching

In short, the expectations of the Clinic Staff were never ex-

behavior.

plored; the Clinic for Learning was to be a one way exchange: the Univer)

sity gave and the school received.

During the summer of

1

?66 a camp was held in upstate Mew York

for sixty incoming seventh graders.

Staffed by four regular JHS 57

teachers, one "Clinic" teacher, one Clinic staff member, and the Princi-

pal and his family, the camp proved to be a remarkable success.

About

thirty students attended each of the two week sessions; each staff person
the
lived with and was responsible for five; the days were planned by
given, the
students themselves, nothing was compulsory, no tests were

common .goal was enjoyment.

Everyone was called by his first name, re-

were legitimate.
sponsibilities were shared, affection was open, emotions
the staff, "learning was
And throughout the camp, in the words of one of

always going on.”

formed
Mot only were there frequent study groups

geography, or geology, but
around a specific tonic, like hygiene, or

ft

U6

games and talent shows were held with a nearby all-white private camp. 7

Better than any other event in the Clinic for Learning, this
summer camp reflected the intent of Clinic planners to affect the child

by changing the setting around him.

That there were no "discipline"

•

,

,
problems
at the camp, that interpersonal, relations between students and
I

staff were warm and supportive, that the students did demonstrate their
innate curiosity and creativity was further verification of the Project
1

"

Director's belief that a child's environment greatly determined his

chances for success in an educational venture.

In the humane, democratic,

sharing environment of the camp, the students grew immeasurably.

A

num-

I

ber of students who attended this carp remember it as one of the most
satisfying experiences of their lives.

Several students, who later became

I

serious problems in the JHS 57 environment, were among the most active
I

and involved students at the camp.

The staff of the camp met several times during the early weeks

of the school year to discuss what leamingscould be transferred to the
The lessons of the camp, they felt, were too powerful,

school, setting.

too important to be forgotten.

But the school presented a different

challenge, with different mandates, and the discussions came to nought.

Several favorable news reports appeared in New York newspapers

during the summer of 19^6.

The New vork Times lauded the Clinic for

Learning as "an effort to show that a slum neighborhood can be rehabilitated by making the school the center of reform."

The Principal of the

u

boost to our
school was ouoted as saying "This will give a tremendous

Suddenly we see goals that can be attained."

teacher morale.

Another

"alliance.
article spoke of the importance of the university-school
\ V

i

rtn

i

and resolve that
The camp, the news articles, and the commitment

sprang from continuous planning sessions held by the Clinic
staff gave

rise in the early fall of 1966 to high optimism.

To involve the entire

staff of JHS 57, a weekend retreat was planned for all teachers
immediately before the start of school.

.

Written invitations had been sent out

*
|

during the summer, and on the Friday before the Monday opening of classes,

chartered buses were at JHS 57 to transport teachers to the N.Y.U. camp
near Holmes, New York.
A

More than two-thirds of the entire faculty, or

•

about sixty-five teachers, attended this weekend which was conceived by

the Clinic planners as a means to "accruaint teachers with the Clinic
j

staff and the Clinic program.”

The Project Director told the teachers

that the success of the "weekend would depend on their involvement; dis|

cussion groups would be held, but they would be conducted more like leaderless rap sessions than informational presentations; nothing would be

mandatory, everything, hopefully, would be open and trusting.

The Clinic

staff hoped that the weekend would help create the kind of interpersonal

atmosphere that would ease their entry in JHS 57.

signed

The weekend was de-

for ice breaking, not policy making.

It was at this weekend that a few of the teachers became skeptical.

The statements of two teachers span the gamut of diverse reaction

to the same set of experiences.

One said:

We had fun at the camp. I felt (the Project Director) accomplished what he had set out to do because I got the feeling that
he wanted a very free and very relaxed atmosphere so that people
would get to know each other. They hpd conferences, but they
weren’t too well planned, kind of like you hopped from one group
to another, and open debate. And he kind of encouraged people
to talk.... After the camp I felt good. I thought it was going
to work.
A second teacher recalled:
'

k

«

l

good time.
I got the impression that the camp was for a

We

U8

did have neet-ingSj conferences, but. "the whole atmosphere
was
superficial. Nothing w^>s definitely planned. The whole idea
seemed to be a recreation time. Things were touched on, but
very lightly. And T got a very unpleasant feeling about the
project there. This is when I became very bitter.... (The
Clinic sta^f) outlined the scope of the project, but there
was nothing specific. It had not been planned, it was all
talk, frequently from the top' of the head. This irritated
me. We didn’t receive copies of what was to be done, no
general outline. I knew that first day it was going to be
a flop.
lQ

Most teachers, however, were not so ouick to judge.

The majority of the

4

teachers enjoyed the weekend; they were aware that the Clinic staff could
not be fully specific until school was in session; they were less inclined

to see it as an activity requiring their participation than as a "free

weekend

.

It.

was at the weekend that the Ci.inic staff notified the school

administration of their decision to adopt the Cluster format.

The seven-

teen seventh grade classes were to be broken down into six Clusters, of
two or three classes each, with a regular teacher from each subject area

teaching all classes in the Cluster; thus, each Cluster would be composed
of

teachers teaching the same students.

Putting this into effect

reouired total rescheduling of the seventh grade and although the previous schedule done in the spring had taken into account almost every

teacher’s individual needs, and had given rise to no grievances or complaints, the school administrators on the opening Monday of school plung-

ed into total rescheduling of the seventh grade.

By Thursday this task,

the followrequiring some 20-30 man-hours of work, was completed, and on

program with new
ing Monday each seventh grade class had a totally new
teachers.

period desigThe teachers in each Cluster had a common free

nated as the .mandatory meeting time for Clusters.
gan that second week.

Cluster meetings be-

Policy decisions has been made by Clinic planners at the end
of
the summer which first defined the nature of the Cluster.

During the

summer, the Project Director and a majority of his staff came to feel

that no single "program" would work for all Clusters or all teachers.

The task of the Clusters in their view would be to facilitate a problem
solving environment, to establish a process whereby teachers, by themselves but with advice from Clinic personnel, could find more satisfying and productive ways to teach.

It was thought that each Cluster

would vary according to the personality and competencies of the Coordinators, and the best feature of each would eventually be replicated and
a model Cluster would evolve.

It was essential from this point of view

to get assurance from the school administration that decisions made by

teachers in the Clusters regarding curriculum, small group work, and use
of N.Y.U. student teachers and other undergraduates would not be counter-

manded; the enthusiasm of the Principal during the early months made
*

K©

this assurance a certainty.

There was critical assumption underlying this position; namely
that teachers wanted to find more productive and humane teaching techniques, as per Clinic staff expectations.

On this basis, a Cluster

arrangement was the least overbearing and autocratic plan for change,

most suited to the needs and personalities of Clinic staff members.
The assumption, however, may have been premature, based only on the

library meeting the previous spring and the assurances of the Principal.
Though the Principal was avid, the teachers had been only passively
sense,
acceptant; they were enthusiastic, perhaps, but in a very real

the Clinic for Learning was thrust upon them.

Clinic planners failed

program, no matter
to consider that without real teacher support, an^

how unthreatening, would be seen as an intrusion.
A smaller number of Clinic staff, led by the

only other full

Professor on the staff, felt that a definite program which
could be

implemented and which

teachers

not

they felt,

sufficient time,

rapport necessary for

been asked by the

Associate Director
and from

was critical.

There was

to develop the kind of interpersonal

"process oriented"

Project Director to

with responsibility

this he inferred

to work with

could "use"

Clusters.

participate
for the

The Professor had
in the Clinic as

"instructional program,"

he would be training Cluster Coordinators

teachers, as well as working

directly with teachers.

Initially, this group had argued for Clusters grouped

around subjects,

an extension of the subject matter departments which already existed in
i

the school.

One Cluster Coordinator competent in the field of English

felt that each Coordinator should have a specific "game plan"

Cluster;

"I thought the big challenge was an instructional one,"

said later.

Solving"

materials

for his

Another, billed as an expert in

"Learning and Problem

felt that the Clinic team should arrive with

—

worksheets, games, activities

could begin to use immediately.

he

—

instructional

which the teachers

This faction assumed that the

Clinic for Learning had some authorization to implement its plans.
One Coordinator referred to a letter written by the Superintendent of

Schools to the Project Director which appeared to give the Clinic "carte
blanche" in changing the school.

This was a faulty inference

—

the

Superintendent hadn't suggested that the Principal relinquish his role
as final authority in the school

—

but for some it remained a prime

t

$0
instance of bureaucratic duplicity.

This latter position was eventually

overruled by those who felt that the Cluster coordinators would have to
create their own personal power bases, and that teachers were the only
ones competent to find solutions to their problems.

From the beginning, this modus operand! of the Clusters caused
confusion and resentment among many teachers.

Some viewed their Cluster

leaders as "lackadaisical," or "wishy-washy," and Cluster meetings became
"rap sessions," of "idle talk," where "anything I said was right."

Many

teachers came to the meetings looking for "solutions," but since there
1

were none, they quickly lost interest.

Because some Cluster Coordinators

had never taught in a black or Puerto Rican school, teachers mocked the ir
.

credibility.

Other teachers made more of an effort to listen, but found

J

of
that the ideas for change were too radical, "with no thought of some

the consequences."

Or, "[cluster Coordinators] had very far fetched ideas

about teaching that had nothing to do with reading.

One lesson he taught

do with taste, sour and
to my class made me furious; it had something to

lesson."
sweet salt, and I did not interpret that as a reading

Many

felt obliged to go;
teachers simply went to the meetings because they

cooperative people," sand one
"some would show up just because they were

Coordinator.

volunteers, some
Although there had been an abundance of

to remain with the seventh
seasoned seventh grade teachers, who wanted
the Clinic or lose their seventh
grade, were fo-ced to participate in

voluneighth or ninth grade teachers who
grade; as well, many experienced
teered could not be included.

prosSome teachers were attracted by the

little
resources in the classroom, and a
pects of reduced class sice, new
were "coactivities. The teachers who
extra pay for after school Clinic

erced

"

resentfully.
to the Cluster meetings
or "bought" in this way came

i

,
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and seldom participated actively in the discussions.

Querulous and skeptical teachers were quick to seize on embar-

rassing Incidents to attack the Clinic for Learning.

One Cluster Coordi-

nator agreed with a community person that karate should be taught in the
j

classroom, both because "self protection was important" and because it

would serve as a way to "get to" the students. The Project Director supported the Coordinator, the Principal said no, and the confrontation blew
i

well out of proportion

—

but no karate was ever taught.

One Coordinator

took his entire Cluster, teachers and students, to Coney Island and, in
the words of an assistant principal, "got bombed out by the kids."

Other

Coordinators tried to teach demonstration lessons and all too often the
students, who can recognize a novice in seconds, destroyed the act.

"Dur-

ing one lesson," recalled one teacher, "I had to physical! y hold the stu1

dents in their seats just so he could finish."

On another occasion,

several TT.Y.U. staff had allowed their small group of students to begin
a

p apcr-and-wnstebasket "basketball" game, and when asked by the admini-

strator on duty in the halls, they had replied that the "lesson was over'
for the day.

1

Undergraduates who came to the school once a week as part

of a regular course reouirement increased the defensiveness that teachers

were inclined to feel.

Sitting in the back of a classroom, sometimes as

many as ten together, undergraduates would surrepticiously or openly
challenge a teacher's method or a point he was making.

As one undergradu-

shut their
ate said, "No one ever told them (other undergraduates] to
not, to learn
mouths, whether they liked what the teachers were doing or

you certainly
how to have manners whether the teacher was right or wrong,

don’t say it in.Jfront of the whole classroom."

11

Finally, administrators

apparent disdain show by
and teachers were constantly provoked by the
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Clinic staff for the normal school scheduling

Cluster Coordinators

missed Cluster meetings, or a3ked to work a four day week, or arrived
late in the morning, the Project Director was frequently not at JHS
57,

e

and undergraduates often came and went from classes at will.

Although the Principal had said prior to the opening of school
I

/

I

"We have at least sixty friends to start the year,” the transition from

camp life to school life may have caused additional problems.

Students

who called teachers by their first names at the camp were told that was

improper in school.

"Things are free and easy on the outside," teachers

agreed, "the classroom inhibits ; we have to do what we can."

Clinic

i

staff members were more reluctant to reach that conclusion, and often

treated students in the same "free and easy" way as at the camp.

Most
*

Clinic staff were quick to excuse a student from a class if it appeared
j

that the child was "stiffled," and he was free to go to the Clinic office,

Room

10,3.

Teachers, even those who had been at the camp, resented these

infractions, but often to no avail.

Eventually, dist nought students

would simply leave their regularly scheduled classes to find sanctuary
in Room 103.

To many of the Clinic staff, this was further evidence of

the oppressive nature of the typical classroom; to many teachers, this
further marked the Clinic as soft and patronizing.

"Students are in

school to learn," said the teachers: "Students cannot be forced to learn."

replied the Clinic,

The community development dimension of the Clinic program also
*

encountered early difficulties.
Trr

Two "community agents" had been chosen

nor had ary
the Rroiect Director, but neither was from the community

special knowledge of it.

One was a tennis pro during the summer months,

teaching in Harlem.
recently turned educator with limited experience

/

S3

The other

hati

graduated two years previously' from
the M.Y.U. School of

Commerce, and had just returned

from,

the Peace Corps.

During the summer
they spent time in the conmufdty,
meeting local leaders, taking walking'
tours, and trying to plan their
activities for -the fall. Their role
was

originally conceived as supporting the
Clusters, one community agent
assigned to each Cluster, visiting
parents of disruptive students, following up

notices about PTA meetings, arranging
for parents to come to

(

the school to observe or assist.

The two original community agents were

responsible for hiring others, a policy which one
referred to later as
I

a "colossal blunder."

In the early fall, a woman who lived one block

from the school but who sent her two junior high
school aged daughters

to school in Queens to avoid JHS 57, read about the Clinic
in a newspaper
report.

After several months of volunteering, the agents asked her to

join the Clinic staff and she accepted.

A woman who understood verv

little of the political and educational realities that undergird the
public schools in New York City, with only slight experience with Welfare Rights Organizations, she became one of the most active members of

the Clinic staff, alternately confronting the Principal and the Project

Her story will become a crucial focus for understanding the

Director.

efforts of the Clinic for Learning on the commiinity at large.

The other community agent hired w=s the Chairman of the Local
School Board, a body which in
as an advisory body.

I

966 had almost no substantive power save

She had been reading the New York Tj mes at Jones

Beach in July, 1966, when she came across an article announcing that
JHS 57,
sity.

a

school in her district, was to be "adopted" by New York Univer-

She notified the School -Community Coordinator working out of the

District Superintendent’s office, and they exchanged incredulities.

She

and the District Superintendent were included'
in the weekend for teachers preceding the opening of school.

It was not until several months

later, however, that she joined the staff of the
Clinic for Learning as

community agent.

Thus, for the first weeks and months of the Clinic.

i

the community staff consisted only of two men, both
white, who knew very

little of the community.

The School -Community Coordinator of the District,

who was black and from the community, assisted the two agents,
but by

their own admissions and the comments of both the Cluster Coordinators
and regular JHS £7 teachers, they offered little support to the operation

of the Clinic for Learning.

The concentration of problems that beset the Clinic in the early
weeks gave rise to a more fundamental clash, between the Principal and
the Project Director, over issues of power and authority.

The Principal

was the first to feel the bind: "Teachers would say I don't want any N.Y.U.

people coming into my classroom.

When I get that it hurts.

Because now

I'm caught in a very awkward situation; I have to stand up for the teach-^er."

Subject department chairmen, most of whom had been in the New York

City system for at least ten years, began recounting tales of Clinic incompetence and irregularity: "Mr. B
past two days"; "Mr.

morrow

—

F— has

—-

has not been in school for the

planned a trip with his students for to-

he has no parent permission slips and no authorization from

the District Office"; "Miss L

wants to allow untrained undergraduates

to teach our students on a small group basis"; "Mr. M
*

—

is suggesting

to his Cl\ister that the entire English and Social Studies curriculums be

Increasingly, the Principal interceded on behalf of his

thrown out."

staff,* and he w^s4m forced to countermand decisions made by the Clinic's
\

\

«

|

on-site Administrative Assistant.

When word of resistance reached the

9
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Project Director, he more often than not
assumed the peacemaker "man for
all seasons" stance that he had used
so successfully at the school meet-

ing in the library the previous spring.

Often disputes were buried

under mountains of conciliatory words, offerred
in reasonable dialogue,,
in search of a common solution.

But increasingly, Clinic trips and room

changes and curriculum suggestions were thwarted by
the "rules" of the
bureaucracy, and the Project Director, realizing that
his very right to
..remain in the school depended on the continuing
good will of the school

administration, almost invariably had to back down.

This left him open to criticism from his own staff.

"

[The Pro-

ject Director} refused to fight the administration when fthe Principal}
and his people began to set up road blocks," said one Cluster Coordinator.

"With the administration refusing to help and teachers refusing to help,

progress in the Clinic became impossible.

Since [the Project Director]

did not want to face up to that reality, we were able to make little progress."

12

Most Cluster Coordinators were floundering, and they looked

to the Project Director for support.

S a id one: "Many of the people in

the Clinic needed strong direction, and [the Project Director} does not

believe in that.
the proper

He believes that the goodness of people will out in

environment.

Maybe all of us were clever and did some in-

teresting things but we all needed a better overall sense of how to
accomplish

our goals."

Another: "[The Project Director} chose six

people [as Cluster Coordinators} that he had faith in and his idea was
that each one of these people was to dictate and institute his own policy.

Now we all found out that this wasn’t possible without power to do it.
had not power at all, you understand.
ter were bargaining power.

We

The only influences we co>ild mus-

The Director of Evaluation of the Clinic,
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vho personally and professionally was perhaps the closest of
all Clinic
staff to the Project Director, spoke more bitterly:

'

Never having anticipated such ruthless undermining of our
efforts and not being really sophisticated enough to begin to
cope effectively with it, and having no real power in the
school and rather little back at the university, wo were, in
effect, rruite defenseless and were all but wiped out.... For
us as a team the first h-6 weeks were both the beginning and
the end of the project.,. ^
'*

5

.

The Project Director and his staff were caught in the ambivalent posture
*

of trying to justify their presence in the face of mounting criticism.
In conception, the Clinic for Learning vras to have operated as a support

system to aid teachers, thus, as a non-directive experimental program;
in fact. Cluster Coordinators to a greater or lesser degree felt inclined

to offer free advice
etc.

—

new curriculum designs, new teaching techniques,

When teachers and administrators would voice opposition to the

"radical," or "impractical" suggestions, the Clinic staff, and the Project Director in particular, would retreat: "We are simply here for an

experiment; if something isn't workable, throw it out; we have no inten^ tion of imposing solutions on you."

A

By Christmas time, 1?66, the Clinic for Learning had almost
nothing to show for its efforts.

In some Clusters, more than half the

regular JHS £7 teachers had stopped coming to Cluster meetings.

Others

would soon inform the Principal that they wanted no New York University
personnel whatsoever in their classrooms.

Regular subject department

chairmen had virtually never been encouraged to attend Cluster meetings,
*

and they began to blame the Clinic program and Clinic "permissiveness"

both in classfor the alarming discipline situation that was appearing,
armed with the
rooms and hallways, whero students roamed with impunity
\

V

careful retort,

I

*•

I

"I'm going to Room 103."

The Project Director, anxious
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to regain some of the lost momentum of the Project,
sent a thirteen
page, “Perspective at Christmas Time," to all JHS
£7 staff.

;

It began:

Perhaps because of the pressures inherent in the
process
of joining the efforts of a school and a university;
certainlv
because of the scope and depth of the problems involved in
educating disadvantaged children; and perhaps beca\ise we in
the Clinic h^ve been working our way into the problem, I find
considerable confusion as to the goals, working assumptions
and the meaning of specific activities in the Clinic.
16

^

Much of what followed was an adaptation, of the original project proposal:
three pages explaining the "culture of poverty" concept, several pages
of Clinic goals

—

"progressively surround the child with positively

oriented people who care,” "to reach the child as a person," "individualized instruction," "curriculum development," etc. --- two pages on com-

munity development almost directly quoted from the project proposal; and
•

two pages on research and evaluation (a process which in fact never

really began).

The final sentences are suggestive of the Project Direc-

tor’s disposition:
I would define winning as motivating more people to work

on the problems of the disadvantaged. I hope we can demonstrate in some small way that slums and the defeatism they
breed can be eliminated. I don't non how we nan lose if we
keep typing.
(emphasis added.

But many of the Clinic staff by January, 1967, were no longer will
ing to keep trying.

The Professor hired as Director of Instruction re-

signed because "there didn’t seem to be much time for an educational

policy or any other planning... there was no function for me to serve.

„18

One Cluster Coordinator, the one who had supervised the APEX students
the year before, resigned and accepted a college teaching position in

New Jersey.

"I had the feeling," he said, "that we were going nowhere."

Another Coordinator remembers precisely the day in early February when

he "gave up."

"Emotionally," he said, "I quit in February.

didn't make any difference if I came in or not."

It just

At least three Clinic

teachers, those hired by the Clinic but paid with Board of Education

money, also resigned in January.

And although it is certainly not true

that all Cluster Coordinators or Clinic teachers "stopped trying,"
school -Clinic relations had reached a low ebb, and all Clinic staff were
struggling.

In January, an Ad Hoc Teachers Group made up principally of
Teachers' Union representatives in the school formed to discuss the

Clinic with the Project Director, his on-site Administrative Assistant,
and the Director of Evaluation, who was soon to replace the Administrative Assistant.

The Ad Hoc Committee communicated the following con-

cerns: students must not be allowed to go to Room

103 without passes;

student teachers should be directed by the Clinic staff to assist with

problems of discipline; the community agents should spend more time on
•

o

individual behavioral problems; Cluster Coordinators should be more
"active and direct" in participating in the Cluster meetings.

19

The Principal continued to receive notes from dissenting teachers.

One teacher wrote to say she would

have no part of the Clinic, and I feel like I speak for
many of the teachers. The Clinic has done nothing for me,
no
only caused confusion, with pupils coming and going for
no
worthless,
been
have
apparent purpose. Cluster meetings
teachstudent
a
accepted
planning or ideas, and no help. I
er because I didn't think it nice to say no, **20
to consolidate the
In the next few months, Cluster leaders tried

could of the second semester.
gains they had made, and salvage what they

was assembled and submitted to the
In March, 1967, a "Progress Report"
catalogued their successes.
Ford Foundation in which Cluster leaders

\

»

%
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Through thin veneers of optimism, it is apparent that
two Clusters had
all but ceased functioning.

One writes: "We have maintained the 'normal

school structures' in all of our classes.

has been in the area of Science."

The main thrust of our work

After which it becomes clear that

the regular JHS 57 Science teacher is the only teacher who will accept

any advice or assistance from the Clinic, though two other teachers in
the Cluster grudgingly agreed to accept student teachers.

"People are

not in a hurry to let us in -- to change things around," he writes.
"They are very hesitant to change the usual structure and pattern of
the school."

A second Cluster leader is still offering "'the language

arts' as the focus of work in the Cluster."

But the Cluster doesn't

function anymore, and "the major thrust of my work with the Cluster has

been coordinating (time} schedules, (and} working with the N.Y.U. personnel."

A third Cluster leader, although admitting the demise of his

Cluster, points to two notable successes: one, "the Clinic teacher with
•

o

the help of NYU student teachers and undergraduates takes one half of

Class 7-15 for Art, Social Studies, and English" and provides them with
cocoa and cookies at the start of the day as well as intensive remedial

work and a revamped curriculum.

(The cocoa program ended shortly there-

after when a hat and coat were discovered in the cocoa vat.)

Secondly,

the Cluster Math teacher with some NYU staff had devised new material
for the three Cluster classes which offered every child a Math program

more nearly matched to his abilities.

A fourth Cluster, led by perhaps

the mo3t non-directive and least threatening Coordinator, also pointed

English
to two successes: "We have split class 7-13 in half for eight

Coordinator and
and four Math periods," taught jointly by the Cluster
Studies was "experithe Clinic teacher; secondly, the regular Social

t
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menting" with breaking his class down into small
groups.
i

A fifth

•

Cluster, led by the young woman whom most people
referred to as the most

dedicated and successful of all Clinic staff, had
several more achieveo

ments to tout: "Class 7-5 was split in two groups," one half
working
with the Coordinator, the Clinic teacher, and all other NYU
personnel.
Accompanying this report was a lengthy documentation of all curriculum
and teaching innovations used with the class.

Secondly, the "non-

readers" of Classes 7-12 and 7-lU "are being taken out of English,

Social Studies, Science, and Art classes for intensified and more indi-

vidualized reading instruction."

Three of the regular JHS 57 teachers

)

in this Cluster are quoted as saying the new class breakdowns are "very

helpful," and each suggests how Cluster meetings could be made more
productive.

But the fourth regular teacher "has a definite point of

view about the NYU operation.

He feels that the Clinic should do more

research and come up with specific suggestions....
sonnel only on tangential class work."

fHe} uses NYU per-

The last Cluster leader, who

had been a Clinic teacher in the fall and who replaced the departed
Cluster Coordinator, was struggling to maintain close relations with
the four teachers in her Cluster and plan some sort of "regrouping" of
i

students which would reduce class size.

By the end of the semester she

had achieved some success in communicating with parents, assisting teachers, and working with small groups of students.

During this time, the community agents were becoming more effective both in the school and in the community.

In January and February,

one of the original agents was personally responsible for getting new

eye glasses for fifty children in the school.

Attendance at PTA meetings

had risen from several in September to as many as fifty in February.

i

6l

Some Cluster leaders began to rely on the
reports of community agents
on home visitations.

As well, a number of local leaders in the
Bed-

ford-Stuyvesant community weio attracted by news of
"trouble at 57."
In the age of riots and rising militancy, black
leaders were quick to
*

i

attack the white "missionaries" from New York University.

Fanned by the

criticisms of the community agent who sent her children to
school in
j

:

Queens, the community at large began to respond to some obvious
short«

comings of the Clinic for Learning: none of the Clinic staff were black,
none of the regular JHS 57 teachers involved were black and only one
*

Clinic teacher was black; no parents or community people had been in-

volved in the planning of the Clinic for Learning; all reports out of
JHS 57 indicated that Clinic staff were too "easy" with students, let-

ting them out of class at their whim, not requiring homework, being
"friendly" with the children but not "teaching" them anything.

Parents

began to complain about the Clinic to the District Superintendent.

The

community agent/President of the Local School Board also heard complaints
and when forced to choose between the Clinic and the community, she chose

community.

In March, the District Superintendent and the School Board

President notified the officials from the Ford Foundation who had funded
the Clinic, and they came to the school to observe.

look to be functioning anywhere near what
chief officer from Ford.

I

"Things did not

had expected," reported the

"It was a mess," said another.

Pressure from all sides resulted in the formation of a Community

Advisory Board for the Clinic for Learning, which met first on March 17,
1967.

The Advisory Board was a quick assemblage of community agents,

Local School Board members, PTA members, community leaders, school adThe first meeting was not tranquil;

ministrators, and Clinic directors.

l

f
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abuse was heaped on the Clinic by disappointed and disillusioned
com-

munity members.

"It was not so much that they failed," reported one

Advisory Board member.
ed."

"But that they promised so much and we listen-

The loudest clash was over the issues of money and accountability.

The Advisory Board asked for a list of expenditures and a current budget; the Project Director said this was private Clinic for Learning
*

«

information.

*

Aghast, the community demanded to know whether the Clinic

was serving the community, or trying to disrupt it.

Eventually, grudg-

ingly, at a later meeting, the Project Director did present a sketchy

outline of the Clinic budget, and the issue was not raised again -

though the damage had been done.
No doubt the Clinic staff was sincere in its efforts to reconnect
.

the school and the community.

In April, another weekend retreat was

planned for Clinic staff and community leaders.

The director of Brook-

lyn CORE, the head of a Youth Leadership Institute, and leaders of local
anti -poverty projects, religious organizations, and local politicians

were invited.

By the end of the session, only the two black community

agents and one white priest remained with the Clinic staff; the others

had returned prematurely to Brooklyn.

The meeting made a large impact

on the Project Director and he considered it a success.

But the com-

munity agent with children in Queens saw it differently: "They (community leaders) were talking about community power, and the Clinic peo-

ple didn't understand."
On April 17, a film about JHS $7 was shown on national televiother single
sion which did more to alienate the community than any

event in the life of the Clinic for Learning

—

to this day, community

movie."
residents vow to "wring the neck of whoever made that

(

It was
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made by an independent film producer, white, commissioned by National

Education Television, who worked closely with the Clinic and was lauded

by both the Principal and the Project Director for his "sensitive understanding" of the plight of ghetto education.

"The extent to which our

film will bring home to the viewer the full impact of this complex and
desperate situation," wrote the filmmaker to the JHS 57 staff several
,

weeks before its completion, "will be the measure of our success."

22

To

be sure, the film, entitled "The Way It Is," showed that the situation

in a black school in a black community was very desperate.

"No one can

.

function well in the ghetto," says the Project Director in the opening
scene

;

"ninety percent of the students are not moving ahead, something

happens to them that keeps them from learning," chimed in the Principal.
at
"More radical solutions are necessary," added the Project Director

the narrator.
the end of the film; "the crisis is heightening," concluded
in fact, the
Anyone who han spent time in JHS 57 will recognize that,

in class-

school
film accurately depicts much of what goes on in the

offices.
rooms of inexperienced teachers, in hallways, in

One also

learning environment.
knows that the school is far from an ideal

In one

responded negatively because
sense, the parents and community of JHS 57
the school actually was.
they were unprepared to accept how "bad"

But

of the school attended by
more than this, it was the characterization
as a "battleground," as
their children in their neighborhood

desperate,

outrage.
many parents to the point of
as "almost hopeless," which brought

they
friends now hate my guts because
"Many people who used to be my
of the origthat movie," reflected one
think I had something to do with

inal community agents.
also reacted strongly.
The faculty of the school

As one teacher

said, "Before the film we were a divided
faculty, but the film brought

us together

—

none of us liked it."

The basic problem, they said, was

that only first year teachers were shown in action;
none of the experi-

enced teachers, in whose rooms "education and learning"
proceeded no

differently than in thousands of seventh grade classrooms across
the
country, were even on the film.

If the community was irate because the

film reflected negatively on them, the teachers felt attacked in the
same way.

One teacher auestioned: "How could anyone who was involved

with that school still hold his head up high after seeing that movie?"
In May , the future of the Clinic , which had been funded as a
two and a half year project, came under discussion.

Four of the Clus-

ter Coordinators indicated they would not be available for a second year,
as did both original community agents, as did both men who had served
as on-site Administrative Assistant, as did all but two Clinic teachers.

A number of community persons, especially those from the wider community
who were not

parents, demanded that the entire Clinic for Learning

staff return to New York University.

The Principal too suggested this

would be the wisest resolution of the conflict.

Other Advisory Board

members and parents were anxious for the Clinic to stay, as long as the

community could monitor and direct the use of resources; $U50,000 projects, they said, were not easy to come by in Beford-Stuyvesant and they

should be maintained at all costs.

Nor was the hope of the Principal

entirely crushed and in private he offered uo resign his office if he

would be made on-site Director of the Clinic.

The Dean of the N.Y.U.

School of Education and the Project Director refused the offer suggestof the
ing that the Clinic, to be effective, had to remain independent

school system.

t
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The Project Director told the Community Advisory Board
that the

objectives of the Clinic program for the second year would be
"tighten
up," "replicate," and "institutionalize," but he later agreed to
cut

back the program to only two Clusters.

New promises were made to the

now vigilant Advisory Board of supplemental services, from the School
of Social Work, the School of Dentistry, the School of Law, and other

New York University departments.

The structure and design of the pro-

i

gram, however, as detailed in a lengthy Advisory Board report dated May
23,

1967, was to remain essentially the same.

but consequential differences:

1)

There were three subtle

a "Negro male" would be appointed as

full time on-site administrator chosen jointly by "JHS 57, N.Y.U., the

District office. Local School Board, and the P.T.A.";

2)

"community

agents would be chosen by the Local School Board, Clinic for Learning,
and the P.T.A."

;

and 3) efforts would be made by Clusters to work close-

ly with Subject and Grade Supervisors.

23

o

The summer of 1967, like the summer before, was another high
point for the Clinic.

The community agent who had procured glasses for

students arranged for thirty boys labeled "discipline problems" by the
school to attend a Boy Scout camp in upstate New York.

Again, the boys

reacted positively to the "freeing environment"; again, "reading and

writing in subjects akin to the camping experience became commonplace
and there was a huge amount of peer pressure created to achieve in cer-

tain skills that required classroom type skills"

;

but again, as well,

can
from the camp evaluation, "there is no data as to how this success

be transferred back to the schools in Bedf ord-Stuyvesant"

.

^

The com-

Bedford-Stuymunity agent also arranged for twelve other boys to leave

New York State.
vesant for the summer to live with farm families in
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With no peer support, moat of the boys lasted less than
two weeks, but
in the words of one, it was a "good experience."

The two most successful Cluster Coordinators and the community
agent/mother also combined in the summer of 1967 to create the single

most successful Clinic event, at least from the perspective of students
and parents.

Called "Program Advancing College Education," (PACE), the

program offered forty-two students a "uniquely different and challenging
educational environment which might affect (their] attitudes, aspirations and self-concepts," lasting over a four week period, held at N.Y.U.,

funded by the Clinic.

Among other things, students used the N.Y.U.

language laboratory to learn French; elaborate student and parent evaluations were prepared; overall attendance was computed at ninety -one percent; every student was given a "diploma"; and for many of them, it "was

just like going to college."

During the summer a "Negro male" was recruited to be on-site
Clinic administrator for the coining year.

A product of the New York

City School system, with nine years teaching and supervisory experience
in a Manhattan high school, he "was beginning to see bankruptcy in the
system," and he was eager to join in a reform project.

Though hired by

the Project Director, with the approval of the Advisory Board, he was

ouick to direct his allegiance to the community.

Challenged by the

Principal as a "spokesman" for the Project Director, he announced he was
"his own man" and joined the Board of Directors of the most powerful

local anti -poverty project.
the community involved."

first goal," he said later, "was to get

Accountable to no one during its first year,

accountable to
the new on-site Director demanded that the Clinic be

parents and students.

Under the constant pressure of the community

I
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agent with children in Queens , he opened the Clinic budget for inspection, sought to build a power base for the Clinic in the community,
and

began to use the Advisory Board as his central polioy making body. 2

'’

But the new Director was unable to fully mend the precarious
power balance that had undermined the first year of the Clinic.

The

Clinic still had no legitimate right to be in the school save at the

confirmation of the school administration.
'

Director could wield was "whatever

[he]]

The only power which the new

could muster or cajole by virtue

of (hisj personality and interaction with people."

And by the time the

new Director assumed his position, the relationship of the Clinic for

Learning and the school had deteriorated almost beyond repair.

Only

eight teachers had volunteered to work in a Cluster the second year,
only half of these were involved the first year, and at least one had
joined with the specific purpose of "finding out how to get rid of N.Y.U."

No administrator was supportive, the Principal remained ambivalent.
"(The new Director]) was a really dedicated sincere fellow," said the

Principal later.

"Despite a number of disagreements we had, which were

because we picked up after a full year of operation, he had his mind in
He was in a bind.

the right direction.

ted each other."

We locked horns, but we respec-

Above all, the new Director understood how a New

York City school functioned; and because he accepted certain immutable
organizational facts

—

e.g., hierarchical authority, bureaucratic

timidity, the "artificial" classroom

—

he was able to avoid the con

the respect
stant confrontations which plagued the first year and gather

of most JHS ^7 staff.
together to
During the fall the two Clusters, which often met
function as they had been
form one Cluster of eight teachers, began to

i

*
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intended.

Often with a psychologist and a social
worker from N.Y.U.,

occasionally with department chairmen and other
administrators, regular toachers and Clinic teachers and Cluster
loaders frequently got

beyond questions of discipline and disruptive
ohildren, which had dominated most. Clustor meetings the previous year,
and reaohed broader Issues
of teaching and learning.

But the gains were small; there were no break-

throughs, no "innovative programs" with wide impact in
the sohool, and
no model Cluster evolved.

Simply, the meetings provided teachers a time

to discuss their work, which was the Justification for Clusters
from the

beginning.
TMo movie, "The Way It Is," was shown frequently during the sum-

mer and fall of 1967 on National Education Television and each time new

revenge minded recruits Joined the community faction wholly against the
Clinic for Loarning.

The movie was made by a man eager to bring millions

in touch with the depressing realities of ghetto education, but for the

supposed edification of the country, he had sacrificed the eelf-respeot
of one sohool community.

In the minds of many, the Clinic for Learning

was on a like course: it was not solving problems, it was blaming the
parents and the children; it was not helping the school, it was exposing it to immense degradation; to some, the Clinic was destroying the
sohool. Just to make n point.

As more and more parents came to see that

the school was failing, as more and more visited the sohool and saw chaos
in the hallo and classrooms, the Clinic for Learning bore the larger bur-

den of guilt.

Curiously, for a time, the administration of the school

wore the mantle of dedicated community service, immune from attack.

By

winter, 1967-68, the community, awaking to the plight of the school,

would no longer tolerate it and they demanded action: the Clinic must

'
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go.

**‘

»

In December, 1967, the Community Advisory Board formed a committee

of five community leaders to evaluate the Clinic for Learning and JHS 57.

The rage of the community is only lightly concealed in the document

which appeared two months later.

"The progress report £of the Clinic

for Learning) is a complete ’lie.’

The goals are a fairy tale.

Goals

are set up so that the child will be completely dissatisfied with living
,

in the ghetto."

(emphasis added.)

And:

The Clinic for Learning should not be continued in the
New York City public school system. The present teaching
methods, the organization, the personnel, and the whole
philosophy of the Clinic for Learning is ineffective for
improving the level of achievement of the ’disadvantaged*
child.

Reading scores of last year’s seventh graders, the report shows, had not
risen more than usual.

Because "the whole emphasis is on teacher train-

ing (of N.Y.U. undergraduates), the Clinic for Learning should be called
r

Clinic for Teacher Training.”’

Although the report pointed to "chaotic

conditions" in the school, they were hesitant to blame the teachers and
administrators, and called instead for the Principal to take over full

control administering the Clinic.
and the
As allies against the Clinic, the regular JHS 57 teachers
from
community did their best to subvert the Clinic’s authorization

above.

School of EducaAs early as April, 1967, the Dean of the N.Y.U.

Board meeting and,
tion had been asked to attend a Community Advisory
to task by a lot of peoin the words of the Principal, "had been taken

p le."

in the Dean's offices
In May and June other meetings were held

of the folloving year, (1967-68),
at N.Y.U., and In the fall and Vinter

parents and teachers.
he continued to hear from irate

In October, 1967,

Board
of a Clinic teacher, paid vith
a dispute over the responsibilities
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of Education funds, was taken directly to
the Superintendent of Schools.

By mid winter, frequent reports of incompetence
and confusion reached
the office of the Superintendent, and although he
was not often person-

ally involved in settling disputes, his patience was
growing short.

Sometime in the early spring of 1968, he told the Education Dean
that
the Clinic for Learning had outlived its usefulness: the Dean
replied

that he had already notified the Project Director to discontinue the

after June, 1968.

The recollections of the Superintendent of

Schools are instructive:
The one thing that stands out in my mind
it was the
only project I know of, while I was superintendent, that
turned out to be such a foul ball. The only one. Some
Projects didn't succeed as well as they should have. That's
understandable. This is the only one I had to step into
and say we're not going to continue it2g

In March, 1968, a research team from Hofstra University came to
the school and were enlisted to conduct an evaluation.

monumental.

The task was

The Clinic for Learning had made almost no effort to evalu-

ate itself, there was never real collaboration between Cluster Coordina-

tors either the first or second year. Clinic expenditures were not audited, and Clinic directors and staff had made no effort to document or

publish their findings.

"In the last week of the second year," recalled

one of the most successful Clinic teachers, "we tried to cone up with
some evaluation of the program.

But it was hopeless.

talked and some of us got good and angry.

We sat around and
t

We all felt so let down."

29

Given the disappointing content of the Hofstra report which finally

appeared in September, 1970, it is likely that neither the Ford Founda-

New
tion nor the central Board of Education nor the administrators of
\ v

i

the
York University nor the public at large have learned anything from

I
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experience of the Clinic for Learning.
The Project continued to operate in JHS 57 until June,
but it
was only for show.

Mo3t teachers and students had nothing to do with

the N.Y.U. personnel.
'

Administrators were no

the Y returned to old routines.

but as the Clinic

1

s

longer threatened, and

Parents for a time continued to attack,

visibility faded they saw no improvement in the

school's performance and they were forced to redirect their ire back to
'

the primary target, the school itself.

^Interview, Assistant Principal, June 25, 1971.
2

Interview, Principal, July

1

5,

1971.

o

Interview, Mario Fantini, Urban Education Officer, Ford
Foundation, November 22, 1971.

^Intepview, Bernard Donovan, Superintendent of Schools,
Y.C.,
November 28, 1971.
N.
'’interview, Principal, July 15,

197-1.

^Interview, Cluster Coordinator

2,

^Interview, JHS 57 teacher

1,

August 3, 1971.

August

li,

®New York Times , July 17, 1966, Section
^Interview, JHS 57 teacher

'

^Interview, JHS 57 teacher

2,

3,

June

1971.

8,

1±,

p.9.

1971.

June 15> 1971.

^Interview, JHS 57 teacher U, July
^

1

1971.

21,

1971.

^Written Communication, Cluster Coordinator U* September 21,

t
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13

Interview, Cluster Coordinator

Ill

1

,

July 23, 1971.

Interview, Cluster Coordinator
3, August l£, 1971.

^Written Communication, Director of Evaluation, May
5, 1972.
16

17

Clinic paper, "Perspective at Christmas Time," p.l.
Ibid, p. 13.

Written

Communication, Clinic Administrator, February

1,

1972.
19.

1967.

20

Clinic paper, "The Clearing," Issue No.1, February
9,

Principal's files, letter from

21

S.

Rochelle, January 26, 1967.

Clinic paper, "Progress Report," March, 1967.

22
i

Clinic paper, "The Clearing," Issue No. 2, March

1,

1967,

p.5.
23

Community paper, "Report of Ad Hoc Evaluation Committee,"
May 23, 1967.

2k
Clinic paper, "Ten Mile River Boy Scout Camp," Summer, 1967.
2$
26

Interview, On-Site Clinic Director, 1967-68, October 15, 1971
Interview, Principal, July

15>,

1971.

27

Community paper, "Report of the Community Committee,"
February 8, 1968, p.7.
pO

°Interview, Bernard Donovan, Superintendent of Schools, N.Y.C,
November 1 8 , 1971.

^Interview, Clinic teacher, August 28, 1971.

Chapter U

Proposition #1 - Effective changes in schools
is- facilitated by oarticipation of teachers in all decision making
proceeds
which affect them.
Though the Clinic planners intended to, and,
in their
estimation, actually did involve teachers in
decisionmaking processes, their unilateral resolution to
implement a Cluster arrangement was in blatant
contradiction. Because the Clinic staff was unable to
change
the knowledge and attitudes of regular school personnel to support this structural innovation, teachers
never really cared about the Cluster and ’under stood
neither its function nor their roles in it. Based
on other research the failure of the Clusters may be
explained satisfactorily, however, additional research findings may point to a necessary extension of
the above proposition.

Clinic for Learning planners had every intention of relying
on the above proposition in implementing their project.*

As we have

seen, the Cluster arrangement was specifically designed to involve

teachers in decision making and was to be the source of all classroom
innovations.

Yet, plainly, the Cluster arrangement did not have the

intended impact on the Clinic program.

Rather, the Cluster became the

focus of considerable negative reaction from teachers, which served more
to inhibit than to facilitate change.

To determine whether this repre-

sents a failure of the proposition, or a failure of the Clinic staff tc

use it properly, or both, requires a closer look at the available data.
Before the Clusters

The Clinic effort to involve teachers in decision making was sub
verted almost before it began.

Teachers in JKS 57 were to be involved

in the decision making of the Cluster, but no teacher participated in
73

*Note: See Chap.1, pp. 13-15, above.

i

,

>

74

the decision to establish Clusters.

Apparently without the understand-

ing of either the Project Director, the Principal,
or many of the Clinic
staff, the first major resolution reached by the
Clinic staff

to
C

adopt Clusters

resulted in a highly inflexible, unilateral, interven-

tion, totally in contradiction to the avowed precepts
of democracy and

non-authoritarianism espoused by the Clinic.

And not only was the de-

cision made without teachers, the strategy of implementation
*

°f the Principal

—

by order

could only reinforce to teachers their essential

marginality vis-a-vis the Clinic for Learning.

In the library meeting

the previous spring, the teachers had stated they needed more materials,

smaller classes, more help with discipline, and more help with clerical
tasks; they did not say they needed a decision making process in which

to fashion changes for themselves and JHS 57.

Not only were teachers

impeded by the bureaucratic fact of life which frowns on risk taking or
reform, but many teachers, especially those who were in their first year

of teaching, recall that they were already struggling very hard to adjust to the ever present confusion in the school and in their classrooms.

The Cluster arrangement, then, was not simply, as the Project Director
said, "a system of planning for planning,

11

it was a mandatory addition
/

i

to a teacher’s already harried schedule.

It did not merely provide

teachers with a neutral opportunity to "solve their own problems," it
gave them the added responsibilities of curriculum revision, improved

teaching, and supervision of N.Y.U. undergraduates.

"To let teachers

solve their own problems" appears to be a laudable goal for education reform, but when a teacher is pressured or forced into a position where he

must make decisions which previously have been made for him, it becomes,
in the words of the Clinic Director during the second year, a "kind of

I
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subtle authoritarianism" to which
he is being subjected.

In retrospect,

it seems clear that had the Clinic
arrived at the school with the promised services and resources, had a
relationship of mutual respect between Clinic and school developed, and
had teachers themselves been
,

re-.

sponsible for the decision adopting Clusters,
teacher participation in

Cluster activities would have been maximized.

This approach, at least,

would have been consistent with the precept of
teacher participation.
Bu-t

*-

considering this hypothetical approach raises still
other

considerations, for it is nowhere clear that under
any circumstances the

teachers of JHS 57 would have voluntarily chosen to
adopt Clusters.

Consistent teacher participation may have been a less effective
implementation strategy than the one which was used.

The contradictory reliance

on the power of the Principal in imposing Clusters may have been,
with

hindsight, a wise choice.

(What is curious, of course, is the almost

complete lack of awareness of the contradiction among the Clinic staff
five years after the project's end.)
x

In fact, there is research which

indicates that enforced structural innovation was the intervention
technique most likely to affect JHS 57

.

According to Blanchard and

Hersey (1972), a "coerced change cycle" which relies on power and authority is most appropriate with "immature" people who are "often dependent and not willing to take new responsibilities unless forced to do
so."

Such people, they argue, "might prefer direction and structure

to being faced with decisions that might be frightening to them."

1

We

have no evidence in this study to indicate that JHS 57 teachers fall
into this ‘“immature" category, though the problem is considered in
greater detail elsewhere in this chapter.

*Note:

See Chapter

1*,

pp. 89 - 89 , below.

Nevertheless, because tne

actions of the Clinic belie it's intention
to use a democratic or parti-

cipative change cycle, it may be appropriate
to look more closely at
the "coerced" or "structural" change cycle.
f

According to Blanchard and Hersey, there are
four levels of
change in individuals

;

changes in knowledge, in attitudes, in individual

behavior, and in group or organizational behavior.

Following a struct-

^ural change cycle, the first level of change is
that of group behavior.

By virtue of the legitimate power which accrues
because of an administra-

tor's rank in the educational hierarchy, that is, because of
his "position
power," a change is imposed on subordinates.

This results in the second

level of change, that of individual behavior as subordinates are forced
to behave in different ways.

This is precisely what occurred in the

Clinic for Learning: the decision to adopt Clusters was imposed by the
Principal, and teachers were immediately forced to begin to behave in

different

ways-,

if only to attend one Cluster meeting per week.

The

third level of change which must be accomplished in the successful
structural or coerced change cycle is individual knowledge; that is,

subordinates must now be made aware of the justifications for the imposed change, the attendant advantages, the potential benefits, and the
overall objectives the change is pursuing.

This in turn will lead

to the fourth level of change, change in attitudes.

At this final

stage, employees will come to understand the wisdom behind the innova-

tion, they will come to identify with its objectives, and participate

actively in its fruition.

The model of the coerced change cycle

offered by Blanchard and Hersey appears in Table I:

T
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In the participative change cycle, on the other hand, change
in knowledge is first precipitated by personal or informational power,

which precedes change in attitudes, which precede changes in individual
and group behavior, as per Table II:

Table II

become sililar
change cycle, the tasks of the successful change program
in the knowledge
to those of the participative cycle: inducing changes
9

and attitude levels of subordinates.

Whether we view the Clinic according

r

f
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to it's intention of using a
participative change cycle, or according
to the coerced change cycle which
was actually set in motion by the im-

position of Clusters, the functions
of the Cluster leaders were the same:
to extend knowledge of educational
innovations and reforms, to demonstrate to teachers that the Cluster could
provide them with help, to

show teachers how the Cluster could
be a potent forum for change, and

finally to induce the belief that change
was necessary and good.

In

short, the Clusters were to expand the
knowledge and attitudes of teach-

ers in support of educational reform.
The Clusters
The six Clusters of the Clinic for Learning relied solely
on

participative methods.

Based on the responses of all teachers who were

interviewed, it is clear that no Cluster Coordinator or Clinic staff mem-

ber ever mandated a curriculum change, or an alteration of teaching behavior, or a different method of disciplining, or any other matter relat-

ed to a teacher's activities in or out of the classroom.

All teachers

responded negatively when asked: "Were you ever forced by the Cluster
Coordinator to do anything differently?"*

All decisions which emanated

from the Clusters, though indeed they were few, were made by the teachers.
All teachers confirmed that "every teacher was given the same chance to

participate in the Cluster meetings."

No Cluster Coordinator, with the

possible exception of one, arrived at JHS $ 7 with a "program for change."
Rather, they viewed themselves^s part of a process for change from which

structure and content would evolve.

*Note:

The one exception, the leader of the

Although this question (and some that follow) was not asked
to every teacher in precisely these words, I have reviewed the
transcripts of teacher and Cluster Coordinator interviews and
have made certain of various responses by referring to closely related questions and answers.

language oriented cluster," "had made a
metaphysical assumption that if

you present people with evidence they will listen
to

it."‘

Although this

Cluster leader tried to induce his Cluster to
make certain decisions,
everyone was equally aware that he was powerless
to impose anything on
the teachers.

"I did more learning than teaching," he said
later.

Fin-

ally, the Project Director and his chief Administrative
Assistant both

supported the notion that teachers must find their own solutions to
their
fi
_

problems.

"We weren't going to plan anything for anybody," said the Pro-

ject Director.

"Teachers must be free to change at their own speed," said

his assistant.
Despite these efforts at securing support of the teachers, at

almost no time during the school year 1966-67 did the Clusters function
as they were intended to function.

Although a sizeable number of teachers

interviewed felt that "the Cluster arrangement could be a useful means
for improving a school," no more than a few of the teachers felt they
o

"had received any benefit from the Cluster meetings" of the Clinic, for

Learning.

Not a single teacher admitted that his teaching behavior had

been significantly affected by the Cluster meetings.

The withdrawal of

many teachers, the breakdown of several Clusters, the resignation of
numerous Clinic personnel, and the intense frustration felt by all members
of the Clinic staff will attest to the fact that the Cluster arrangement

did not facilitate the efforts

the Clinic for Learning to change the

.*

school

From the data, it appears there were four principle reasons why

*Note:

See Chapter

3, above.

80

involving the teachers in the decision
making of the Clusters hindered

rather than encouraged the Clinic for Learning.

1)

The Clinic never de-

livered the resources it promised and teachers
grew skeptical;

2)

Teach-

ers were unclear as to how their Cluster
responsibilities correlated

with the demands of administrators and the
requirements with which they
were more familiar, e.g., lesson plans, Board
of Education curriculum,
etc.; 3) The attitudes of many of the Clinic staff members
foreclosed

the possibility of meaningful interchange with teachers; and
U) Many tea-

chers never identified with the process of solving their own problems,
it was never "their" process, and it became instead just another

problem.
:l)

No resources provided.

!

Clinic planners had been anxious to secure a school as a "reality
base" for the teacher training component of the Clinic program, and they

viewed teacher receptivity as crucial.

Most JHS 57 teachers remember

the meeting in the library in the spring of 1966 as having one dominant
theme: New York University was prepared to commit itself to the improve-

ment of JHS 57.

Teachers were asked repeatedly to express their needs;

the Project Director vowed to help meet those needs, and the Principal

urged his teachers to listen and join.

The message was that burdens

would be lifted and problems would be solved.
that were never kept.

But these were promises

No resources from the Schools of Social Work,

Law, Dentistry, appeared at the school the first year, and when they did

*

appear, the project was already beyond repair.

No psychological ser-

vices were provided for the "emotionally disturbed."

"Teachers were al-

r>

ways asking, 'Where are all the resources*'" recalled the Principal.
available,
During the first, semester, there wa3 only one student teacher

/

and though there were twenty in the second
semester by this time the

Clinic was so fragmented that it had little effect on
their performance.

(A number of teachers ° surmised that the
effectiveness of student

teachers was due to traditional restraints

—

-the grade from the co-

operating teacher, the simple need to "survive"
ation with the Clinic.)

—

not to their associ-

Teachers were unprepared in the fall to be made

part of a "process of decision making" when all the while they were

expecting to get help

.

They had participated in what they saw as the

most crucial decision: how would N.Y.U. help JHS 57?

benefit from the fruits of their input.

They expected to

When they saw that Cluster

leaders as a group had no knowledge of JHS 57, no special qualifications,
no "useful" resources or materials, and on several occasions actually

demonstrated their incompetence by trying to teach a "model lesson,"

many quickly dropped out.

Because they expected their jobs to be made

easier, they soon came to view the Cluster, with its opportunities for

involvement in decision making, as a waste of time and a sham.
J
2)

Conflict with existing power relationships.

In introducing the Cluster to JHS 57, Clinic planners exhibited
a gross lack of concern for existing power arrangements among administra-

tors in the school.

In a junior high school, each of the major subjects

has a departmental chairman, who may also be an assistant principal, and

who is responsible to the principal.

Among the duties of department

chairmen are collecting weekly lesson plans from teachers, holding
periodic meetings of all department teachers to coordinate examinations,
the departcurriculum, and other matters, insuring that new teachers in
and occasionally
ment are given spme assistance adjusting to the school,

teaching demonstration lessons.

There were four such men in JHS 57 in

r
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the fall of 1966.

Each had been encouraged by the Principal to
accept

the Clinic for Learning, and work closely with
its staff, even though

many of the proposed responsibilities of the Cluster
Coordinators were
under the jurisdiction of the department chairmen.

The Clinic staff made

almost no effort to alleviate this obvious conflict of
interest.

De-

partment chairmen were not invited to Cluster meetings, they
were consulted very infrequently by the Clinic staff, and generally held
in low
esteem.

It is not surprising that they came increasingly to resent the

Clinic.

"They said we were rigid, no flexibility, and the kids disliked

us because we were authority," said one administrator.

"We wanted to see

it succeed, but we couldn't help, and so we turned our backs on it."

The

Principal had made it clear that Cluster teachers need not remain within the Board of Education curriculum; subject department chairmen made

their dissatisfaction about this policy known by demanding lesson plans,
insisting upon frequent classroom observations, and refusing to give
assistance to new teachers brought in by the Clinic.
Clinic staff attitudes.

3)

/

J

The Project Director had also asked at the library meeting, "Are

you doing the best job you possibly can?. Are kids really learning as
much as they should?"
can we help?"
teachers.

And when the teachers said "No," he asked "How

This presumably was done to put the onus for change on the

But such shallow and transparent psychology was hardly enough

to convince teachers that the Clinic ^as not coming to the school with

the already finished assumption that they (the teachers) were doing an

inadequate job.

At the spring meeting, Clinic staff members acknowledged

none of their predispositions about JHS 57 and it's "bankrupt" educational
policy.

It was precisely at this point that dialogue between the Clinic

and the teachers became nearly
impossible. .By refusing to admit they
felt the school was "bad," even
"destructive," they insured that that
message would be communicated in
countless other ways. By failing to

exorcise negative assumptions about
the teachers, the subtle maneuvering of the Clinic staff to reform JHS
57 was bound to produce open and

venomous resistance.

To adopt a stance which condemns poor
teaching is

certainly legitimate and probably would
have caused, in the words of one
Cluster Coordinator, more "original hostility,"
but to adopt such a
stance without acknowledging it is almost
certain to backfire.

As it

happened. Clinic staff members sought to conceal
their arrogance; but

their later reflections belie any claims to
equanimity.

One Cluster

Coordinator recalled: "The teachers didn’t want us around.
we come out there for, anyway?

body learned anything

—

What did

They were getting along alright.

but who cared?"

know how bad the teachers actually were."

No-

Another said: "We just didn't
^

A Clinic administrator ad-

mitted: "We had hypothesized that teacher-student relationships were

negative and punitive

^ Other Coordinators railed at teachers who, they

said, only wanted to hit and defeat and punish the students.

It is not

surprising that many teachers felt harrassed and threatened by the in-

truders from N.Y.U.
li)

Teachers never identified with the process of problem solving.

No doubt, there was some truth to the implicit accusations of
the Clinic staff.

But this is not

K,o

suggest that all teachers at JHS

57 were tradition bound and inflexible and unimaginative.

Teachers who

would not fit this description also rejected the decision making capabilities of the Cluster for related, but different reasons.

These

8U
teachers, in all but a few
cases, rejected the Cluster because
it never

was "their' s,“ it never was
useful to
vhich they had no control.

then, and it

was something over

-I went to a couple meetings,
saw that it

was nothing, and stopped going,”
said one teacher?

“The meetings had

almost no effect on me; I thought
they were a waste of time,” recalled
another.

ment

For these teachers there was
almost nothing to induce commitno special problems to solve, no
responsibilities, no apparent

benefits to them or the school.

The Cluster simply existed outside of

their sphere of interest.
Theoretical Implications
In the minds of the Clinic planners, reliance
on proposition #1

stated above, involving teachers in decision making,
was highly justified on a theoretical basis.

As we have seen, their initial reliance

was undercut by their failure to recognize the implications of
their decision to adopt Clusters.
o

*

ed purposes

—

Yet the Cluster could have served its intend-

to elevate the knowledge and attitude levels of teachers

with regard to educational change.

Involving teachers in the Clusters

did not have the intended consequences for the four reasons outlined
above:

1)

failure to deliver promised resources,

2)

organizational con-

flicts with school administrators, 3) Clinic staff attitudes, and U) no

teacher identification with the Clusters.

In determining whether this

reflects an inadequacy of the proposition, or of the way it was used,
other research may be useful.
Gross

et al

(1971), in a case study of an education innovation,

rejects the view that subordinate participation is positively related to
O

\

\

t

successful implementation of innovations.

After an extensive review of

the literature, Gross finds that
evidence to test the relative effectiveness of strategies of initiation that stress participation in comparison
with other methods, for example, imposition from the top,
is not available. Most proponents of subordinate participation use as the basis for their advocacy of this approach
personal experience, logical argument, or the findings of
a few empirical studies,
(p.26.)

Other literature points to the excessive extremes to which the principle
of subordinate participation can be extended, for example, allowing
wage

earners to participate in determining overall organizational goals
(Leavitt, 1965; Herzberg, Mausner, Snyderman, 1959).

Most of this dis-

sent, however, concerns the nature of the decisions on which employee

participation is solicited; there seems to be very widespread agreement
that employees should participate in some decisions which affect them,

although determining which decisions, and how, are subjects of some
controversy.
As outlined in Chapter

1

above, Bridges and Owens have suggested

three criteria for determing when a particular decision making process

should involve subordinates, a test for relevance, a test for expertise,
According to Bridges a decision is "rele-

and a test for jurisdiction.
I

K

-

.

^

——

’

—

.

vant" to a teacher, and the teacher should be included in the decision

making processes, if the teacher has a
in it.

"hjLgh

personal stake" and concern

The Cluster was designed to make all decisions about "What shall

be taught," and "Who shall teach what."

It would appear that no decision

could be more relevant to a teacher than "what shall be taught" or "who
shall teach what."

To try to reach decisions about these matters with-

out the participation of teachers would be clearly unwise.

On the other

many teachers
hand, the Cluster had very little legitimacy in the eyes of
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since they had had no hand in its design.'

They could be fairly certain

that no decision would come from the Cluster which
would adversely affect them.

Thus, it was not that the decisions weren't relevant,
but

that for many teachers there were no decisions to be made;
hence, the

Cluster itself was irrelevant.
Bridges uses a "test for expertise" to determine whether a de-

cision is "outside the scope of experience and sphere of competence."
It is likely that some teachers felt unsure of their ability to perform

tasks suggested by Cluster Coordinators.

It is likely that some were

confused and uncertain about what the role of Cluster teacher would be.

Had innovations been imposed on teachers, no doubt many would have protested their inability to perform in new ways.

But because the few de-

cisions which came from the Clusters were made by the teachers themselves, one must presume they felt competent, and experienced to deal

with the implications of the decision.
Owens has suggested as a third criteria a "test for jurisdiction,

that is, do the teachers have the requisite authority to implement their
decision.

There is some cause to doubt whether the proposed decisions

met this test in JHS 57.

We have already observed that one reason for

the failure of the Clusters was resistance from administrators who view-

ed them as an encroachment on the rules and regulations for which they

were responsible.

Subject department chairmen were the administrators

least likely to willingly abide by curriculum and staff decisions that
came from the Clusters.

For two reasons, however, we may suggest that

the Cluster arrangement did not totally fail to meet Owens' third criteria.

First, although department chairmen were resentful, there were

effect on
many potential areas of decision making which had only a small

9
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the chairmen.

Secondly, the Principal, especially
i„ the early months,

was staunchly in support of the
Clinic and impressed upon the
staff
that Cluster decisions would, within
the boundaries of legality, be

<.

legitimate.
•

Based upon these three criteria one
might predict that the

Cluster arrangement, though precarious,
would not have been the sorry
failure that it was.

Another widely reported but generally
unheeded

study may help clarify this discrepancy.

In I960, three researchers

tried to replicate the findings of the Coch
and French study* by measuring the effects of increased participation
on workers' productivity in
a Norwegian shoe factory.

(French, et al, i960.)

Of nine four-man

work groups involved,
five experimental groups met with their foreman and
representatives of the planning department to plan.... Two
of the experimental groups held two additional meetings in
which they participated in deciding about the division of
labor into four jobs.... (etc.} (p.18.)

Results showed no difference in the productivity of the experimental
groups.

To explain the apparent contradiction of the Coch and French

finding, the authors pointed to the "presence of relatively strong group

standards for the 'fair' or 'safe' level of production."

The workers

reported they would "not risk going beyond a given level" of production
for fear that wage rates and benefits would be changed.

Also, "the

Norwegian worker had a stronger tradition of being organized in a union
than had the workers in the American factory {of Coch and French}

.

This

in turn can produce an attitude that the legitimate pattern of partici-

pation is through union representatives rather than direct participation."
—
Note:

See Chapter

1,

p.13, above.

•
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(p.18.)

In other words, due to certain unanticipated
variables, workers

felt that increased production would have an overall
detrimental effect
on their interests.

The authors do not suggest that the theory of

employee participation needs revision, rather, “it is a theory
that could

explain differing effects of participation among different cultures,
among
different factories in the same culture, and among individuals in the
same
factory."

Numerous authors have asserted that a big city public school

bureaucracy is bound and gagged by the fear of its employees to risk

reprimand by stepping outside of their assigned roles. (Katz, 1971; Fantini,
1970; Levin, 1970).

David Rogers (1968), in 110 Livingston Street

,

per-

haps the best analysis of New York City, has blamed the "professional
bureaucracy" for the general stagnation of the system.

"What's wrong with

the system," he quotes one Principal as saying, "is the teachers who won't

take any responsibility for trying anything new.

The reason they won't do

so is that assistant principals, principals, and district superintendents

won't either, and this goes all the way up the chain of command." (p.279.)
In the environment of JHS 57, innovation in teaching and curriculum use

was not rewarded; "controD

"

was.

Teachers who were committed to the

children and to their growth were not respected; teachers who could main-

tain silence in their classroom were.

Department Chairmen who encouraged

their teachers to experiment were tolerated; those who collected lesson
plans were "hard working."

This milieu may well have contributed to the

failure of the participation strategy of the Clinic for Learning.

search would be needed to verify this hypotheses.

Re-

But based on it, and

obviated
on the hypothesis of the Norwegian study that “group standards"

89

the effects of increased participation, a fourth
criteria may be necessary
to determine whether participation would be beneficial:
a test for environ-

ment.

Roughly, this test should determine whether the
subsystem in which

employees, i.e. teachers, operate is conducive to change;
whether partici-

pation is valued; whether individual initiative is recognized
as important;
and whether new ideas and new ways of operating are looked at
warily by

those in power.

It may well be that in an environment not conducive to

change, participation will have no effect on performance and may, as in the

case of JHS 57, work against the success of a change project.

Note: One instrument for assessing environment is the Organizational
Climate Description Questionnaire (OCDQ) developed by Andrew W. Halpin.
Unfortunately, this instrument has been used primarily for research purposes, and less often to guide innovations.
(See Halpin, 1963.)

^

Kenneth Blanchard and Paul Hersey, Management of Organizational
Behavior .
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1971), p.161.
p

3

Interview, Cluster Coordinator 3, August 15, 1971.
Interview, Cluster Coordinator

1,

July 23, 1971.

^Written Communication, Director of Evaluation, May 5, 1972.
'’interview, JHS 57 teacher 9, June 22,

1971.

^Interview, JHS 57 teacher 10, June 2, 1971.

Chapter 5

Proposition #2:

Leadership behavior of outside change agents should be
high in relationship and low in task.

Leadership is vital to successful educational change. The
Clinic directors and Cluster Coordinators were to exercise the
kind of leadership defined by theorists of "organizational behavior and change" as being most appropriate for "change agents"
or "outside consultants," that is, high relationship, low task
behavior. The Clinic staff was uniformly ineffective in performing their leadership tasks. Because in varying degrees they
lacked knowledge, experience, and insight they failed to "lead"
the teachers in the Clusters or the school administrators in
any real sense. This failure, however, may have been predictable from the beginning: the non-directive, facilitative style
of leadership employed by the Clinic staff, the only style
available to them as outsiders, was the style least likely to
have an impact on the regular JHS 57 teachers who required more
structured and directive leadership. Theoretical implications
of this conflict are considered.

A considerable amount of research has stressed the importance of
leadership in schools.

Gross and Herriot (1965) found that Principals

who exhibited a high "Executive Professional Leadership" as determined
by teachers' responses to questions tended to correlate with higher

teacher morale, more professional behavior, and higher pupil achievement.

Herriot and St. John (1966) found that in lower socio-economic schools,
the Principal tended to have more impact on teachers' handling of prob-

lems of student discipline and school control.

Other authors have

argued that leadership is the single most important factor in in imple-

menting successful change projects (Gross, et al, 1971).

It is important

to note, however, that these and other studies concern only those within

\

\
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a given organizational structure.

In evaluating the performance of the

N.Y.U. Clinic for Learning, a more limited
definition of leadership must
be construed to account for the fact that Clinic
staff members held no

position within the heirarchy of the N.Y.C. School System.

Whereas

the Principal of a school presumably has a full range of
leadership pos-

tures available to him, the Clinic staff was forced to rely on
a very

restricted kind of leadership behavior, one which insured their continued
,

acceptance in the school, on the one hand, and which fostered innovations
in teaching, on the other.

There is widespread agreement among theorists about the leadership objectives that the successful outside consultants must pursue
(Jung,

1967; Bennis, 1966; Sarason, 1971; Owens, 1970; Golembiewski , 1970;

Argynis, 1971).

Generally, these objectives can be grouped in four cate-

gories: 1) diagnosing, 2) building an environment conducive to change,
3)

providing linkages between clients and outside resources, and

!*)

facilitate setting of common goals.
1)

Diagnosis:

The most crucial job of an outside consultant

before he can exercise leadership is, in the phrase of Seymour Sarason,
to understand "the culture of the school."

keep

He must know which factors

the school in equilibrium, and maintain the balances of power, in-

fluence, and responsibility: he must recognize the relationship between

teachers and administrators, between teachers and students, and between
the internal school environment and extfcmcJ. pressures; he must decipher

group norms,

peer relationships and pressures, the "modal," or normal

change processes which occur in the school, and make a rudimentary

"force-field analysis," cataloguing the positive and negative forces for
change.

The task of diagnosis is never complete, and there are no final

'

rules as to what constitutes a competent
diagnosis.

Because so called

"change agents" are the chief purveyors
and benefactors of intervention

theories which highlight the importance of
diagnosing the client system,
they most often make this final determination
themselves, with the advice of those who have sanctioned their
presence

—

i.e., in schools,

administrators and principals.
2)

Building an environment conducive to change:

The emergence

of the role of outside consultant as facilitators has
roughly paralleled
the growth since the late 19U0's of "T-Groups," or Training
Groups.

T-Groups are small groups usually numbering no more than twelve,
in which
the reluctance of the nominal leader to exercise leadership results
in a

"leadership

vacuum" in which participants are encouraged to explore

questions relating to their own behavior.

Relying heavily on the tech-

nique of "feed-back," offering descriptive and non-evaluative comments
to another about his behavior patterns and its effects on others, a T-

Group is designed to facilitate personal and professional growth.

In

the non -authoritarian, non-threatening environment of a T-Group, openness, trusting, and sharing are highly valued, and pent-up feelings or

emotional blockages give way to more complete, and satisfying communication.

The literature reveals that virtually all proponents of outside

change agents support if not its full techniques at least the goals of
the T-Group, that is, its supportive, open, democratic ambiance.

In a

contrasting "closed" environment, "feedback" often becomes "criticism,"
trust is dangerous and ill-advised, and closely shielded emotions stifle

interpersonal communication. Change of any sort in such a setting is fraught

with risk; in an '"open" system, change agents believe, participants will
be more acceptant of new attitudes and behaviors.

f
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Providing linkages with outside resources:

^3)

Presumably,

change agents have a wide range of knowledge
and experience which will

allow them to link clients, for example,
teachers, to a multitude of
resources which alone they would have neither
the time nor the inclina-

tion to seek out.

Change agents can provide teachers with the
products

of scientific research, with new materials, with
direct contact with
"experts" in a given field, and with other teachers
and administrators

in the same school who may have new ideas.

In short, the change agent

can act as a connecting pin between the internal system and
its surround-

ing environment.
Setting common goals:

4)

Depending on the client system, an

outside change agent will be called upon to assist in formulating change
objectives.

Sarason

( 1

971

In some cases, such as the new Math program reported by
) ,

the overall goals of the proposed innovation will have

been decided by higher administrators before a change agent is solicited.

In such a case, the change agent would be useful in devising sub-

goals to facilitate implementation.

In other situations, such as the

one described by Fantini and Weinstein (1968), change agents are in-

strumental in specifying problem areas and determining which problems to
attack.

In this latter situation, which roughly corresponds to the

Clinic for Learning, the central task of the group facilitator/change

agent is to lead his group to a consensus and a common commitment to

change
It is apparent here that none of the functions of an outside
•

.

change agent are suggestive of a "high task" leadership style.

*See Chapter

1,

p.17, for full definition.

*

Because

of his role as an outsider, high task behaviors

—

defining roles and

responsibilities, establishing patterns of organization,
directing subordinate involvement

—

are unavailable to the consultant.

Indeed, the

"temporary social system" which the change agent- is seeking to build
stands at the antithesis of authoritarianism or directiveness in any
sense.

Most theorists of planned organizational change fully recognize

that this lack of "position power," that is, formal power within the
organization, limits the behavior of the outside consultant.
(1961*)

Bennis

has written that "of the possible sources of power" available to

change agents, the most effective is "value power"
the ability to influence through representing and transmitting values which are admired and desired by the client
system. . . . concern for our fellow man, experimental! sm, openness and honesty, flexibility, cooperation, and democracy.
(p.36l.)

It is for this reason that strategies developed for change agents

stress interpersonal and human relations skills.
fiiost

Thus, change agents are

successful using a "high relationship" leadership style

—

stress-8-B*

ing personal relationships, socio-emotional support, mutual trust.
Presumably, given a modicum of credibility within an organization, the

change agent will be able to establish a "personal power" base by virtue
of his own expertise.

The intentions of the Clinic for Learning staff suggest an awareness of the need for a high relationship and low task leadership style. ***
The values listed by Bennis are precisely those espoused by the Clinic

See Chapter
See Chapter

pi 17, above for full definition.
explanation.
1, pp.11*-l6, above for full

1,
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staff.

Despite some early disagreements,
the staff pursued the leader-

ship behavior which appeared most
likely to protect the fragile power

base upon which the Clinic for Learning
rested.

Directing and organiz-

ing almost nothing, they sought
simply to engage the regular JHS 57

staff in a process of problem solving, whereby
teachers would dictate

tasks to themselves.

Based on the four objectives of leadership defined

above, how well did the Clinic staff fare?
1)

Diagnosis:

The complaint heard most frequently from regular

JHS ^7 teachers was that the Clinic staff did not
"understand" the
school.

They did not, said the teachers, recognize the absolute neces-

sity of strict discipline both in and out of the classroom; they refused
to give up ivory tower notions that "coerced learning" is somehow contra-

dictory; they showed little respect for the opinions of experienced teac-

hers and administrators.

The Principal and his chief assistant shared

the conclusion that the Clinic failed to "take the school as it was."
"If you get people running it," said the Principal with reference to the

Clinic staff, "who haven't had any experience in education, suddenly
saying,

'You don't know what you're doing,' and 'This system you're

holding up has to be destroyed,' people say 'Wait a minute.'

Because

this is their livlihood, and every man has a right to protect it."

1

Several of the Cluster Coordinators confirmed, with hindsight, that the
Clinic staff had failed to look closely enough at the reality of JHS 57.

Said one: "We didn't very clearly analyze the classroom teacher in the
school

—

what makes up the system she's in, what her problems are, her

investments are, her vested interests, commitment to the status quo,

what indoctrination she has had, how she has already had to conform to
the system because she's been there a couple of years."

2

Another: "Our
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planning was rather extensive, however,....
we were primarily working and
talking about problems of students.

Once the program began our main

problems were teachers' and administrators'
resistance to any and all
of the innovations we had so diligently planned
in the ivory towers of

N.Y.U."

Another spoke in more personal terms:

"I wasn't prepared for

the fact that an overwhelming number of seventh grade kids
weren't even

functioning on a first grade level.
depth of the problems.

should have upset me

.

"

I wasn't prepared for the absolute

With hindsight,
^

I

look back and wonder why it

And, not surpri singly, the community was almost

unanimously in accord with its evaluation report finding that "The plan
for the Clinic was conceived by N.Y.U. personnel who had not taught in

Bedford-Stuyvesant and were not involved in Bedford-Stuyvesant community
affairs."^

The only man whom teachers and community considered to have

an adequate understanding of the school was the on-site Director the

second year of the Clinic.
him.

There were two crucial tenets which guided

First, he recognized that an inner city school made different de-

mands on teachers, administrators, and potential change agents.

"You

have to know the needs of the community," he said later:

Black children need more of an authority figure in the
classroom. The majority of the Clinic staff was coming from
a white, middle class background, and they didn't have what
it takes. Sometimes it almost reauires you to subvert your
professionalism to meet the needs of the kids, (emphasis
added.

In other words, the educational theories do not always apply.

Given that the Clinic for Learning was trying ultimately to improve the

lot of the child, they did woefully little to comprehend his complex

world at JHS 57.

As one teacher commented:

The kids, in Bedford-Stuyvesant are like kids no where
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else.

The Clinic people had read a few books
about "disadvantaged students," but when they came to
57, they didn't
know anything.^

Without knowing the child, there was little hope
for empathy or
understanding with teachers.

Had they understood, it is very unlikely

they would have devised a change strategy based on a high
relationship-

low task leadership style.

In such a situation, the outsider without

power stands almost no chance of having an impact on the school.

The

second belief that guided the second year Director was that change
would

be small, it would not be "revolutionary," it would not be primed for
nationwide replication."

In working with the system, he was willing to

accept the paramount goals and vested interests that supported it.

Hav-

ing reached this basic accomodation, he was able to maneuver.

We did find some administrative running room. I did not
find regulations constantly binding. There were openings
that could be exploited. But they were small openings. The
big issues were not open.g
%

c

By the time the second year Director arrived, the damage result-

ing from poor diagnosis had already been done.

His experience and in-

sight could have almost no impact on the overall fate of the Clinic.

In short, five years after the demise of the Clinic for Learning,
the evidence apoears overwhelming that Clinic planners failed dismally

in diagnosing the school.

This verdict, however, may not be sufficient.

Piecing together the events of the spring and summer of 1966 reveals that
a large number of respected, apparently responsible and competent men

and women did not share this conclusion of history.

The Principal, who

presumably knew the school better than anyone, was exhuberant all during
the planning phases.

The Dean of the N.Y.U. School of Education was

instrumental in finding funds for the Clinic, and although he held some

}

%
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reservations about the abilities of
the Project Director based on his

experiences with Project APEX, the Doan
did not counsel for "more complete diagnosis" of the school.

The officers at the Ford Foundation

went over the project proposal minutely;
their presumption was that the
Clinic staff did understand the school
sufficiently.

Furthermore, all

of the Cluster Coordinators except one had
taught at the secondary level;

four of them had taught black or Puerto Rican
children; all but one of
them had on at least several occasions been in JHS
57 during the spring
of 1966.

Finally, the amount of time which the Clinic staff spent
plan-

ning ("8-10 hours a day") during the summer suggests they
felt that any
deficiencies which existed in their diagnosis would not prove disastrous.

This is not to imply that the Clinic staff did, in fact, conduct
a satisfactory analysis of the school before entering it.

to point to the elusive nature of any "diagnosis"

;

Rather, it is

in retrospect, it

appears that change agents who "succeed" have diagnosed well, those who
^"fail" have not.

Is "diagnose," then, more than just a convenient means

of explaining what has already happened?

Certainly no responsible edu-

cator, like the members of the Clinic staff, would undertake a change

project knowing that he had conducted a "poor" diagnosis of the client
system; as with the "personality theory" outlined above,* "poor diagnosis" may be a too simple explanation of failure.
2)

Building environment conducive to change:

Proponents of

planned organizational change processes will argue that leading a
successful Training Group (T-Group) demands experience and skill. (Miles,

Note:

See Introduction, p.7, above,
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1959: Bradford, Benne, Gibb, 1961*).

The staff of the Clinic for Learn-

ing made no pretense of possessing such
skills; indeed, there is little

indication they were even familiar with the
concepts of the T-Group, or
of "group process," or even of "organizational
change," as they are

commonly thought of.

Yet the objectives which Cluster leaders sought

are similar to the objectives of an organizational
change strategy

openness, information sharing, common involvement, team building,
etc.

Whereas "professional" change agents or Training Group leaders
would no
doubt scoff at the efforts of the unskilled Cluster leaders, other com-

mentators are more cautious.

For example, Odiorne (1970) has written:

In the absence of any research evidence which demonstrates that (T -Grouping) changes behavior, we are left
with nothing but anecdotal evidence and example drawn
from experience. This qualifies any number of people to
judge,
(p.277.)

Skousen (1970) suggests that irreparable damage may be caused by T-Group
tampering with the possibly precarious emotional balance of participants.
;o

These authors would undoubtedly argue that the "skilled" T-Group leader
is no more valuable than the reasonably competent but "unskilled" leader

of any work group in a job setting.

To the extent that they were sin-

cere, the Cluster leaders were behaving no differently than countless

scores of those in "helping relationships" before the "science" of organi-

zational change was born.
Again, this is not to absolve the Clinic staff, rather, to suggest that their lack of interpersonal competence was not the decisive

factor in their inability to create an environment conducive to change.
At least two other reasons are critical.

First, because they were

essentially uninvited by the regular teachers, the Cluster meeting be'

\
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came almost unavoidably a threatening experience.

Because "improved

teaching behavior" was always an implicit goal
of the Clinic for Learning, teachers implicitly defended themselves.

labeling the Clinic "a waste of time."

A favorite defense was

One teacher may have been

talking about himself when he said:
I think that for some teachers there was
not that much
willingness to cooperate, because a lot of the ideas that
were being tossed around were old hat. They had been
tried
already
1

.

^

Only the most self-assured and capable teachers, a very small
percentage,
could use the Cluster as a resource; for the others it was simply another
source of embarrassment and irritation.

One Cluster leader put it this

way:

A lot of teachers were put in a very difficult position...
The Clinic, with all its high ideals, placed teachers in a
position where they had to appear to be mercenary and sometimes pretty rotten people.^

That this conflict was never brought to light, in any of the Clusters,

foreclosed any chance of real collaboration.

^

Secondly, the goal of an

open, trusting Cluster was anomalous in the closed, bureaucratic, hier-

archical ambiance of the school.

It was not likely that teachers would

drop their guard for Cluster meetings when guarding was such a vital

part of their survival in dealings with students, department chairmen,

and top administrators.

In the "survival environment" of the urban

classroom, humanitarian precepts often fall on deaf ears, (see, for example, Gentry, et al, 1971).
3)

Providing linkages:

Virtually all of the teachers complained

that the Clinic for Learning reneged on its promise to mobilize the re-

sources of New York University.

Nor did the teachers receive enough

new materials or "expert" advice to satisfy them.

The administration
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and the community charged the
Clinic with providing only
unfulfilled
pledges and useless verbiage.
The evidence here is preponderantly
_
against the Clinio staff. Time
and again, expectations were
inflated
then crushed. Despite their
early questioning of teachers,
little actual planning was done to
determine what in fact teachers did
need, and
could use in their classrooms.
Valuable linkages with the external

environment were not provided.

Nevertheless, damning commentary comes

mostly from those whom the Clinic failed,
i.e., teachers, administrators
and community.

The Project Director, on the other hand,
recalls:

11
the p ®°P?- e [Clinic staff) were experienced
personnel
in tu
in
the public schools, in their field and
in their profession. ,,
t this moment I still would have no
criticism of these people. 11

Although some "gave up" after no more than
a month or two, all of the

Cluster leaders arrived at JHS 57 with a common
resolve; to help make
the school a better place for students and teachers
alike.

The link-

ages they provided with outside resources proved to be
inadequate, yet

they were experienced, professional people presumably doing
their best.
The faulty, and very common, assumption they held was that
good people,

working hard, improvising, innovating could succeed in changing a school
i

In fact, very extensive planning and coordination were required to pro-

vide adequate outside resources, and this was never done.

The assistant

Principal, the chief liason between the school administration and the
Clinic, summed up the Clinic’s strategy:
I used to ask for reports, guidelines (from the Cluster
Coordinators}. They said, We can't plan in advance, we
take it as it happens."
"Okay," I said, "What happened
last week?" "Well, we didn't take any notes."
,r

k)

Setting common goals:

For all of the reasons cited above

there is little doubt that the Clinic for Learning staff was grossly
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unsuccessful in facilitating common goal setting among
the teachers and
administrators in JHS 57.

One focal consideration deserves repeating:

essentially, Clinic planners relied on the intrinsic motivation of JHS
57 teachers to provide the impetus for change in the Clusters.

Aside

from this, there was nothing to encourage teacher involvement, nothing
to persuade teachers that replacing time worn but predictable behaviors

with new and uncertain ones was in any sense worth the effort.

Because

intrinsic motivation often does not prosper in a chaotic survival environment, the Clinic and the school remained at odds.

Far from becoming a

"process of problem solving," the Cluster arrangement became for most

teachers simply another problem.
Based on the, at best, ambivalent performance of the Clinic
.

staff in achieving the four objectives commonly associated with outside

change agents, a satisfactory explanation of the failure of the Clinic
can be fashioned.

It would seem that no change project could withstand

the burdens of poor diagnosis, weak environment building, inadequate re-

/
sources, and undefined goals.

And yet the hesitations of judgment above

indicate a reluctance to conclude on this note.

Somehow, it seems as

if a team of even the most widely competent and professional change
agents, experts at diagnosis, environment building, etc., would have had

difficulty in JHS 57.

Somehow, the above discussion does not seem to

tell the whole story.
on the
In trying to describe leadership behavior, we have relied

organizational change
two dimensions most commonly used by theorists of
behavior.
task oriented behavior and relationship oriented

and Hersey

(197.1)

—

Blanchard

effecthave suggested the need for a third dimension,

*See Chapter

1,

p.17, above.
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iveness, to aid administrators
in choosing an appropriate
leadership
style. Relying on studies
which conclude' there is no
single "best”
a ership style, they argue
that the only appropriate
measurement of
leadership is its success in
achieving defined goals. Rejecting
the
widely held belief that high
task-high relationship
called "team"
leadership by Blake and Mouton
(196b)
is the best leadership style,

-

-

they postulate a "life cycle" theory
which holds that leadership must
be dependent on subordinates'
maturity levels that is, on the ability
and motivation of subordinates to
act with independence and responsi-

bility and internal satisfaction.

They argue that for very immature
em-

ployees, those incapable of thinking and
acting for themselves, high

task -low relationship style is most
appropriate.

As employees become

less dependent and more capable of independent
activity, the measure of
task behavior will decrease while concern for
relationship increases.
For highly motivated, highly competent people, a
low task-low relation-

ship style is most appropriate.

(See Table III.)

TABLE III

subordinates
maturity level:

mature 4

),

immature

2

high

3

leadership
behavior

r

l

concern for relationship

j

low

Jk

V

1\

low

high
concern for task

If, as we hypothesized in the previous chapter, it is true that

teachers in the New York City School System are rewarded not for teaching

?

9
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but for controlling students, and if the bureaucratic
milieu is responsible for the cautious and dependent behavior that
seems to characterize

many teachers, and if most JHS 57 teachers had been struggling
before
the Clinic to reach some sort of satisfactory accommodation to their

strenuous predicament as ghetto teachers, then according to Blanchard and

Hersey's schema the most appropriate style of administrative leadership

would tend toward high task-low relationship (Quadrant
haps high task -high relationship (Quadrant

2)

.

1

above)

,

or per-

In such an environment

a high relationship-low task leadership style (Quadrant

3)

or a low re-

lationship-low task style (Quadrant U) will be misconstrued as "weak"

leadership and the increased freedoms for independent activity will be
abused.

A useful analogy to illustrate this dynamic is found in the re-

lationship between students and teachers in inner city schools.

Gerald

Levy (1970) has perceptively described the plight of the "liberal,"
"humanitarian, " hence, "high relationship" teacher in the ghetto school:
(jbey) are unprepared for the task assigned them. The
abstract morality of their suburban and academic past does
not prepare them for ghetto education. -Their assumption
that teaching will provide an arena for the expression of
their humanitarianism is severely tested by their initiation
into Midway's life. Destroyed by the children and forced to
fall back on the illiberal techniques they so despise many
experience the bankruptcy of their liberalism. (p.175»)

McMillan (1971), in an article written about JHS 57, has argued that "in
the beginning one must be the teacher that the children do respect

the mean teacher

—

not only the teacher that they should respect

concerned, imaginative teacher."

(p.65.)

—
— the

The point of both authors is

in the
that a high relationship-low task teaching style will result
"destruction" of the teacher by the students.

The only functional teacn-

students' expectations
ing style, then, is one which measures up to the

I
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of strict discipline and high task behavior.

A similar argument can be

made about teacher expectations: their immersion in the system, among
other things, has lead them to rely on the strong bureaucratic and ad-

ministrative limits placed on their behavior; they are not generally

accustomed to responsibility and independence.

Following Blanchard and

successful is
Horsey’ s argument, the only leadership style which will be

high task
one which corresponds to their level of maturity, that is, a
style

Theoretical Implications
to aid persons
This theoretical formulation, however, is designed

organization, a Principal, a dewho hold legitimate positions within an

partment chairman, a teacher.

We have seen that the most appropriate

based on the guidelines of
leadership style for the outside consultant,
"change agent," is one which reresearch which defines the role of the

lies

he«?i^m^no»atic

and humanitarian values.

What, then, is the

school such as JHS 57 ?
task of the outside consultant in a

How does a

democratic and
an organisation where
consultant exercise "value power" in
how does one
rejected? On the other hand,
humanitarian value systems are

to implement
when he has little authority
exercise high task leadership
any of his decisions?

Coordinators felt that if they
A few of the Cluster

would have never done it.
do over again," they

had it to

"The way we had it

Said another:
was no way for it to work."
planned," said one, "there
have used the
the school, we wouldn't
and
system
the
4t we had examined
were at least two
this pessimism, there
notwithstanding
Cluster." Yet
open for future consults
Clinic staff, two avenues
the
for
open
avenues
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teams in inner city schools: first,
relying' heavily on the position power
of the Principal, and secondly,
providing a very high level of technical
competence.

Position Power of the Principal

—

j

As we noted in Chapter Three above, a few
of the Clinic staff

members felt that the original strategy of implementing
an instructional
program, a direction eventually discarded by the majority
of the Clinic
staff, would have been more successful.

This would have required the

consistently strong administrative leadership of the Principal.
cision to adopt Clusters was mandated by the Principal.

The de-

But rather than

rely Pu**ther on administrative fiat to implement curriculum or scheduling
decisions, the Clinic for Learning both turned away, and was driven away.
It turned away for philosophical reasons, force and coercion were not

consistent with what they believed to be their more ethical value system.
In a very real sense they looked down on the JHS 57 staff for the timid

manner in which they submitted to and perpetuated the rigidly hierarchical
authority structure of

"the

school system.

They were driven away, as we

have seen, by their failure to deliver the promised services and by their
i

refusal to compromise on even the most uninhibiting administrative restraints

—

for example, parent permission slips for student trips.

By

not understanding, or accepting, that authority is the cornerstone of
bureaucracy, the Clinic stumbled helplessly into an inevitable series of
confrontations, first with teachers, then administrators, then parents.

Not recognizing the usefulness of administrative strength, and hypocriti-

cally rejecting the tactic of coercion, they foreclosed at least one
avenue that might have proved useful.

For in the early days of the Clinic,

*
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the Principal, with the support of the District
Superintendent, the

Superintendent of Schools, and the Board of Education,
was unmistakably
and unequivocally a friend.

The Clinic all but ignored what could have

been a most potent impetus for reform.
There is some evidence that Clinio planners at least
recognized
this possibility in the early stages of planning.

Early Clinic literature

suggests that each Cluster would vary according to the specific competencies of the Coordinator.

The Cluster Coordinator most in favor of the

direct implementation strategy lamented later,

”

I thought the program we

came up with was going to be implemented strongly.”

The assistant Prin-

cipal in charge of liason recalled, "At the beginning we got the impres-

sion that each Cluster Coordinator would come in with a definite plan in

mind for direction.

But we never saw these guidelines."

But as we have

seen, those advocating a "totally" collaborative change strategy were in

the majority and were eventually responsible for fashioning the Cluster
as the focus of the Clinic's low task -high relationship leadership style.

Finally, it is curious that all of the Clinic planners whom I

contacted have simply "forgotterf that Clusters had been unilaterally

imposed on teachers.

Not a single Clinic staff member spoke to me of

this contradiction, in a direct way; indeed, most still believe that

they did everything possible to establish a democratic, collaborative
environment in which teachers could change themselves; that teachers
didn't change only proves further their ineptitude.

High Technical Competence
A second solution lies in the definition of "high task" leadership.

Blanchard and Hersey

(

1969 ) write: "In brief, task oriented
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behavior consists of structuring the relationship and activities
in a
group situation in terras of task accomplishment."

But this type of be-

havior is not available to an outsider, who must gain credibility by
offering values that are respected and rewarded in the organization.
The solution lies in broadening the definition of "task" behavior to in-

clude highly skilled and/ or highly technical behavior of the kind re-

spected by subordinates.

Stuart-Kotze (1972) has developed this thesis

by suggesting that for immature employees effective leaders will not only
have to "plan, control, design, etc." but exhibit a high level of "technical competence."

In an educational change setting, "technically compe-

tent behavior" is of a kind which teachers will both respect and seek to
emulate.

JHS 57 teachers, as practitioners, had strong opinions about

what would and would not work in their classrooms; as noted above, there
is little doubt they would have graciously adopted techniques they felt

would result in higher reading and math scores for their children. Similarly, they would be immediately grateful for any added resources or

materials that would make their jobs easier.

Had the Clinic been able

to produce on their promises of psychological and legal assistance, had

they come to the school loaded with materials that teachers could use,
even something as simple as mimeographed worksheets, if real "experts"

who knew how to teach in a black and Puerto Rican school had accompanied
manner,
the Clinic, thj.t is, had they performed in a technically competent
of time,
and had the resultant benefits continued for a sufficient length

developed in which
then it is likely that a climate of change would have

behavior of an
teachers would have been more receptive to the leadership

outside consultant.
two major effects.
High technical competence leadership will have

First, it will help provide an
environment in which high concern for

relationships will be valued by subordinates;
once consultants have, in
a sense, "proved" themselves to subordinates,
their highly affective and

humane styles are not so likely to be judged
"wishy-washy" or "impractical."

Secondly, technically competent behavior can
provide a certain

cushion of credibility for consultants which will
allow them to exercise
a high task -high relationship leadership.

Immature employees are far more

likely to take orders from someone who has "done them a favor,"
than from
someone who has only promised to do so.

The efforts of the Clinic for Learning staff to exercise techni-

cally competent leadership were unsuccessful.

Not only did the Clinic

staff not possess the kind of competencies that would have benefitted
teachers, they were dismally incapable of mobilizing the skills that were

available

—

experts from New York University, abundant written and audio-

visual materials, and above all, experienced teachers and administrators.
Clinic planners had been well aware that gaining teachers' support would

demand some kind of new reward system; the total inadequacy of what they

provided is only another indication of their cursory understanding of
teacher needs
During the second year of the Clinic there was one dynamic and
successful example of technically competent leadership.
"expert" from N.Y.U.

A Social Studies

who had little to do with the Clinic was in charge

of supervising several undergraduate student teachers.

One was assigned

to an eighth grade class in which the regular teacher had "given up"

because the class was in perpetual and uncontrollable bedlam.

The student

o

teacher came to the expert desperate and in tears and asked for help.
The expert replied:

»
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you don,t agree
a lot of
you think it's kind of reactionary, and fascist, but you've
tried your thing and it's
f Lle
S ° tlT mine
1 told her not to balk to any
kids
? +^
lnt ° the r °° m
this meant bein g unfriendlv + her
because y°u lose your class that way...
I
toid uher x’”
to prepare written work... I told
her even if
she got into a good discussion about
something to go on
to the next p ast of the lesson.
l?

stuff

^5

’u
because
*

The students came in, she silently waved
them away from the desk, gave

them the written work, proceeded briskly
through the lesson, and the
bell rang without so much as a raised voice.

"The cooperating teacher

is sitting in the back telling me he doesn't
believe it," said the

expert later.

Soon after this incident, regular teachers began seek-

ing him out, teachers who hated the Clinic and
everything about it, to
ask his advice.

As one of the Clinic staff members reflected:

"He

was the only one that came up with anything meaningful for the new
teachers.

But by then it was too late." 1 ^

This was the kind of

c

immediate help

that might have launched the Clinic for Learning, but

when it came the Clinic was effectively over.

^Interview, Principal, July l£, 1971.
2

Interview, Cluster Coordinator

1,

July 23, 1971.

^Written Communication, Cluster Coordinator

2,

August 3, 1971.

1

^Interview, Cluster Coordinator 2, August 3, 1971.

•
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Community Paper, "Report of the Community
Committee,"
February 8, 1968.
^Interview, On-Site Clinic Director, 1967-68, October
Interview, JHS 57 teacher 5, June 13 1971
,
8

15

,

1971.

15

,

1971.

.

i

Interview, On-Site Clinic Director, 1967-68, October

Interview, JHS 57 teacher 6, June 17, 1971.
10 .

Interview, Cluster Coordinator 3, August

11

12

13

5,

1971.

Interview, Project Director, July 16, 1971.
Interview, Assistant Principal, June 25, 1971.
Interview, N.Y.U. Professor, November

1,

1971.

^Interview, Clinic teacher, August 28, 1971.
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Chapter 6

Proposition #3:

Parents and community groups in inner cities
must be
given broader opportunity to participate in
the life
of the public school.

Proposition #3a:

The Clinic for Learning could act as
a catalyst for
increased involvement by parents and community.

».

^

$7 is a failing institution. Historicallv, the failure
of efforts to improve education for ‘'disadvantaged"
students
has led to sporadic attempts by black and Puerto
Rican parents
to exercise more control over the public school. The
community
development plan of the Clinic for Learning was of low
priority
in 1966, but in 1968, parent and community reaction had brought
it to center stage. The issues surrounding the Clinic's
attempts to catalyze the community are complex, and are best
seen through the eyes and experiences of the two community
agents from the community. The majority of parents were "traditionalists" and reacted negatively to the Clinic, as did one
community agent. A small but growing percentage backed the
3^8 attacked the school administration, as did the other.
The film, "The Wav It Is," highlighted even more the split in
community reaction. Though there is a lack of data to determine
whether the limited community participation the Clinic evoked
benefitted the school, certain directions can be discerned.

Background
In JHS 57, where in 1965 students ranked one hundred and four in

reading achievement out of one hundred and eight New York City junior

high schools, only about two-thirds of the students entering the seventh
grade finish the ninth grade; thus, the seventeen seventh grade classes

in September, 1966, became only twelve ninth grade classes in June, 1969*

Of these, approximately one -third graduated from the ninth grade with an
academic diploma, signifying that they had scored over a seventh grade

level in reading and word comprehension.

Based on Board of Education

statistics, it is likely that no more than half of this number ever

finished high school, and probably no more than half again received academic diplomas.

Thus, given a class of six hundred fifty seventh graders,
111
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no more than four hundred
fifty are likely to graduate from ninth grade,

and only about two hundred will
graduate with academic diplomas.

Of

these two hundred, about one -hundred
will finish high school, and maybe
fifty, at best, will receive academic
diplomas.

In short, roughly twelve

out of every thirteen seventh grade
students in some black and/or Puerto

Rican schools in New York City, that is,
as many as ninety percent of
them, will not successfully navigate the
public school course, (see

Brooklyn Educ. Task Force, 1970).
It was not until the late 19^0'

s

and early 1960's that the plight

of the "culturally disadvantaged child" came into vogue
among liberal

white educators.

Some professional educators focused on the child and

his cultural milieu; the child's inability was alternately blamed on
"sensory deprivation," language patterns in the home, value differences,
social deprivation, poverty, and a host of other environmentalist ex-

planations.

At the same time, an increasing number of liberal educators

began to discern failings in the curriculum; observers became aware of

/
the implicit presence of "middle class values" in most public school

curriculums, and this was posited as the reason why lower class black

children were unable to achieve at rates similar to whites.

More recent-

ly the argument that insensitive, racist, incompetent, middle class
teachers are responsible for black and Puerto Rican underachievement has
gained wide support.

But the attacks are usually anecdotal, highly sub-

jective and personally vituperative, and do little to improve the quali-

ty of teaching.
As if in desperation to explain the "failure" of millions of

disadvantaged children, some researchers turned back to the child himself,

See Chapter

1,

pp. 25-28, above.
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and found that it was he himself, genetically,
who was inferior.

A few

joined the ranks of Jensen (1969) in arguing
that heredity not environ-

ment was at the heart of the dilemma, but far more
continued to apply
and reapply the old theorems of cultural or curricular
or teacher disadvantage.

In all, the problems of minority education continued unabated;

urban public schools continued to turn out negligible percentages of
students who are equipped, in the traditional sense, to become productive

members of the economy, especially in light of the fact that education
is being used increasingly by employers as a basis of preliminary selec-

tion for skilled and even unskilled jobs.

(For example, to become a

sanitation worker in New York City requires a high school diploma.)
As we have seen, a new thrust for educational reform emerged in

the middle and late 1960's to challenge the seemingly hopeless prescrip-

tions of the professional educators.
trol"
/

—

The movement for "community con-

defined here as the efforts of predominantly black and Puerto

Rican parents to have a larger voice in the education of their children

—

was the last desperate attempt to make public education truly a means of
upward social mobility, and make minority children competitive on the
job market with white children.

Had "compensatory education" succeeded

in this goal, had "relevant curriculums" raised reading scores, had a
"humanization of teachers" ever become a reality, then it is quite un-

likely that

coriimunity control

would have been born.

But given the al-

most complete powerlessness of inner city parents in dealing with huge
centralized educational bureaucracies, which determine from their central

*See Chapter

1,

pp. 21-23, above.
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offices all matters of hiring,
firing, promotions, curriculum,
scheduling,
standards of success, expenditures,
etc, it is not difficult to Justify
their rancor.
"Community control" may not be
the answer to ghetto education
either. Even in New York City
where a decentralization law has now
empowered thirty-one Community School
Boards to act in certain matters of
school governance, a loud dialogue
continues over its effectiveness.
Fantini and Gittel, two strong advocates
of community participation in
the public schools, admit that community
control “can hardly be considered
a full-fledged movement" (Fantini, et
al, 1970, p.228); while respected

detractors argue that it "can only promise future
conflicts, continued
and cumulative inferiority, and ultimate national
disaster" (Pfautz, 1970,
p.39)»

Although it is true that parents in smaller communities
through-

out the country have always controlled the schools, it does
not necessar-

ily follow that all big city bureaucracies are incapable of
providing

/ quality education.

Although conventional solutions to the problems of

educating the "disadvantaged" have demonstrated no instant success,
there is no suggestion that the conventional wisdom is bankrupt.

Never-

theless, the glaring truth that white educators have been unable to

educate black and Puerto Rican younsters remains intact, and regardless
of who is to blame, some black and Puerto Rican parents have announced

to the nation that they want to try it themselves.

The Clinic for Learning provides a unique vantage point for observing this interaction between a public school and an inner city community.

In a single school, we can view this transitional phase of edu-

cational reform, when certain segments of an inner city community began
to lose faith in the conventional cures and began struggling to fashion

L
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their own.

This process is occurring throughout the
country in the

1970 s and will no doubt continue until community
control succeeds, or

until it is proven hollow.

Countless change projects since 1968 have

reflected the Clinic's concern with providing access for
control to
parents and communities, and the Clinic for Learning may rightly
be considered a forerunner in this regard.

Looking to the past, they chose a

mixture of conventional "solutions" which together they hoped would
affect the students -- they subscribed wholeheartedly to theories of

cultural deprivation; they argued for revised curriculums; they insisted
on close human interaction between teachers and students.

Finally,

grappling with the avant garde, they advanced a program of community involvement.

Their efforts to involve the community in 1966 were not of

very high priority.

Yet, in the two years from 1966 to 1968, parents

of JHS ^7 students, like minority parents throughout New York City began to reexamine public school failure.

They reviewed the deplorable

record of defeat of past educational reform, and more and more of them
came to see the problem not in terms of curriculum or reading scores

but in terms of control .

Coming as it did in this critical period of

transition, the Clinic for Learning exerted a far larger effect on the

community than its efforts warranted.

Almost unwittingly, the Clinic

played a vital role in the emergence of an active community voice among
the parents of JHS 57 students.

Two questions form the heart of our inquiry into the Clinic's

attempts to build a community school.

Neither purport to carry the same

used in previous
scientific weight as the more theoretical approaches
certain societal varichapters; yet both are broad enough to encompass

ables crucial to a full understanding.

First, how effective was the
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Clinic for Learning in achieving
its avowed goal of creating a viable

school-community "partnership"?

And secondly, to what extent did com-

munity participation benefit the
school?
able in this study.

The first question is answer-

Though the survey of parents and students
herein

was small, certain firm conclusions can
be reached.

We will view this

question by way of the two most significant
aspects of the Clinic which

affected the community, that is, the community
agents and the film.

The

second question is only approachable here, and
we must respond to it

cautiously , recognizing that it touches upon far broader
questions of
social policy than can be dealt with here.
1)

How effective was the Clinic in creating a viable "school-

community partnership"?

Community Agents
The principle means of seeking community involvement was through
the community agents.
•

As we have seen, the original agents were neither

\c

knowledgeable nor experienced in black communities, and during the first

months of the Clinic, the community knew little or nothing about its
activities in JHS 57.*

Both community agents were described by a number

of community residents as "sincere," but because they were white their

forays into the community often met with resistance and mistrust.

Be-

cause there had been no effort by the Clinic to involve the community in

planning the Clinic program, because there had been no attempt to publicize the arrival of the $1*50,000 change project in the community, and

because the great majority of parents were as estranged from the schools

See Chapter

pp.52-5U, above.

i
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as their children, the community
agents appeared as an unwelcome exten-

sion of the school.

Community agents were authorized to offer the parents

no more than the school itself could offer, that is,
Parent Teachers
Association meetings, visits with teachers, observation in classrooms,
i

special school -community events, etc.

Increased community participation

in these areas would have benefitted the school, but over a short period
of time, with culturally alien community agents, it was not at all like-

ly to happen.
A first major breakthrough in the community development program
occurred with the hiring of the Local School Board Chairman^ and the

neighboring parent with children in Queens as community agents in the
late fall of 1966.

Each remained on the staff of the Clinic for Learning

for the next year and a half, until June, 1968; each performed the cen-

tral tasks of a community agent as directed by the Clinic directors,
that is, visiting parents, encouraging PTA membership, following up dis-

y

cipline problems, etc.: and, most importantly, each in an almost com-

pletely different way was responsible for the failure of the Clinic’s

community development program.

Although it is impossible given the

limitations of research to accurately measure the response of parents
and community to the Clinic, we can focus on the polarity and intensity

of response by looking closely at these two community agents.

Each

represented a different pole, had different followers, and each tried
to influence the Clinic, the community, and the school in different

**Note:

The Local School Board in 1966 was a purely advisory
community body. It was replaced in 1969 by a. Community School Board with limited but substantive
powers

1
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directions.

Contemporary conflicts between community
groups are finely

drawn between these two.
The School Board Chairman was
a seasoned "school person"; she

was familiar with the administrative
restraints', the procedural regulations, and countless rules that kept
the public school system running.

Even before she became a community agent, she
had asked one of the
Cluster Coordinators how any new curriculum
suggested by the Clinic staff

would correspond with the mandatory city -wide examinations.

She was

stunned to hear the response: "What city-wide examinations?"

In the

first weeks of the Clinic, Cluster Coordinators planned student trips

without approval from the district office and without parent permission
slips.

"I hit the ceiling," she recalled later.

She was furious at the

Clinic practise of letting children leave regularly assigned classes to
go to Room 103, and it was clear to her that the "missionary" mentality

of the Clinic staff, steeped in the rhetoric of humanism, was totally

incapable of teaching black and Puerto Rican children.

On a tour of the

school with Ford Foundation officials, she protested the use of an under-

ground newspaper with unsavory language in a Clinic classroom.

She be-

came an active member of the community Advisory Board, and came to feel

that her dual role as community agent and community resident was vital
in keep ing the community informed.

Although she remained on the Clinic

staff until the end, her ire was almost always focused on her N.Y.U.
superiors and almost never on the school administration.

To this extent

she became an ally of the Principal, the District Superintendent, and the

Board of Education.^
Two of her most trusted confidants were the Vice Chairman of the

Local School Board and the District Superintendent's School -Community
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Coordinator.

Both of these women also had vested
interests in the stable

functioning of JHS 57, and both were
sympathetic to the Principal.

From

their point of view, the Clinic staff
was grossly ignorant about the

New York City Public School System and grossly
incapable of helping JHS
57 function as it was intended to function.

The School -Community Coordi-

nator commented on the Project Director of the Clinic:

».

He was a maverick and liked to do things in a maverick
way.
However, there are certain things, like contracts and kids
and
bureaucracy , which are going to do in any maverick. He just
didn't know how to work within a school situation.

Because these three women held established positions in the educational
system, they had easy access to parents and the community at large.

No

one accused them of sabotaging the Clinic, and certainly they were ada-

mant about improving education, but even the most neutral communication
about the Clinic was bound to raise the hackles of large numbers of
parents.

For, with few exceptions, the parents of JHS 57 students are

educational "traditionalists."

School, they will argue, is a place to

learn; children are in school to be educated; teachers are in school to
teach: everything else is secondary.

Contrary to certain theories of

"cultural disadvantage," black and Puerto Rican parents place a high pri!

ority on education and view success in school as one of the few available avenues for upward social mobility.
1963.)

(See Glazer and Moynihan,

The parents at JHS 57 were interested in higher reading scores,

not "improved self-concept" for their children; to get into high school

children had to take statewide Math and History and Science examinations,

not list the number of culturally enriching trips they had taken.

Tales

of "permissiveness" that reached many parents evoked doubt and skepticism
^

1

% <*»•

in some, anger and resentment in others.

"We were being experimented with
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again," said one hostile parent.
from."

"They should go back where they came

Almost before they were settled, the Clinic
for Learning staff

was hearing this kind of reproach from the community.

To be sure, the

Local School Board Chairman, aided by the
Vice-Chairman and the SchoolCommunity Coordinator, provided a communications link
between the Clinic
and the community, but given the Clinic's insensitivity to the
educational conservatism of many parents, given its hiring of two white, in*

experienced, non -community residents as community agents, and given the

"subtly authoritarian" manner in which Clinic plans were introduced

without so much as informing community groups, it became progressively
more difficult, indeed impossible, for the Clinic to win significant

community support.

The Clinic, in this light, became the enemy of the

community much as it became the enemy of the school.

The reaction of a

great number of parents and community residents was well stated in the

Community Evaluation Report in February, 1968:
The Clinic for Learning was brought in without the knowledge
of the community or the Parent's Association. The community was
not involved in the organization or the selection of personnel
for the Clinic . . there was no orientation for the staff of
Junior High School 5>7. The Clinic staff was likewise not oriented to its function. The students were not aware that the Clinic
was coming into the school. As a result they did not know the
role the Clinic would play or their roles as students. The
plan for the Clinic was conceived by NTU personnel who had not
taught in Bedford-Stuvvesant and were not involved in BedfordStuyvesant community affairs.^
.

From this community point of view, the Clinic program was a gross and

total mistake.

The other community agent

—

with children in school in Queens

to exercise
together with the most active original community agent came

the community.
a ouite different though much more limited effect on

}
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While struggling to connect
the Clinic for Learning and the
community,
they grew to feel that the school
itself was the crucial barrier. Parents, they argued, had no idea
of the chaos and confusion that
had lacerated JHS £7 since long before the
Clinic had arrived, and which would

continue long after the Clinic had
left.

"Parents," said the original

community agent, "wanted their children
educated

only object of the school was control....

They didn’t know the

There was no way for the com-

munity interest to come in line with the
school's interests.
didn t give a

s

about the kids."^

The school

The other community agent (with

children) was always sympathetic to the
travails of the Project Director

and the Clinic staff; the failure of the
Clinic, she observed, was not
due as much to Clinic incompetence as to the
inability of the Principal

to change.

She said that the Clinic for Learning was simply two
years

of "quiet harrassment" of the Principal.

said later.

"He just didn't have it," she

"He couldn't take the criticism and he didn't know how to

handle {the Project Director)."'’

Her communications with the parents

and community had a decidedly different ring than those of the School
Board Chairman.

She sought to rally the community in defense of the

children, in support of the Clinic, in opposition to the school.

It was

clear to her that the Clinic staff was not overly aware or experienced,

but they were trying to make JHS £7 a better place and they were laying
blame in it3 proper place
teachers.

—

at the feet of *he school administration and

At times she felt even the Clinic was too timid.

During the

second year she berated the on-site Director for not confronting the

administration more forcefully; at one point, she was "fired" by the
Project Director and the Principal, then reinstated.

Above all, she con-

tinually demanded that the school be held accountable for the children's

122

failure

It would be difficult to overstate
the split between these two

community agents, the School Board
Chairman and the neighborhood resident,
one a respected member of the established
education leadership elite and

the other a vocal and vitriolic newcomer.

Their responses to the de-

parture of the Clinic in June, 1968, highlight
the divergence again. The
School Board Chairman who with many parents and
community groups argued
for the end of the Clinic said:

The most important thing at the end of the Clinic was
when the Superintendent of Schools promised in a meeting
with the Project Director and the Dean of the N.Y.U. School
of Education that no project would ever be allowed to come
into our district without first getting the permission of
the Local School Board./;
o

In terms of traditional alignments, this agreement granted the local school

board slightly more power vis a vis the school administration, and in a
traditional sense, it was a victory.

But it would not be far-fetched

to argue that in terms of student learning the power to halt another "Clinic
for Learning" is really no power at all: with or without the Clinic, the

school fails far too many students.

The other community agent, with scant

prior experience in education "cried when the Clinic left."

The struggle

for real community influence in the school had begun, in her mind, and
she was heartbroken.
said.

"The school and the Clinic became enemies," she

And the only way for parents to make the school change was to ally

with the Clinic and force it to change.
hard enough.
ical."

"But some parents wouldn't fight

They couldn't handle the power situation; it was too polit-

She was frustrated by what she saw as the innocence t and intransi-

gence of the parents, and she saw many of them closing ranks around the
Principal.

The parents, like the Principal, were "not to the point of
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using negative commentary for positive use."^

Not surprisingly, her

views found more support among outspoken leaders
of the Bedford-Stuyvec

sant than among traditionalist parents.

The Film vs. The Community
The airing of the film, "The Way It Is," was the second
major

event in the Clinic's community development effort.
'

Predictably, the re-

sponse of the School Board Chairman and the school administration, on the
one hand, and the community agent (with children in Queens) and the Clinic

staff on the other, were almost diametrically at odds.

The School Board

Chairman thought the film was "disastrous"; "no one from the community,

no parents, no students were allowed to see the movie before it was shown
nationwide," she said.

She, and a great majority of parents and students

reacted strongly to the film's racist overtones.

At a special School

Board meeting called at JHS 57 after the showing of the film, angry students were the main speakers; they told how many scenes of classroom dis-

ruption had been staged for the camera, how two girls had been picked
especially to sing as they walked the hallway, and how filmed scenes

with well behaved students and competent teachers had been cut.

At

I

least ten students wrote letters to the film's producer.

One wrote:

"if people saw' the film they will say I will never take my child to
O

that school."

Another: "I like the film a little bit.
o

disgrace to the community."

But it was a

Another: "I think that they should have

shown the good part of the film so we won't have something to be ashamed
of."

10

The PTA President was eoually appalled: "I just can't believe

and down
that these children weren't deliberately encouraged to run up

the hall and scream."

12U

The Principal of the school and his chief
assistant were eager

to join the chorus of nays.

They agreed that the film was an affront
c

to the school and community, and they viewed
it as part of the overall

design to discredit the "entrenched" administration.

But this

outward response did not fully reveal the complex effects
of the film on
the school administration.

The Principal especially felt the salve of

sympathy from those who admired his "front line" service.

The wife of

the film producer remembers that the Principal's wife turned to him

after a private screening of the film and said, with understanding, "So

this is what you have to go through."

At a White House Conference on

Education, where the film was first shown to an assemblage of nationally recognized educators, the Principal, who was the only practising
school administrator in attendance, received bounteous praise for his

dedication in the face of staggering odds.

implored the Principal.

"This is the way it is,"

"Yes," the liberal educators agreed, "It is

a desperate situation."

The other community agent, and a very few parents and students,

recognized that the film, though staged and one-sided and derogatory,
|

was very much closer to being "the way it is" than most parents or community residents cared to admit.

"That film made the community mad as

hell," said the community agent.

"But it was the truth."

The community

agent asked the film producer and his wife to come to the school to

persuade angry parents that the film was a documentary not a criticism
of the school.

One insightful student feared the awakening of parents:

the children's
"I didn’t like the film," she wrote to its producer, "because

parents think that their children are good in school."

13

A staunch PTA

125

member felt it was time for the parents to
"wake up."

The movie "let

everyone know things they never knew." 1 ^

The Clinic staff bathed in some of the same
ointment as the Principal.

All of the Cluster Coordinators and Clinic
directors were in

Washington for the first screening of the film (a fact which
made the
Principal and the School Board Chairman furious), and they
accepted the

condolences from the professional educators about their "impossible sit-

uation

.

By this time, the spring of 1967, the Clinic program had been

thoroughly demoralized and the staff found it easy to agree that the
inevitably desperate and hopeless plight of the ghetto had been the cause
of their defeat.

Without trying to oversimplify, we will hazard a few clarifying
generalizations about the film's effects.

It angered one community

agent while it opened the way to higher social awareness for another.

The greater majority of parents saw the "truth" of the movie as an
attack on them; the majority of Clinic staff saw its truth as a vindication of their efforts.

The school administration capitalized on the

adverse community reaction by further damning the Clinic.

One community

agent tried to convince parents that the film was accurate; most parents

refused to believe it.

In these conflicts it is difficult to speak of

rightness or wrongness or virtue or blame.

Some, like one of the origi-

nal community agents, felt "the movie did more to perpetuate the myth of

black inferiority" than any event in the Clinic.^

Others, like the

Assistant Principal and many Clinic staff members (who continue to use
the film in classes for teacher preparation) argue that it "is a great

training film; it shows what can happen.

There is truth in each

t
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position; the film is "good" and "bad"; and every
interest group can
find justification in its stance.

Like many controversial things, the

viewer's response will almost certainly be more a
function of his social
and political interests than of his abstract appreciation.

In this case,

the central social and political fact was the very loud and
very nega-

tive reaction of a very large number of parents and community residents.

'1967-68, The Second Year of the Clinic

At the end of the first year, the Clinic for Learning had almost
no support among parents.

Many parents and students spoke of feeling

"used" by the Clinic, especially after the film.

But the following year

saw a small though perceptible shift in community feelings.

The film had

aroused parents and community, and for better or worse, they knew more
about the school than they had the year before.

By the time the Clinic

was driven out, the school had come into the spotlight of community concern.

Whereas the heavy preponderance of community sentiment during the

first year of the Clinic supported the School Board Chairman, more and

more interested parents and community residents gradually shook off the
shameful aftertaste of the film and began to follow the lead of the com-

munity agent who demanded accountability of the school officials.

All

of the officers of the PTA (most often referred to simply as the "Parents

Association") finally applauded the efforts of the Clinic for Learning.

"Discipline is better now," the President was quoted as saying during the
second year, "Children are more relaxed, more attentive.
municate.

It's a great improvement."^

They can com-

The treasurer wrote later, "I

ever.
think the Clinic for Learning was the best thing for JHS 57

J8

the P.A.C.E. program
The large number of parents of children who attended

summer of 1967 had unanimously
favored continuation of the program

for another summer, 19 and they
were hesitant to believe that the Clinic
for Learning was not sincere
in its efforts to help the school.

In addi-

tion, a brief teachers union strike
in the fall of 1967 over issues of

community control in the nearby OceanH
ill -Brownsville district provided
ammunition for community agitation.

Though the brunt of the community

evaluation of February, 1968 was anti -Clinic,
there were some subtle but
suggestive anti-school remarks as well; for
example, "Parents have no

respect for teachers." (p.3.)

The pro-Clinic community agent along with

radical members of the Bedford-Stuyvesant community sought
to highlight
the Clinic's failure as being the result of an insensitive, unresponsive

public school bureaucracy.
Nevertheless, despite these enclaves of support, this more

agressive community stance never had a very large following among the

two to three thousand parents of JHS 57 students.

Their traditional

alienation from the public school, their often unqualified respect for
"the teacher," and their own lack of academic skills left most parents

reluctant to begin "demanding" accountability.

To this extent, the Clinic

for Learning failed to build a viable relationship with the community.

On

the other hand, the activities of the Clinic did result in a significant-

ly larger participation by parents in school affairs; the primary "affair"
was eliminating the Clinic.

But this was decidedly not the kind of

school community partnership Clinic planners had originally in mind. They

had no scheme to join the school and the community at their own expense,
and to this extent as well their plans for a school community alliance

were thwarted.
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Finally, we must note that
the explanation for the failure of

the Clinic's community program
does not reside solely in the implemen-

tation stage.

Despite the unqualified original community
agents, de-

spite the ignorance of Clinic staff
about parental concerns, and despite

the offensive effects of the film,
there is evidence that the failure

was due to the naively articulated and
shallow liberalism that guided
the original project planners.

The original project proposal stated:

i

The parents of disadvantaged children and the urban
communities in which they live clearly need more attention
from the school than they now receive. The staff feels
that only substantial increases in school personnel, in a
kind of "saturation" program, can provide this needed
attention.
20

As conceived, the Clinic staff, not the school staff, would minister to

the community; the Clinic teachers, not the regular teachers, would

reach out to parents.

In conception, the community development compo-

nent of the Clinic was designed not to coalesce the school and the community, but to drive the Clinic as a wedge between them.

It was simply

assumed by Clinic planners that the community would become an ally.
Though they had little more to offer than "concern," Clinic planners
I

felt assured that the "parents of disadvantaged children" would be grateful.

Parents were given little credit for being able to determine what

would and would not benefit them.

Clinic planners failed to realize

that "concern," or "attention," by itself, was not nearly enough.

In a

sense. Clinic planners saw their mission in terms of educating parents,
as well as students, and they sought naively to hide the obvious pre-

sumptions that lay behind their plans: that is, that parents were not
"educated," did not know a3 much as the Clinic staff, did not understand
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why their children were failing
in school, and that they would be better
off if they adopted the ideas
of
the Clinic for Learning.

Again, here,

we reach the edge of racism.

Not only did Clinic planners
underestimate both the wisdom and
the strength of parents, they
nearly overlooked the power of the school

to rally itself under attack.

They seemed to assume that the school

would be happy to change in the
directions outlined by the Clinic.
the school had no real intention of changing.
for Learning was the "odd man out"

;

But

As a result, the Clinic

the community, realizing that the

^ a<:* nothing substantive to offer them and
seeing their ineffect-

iveness with the children, became an enemy; the school,
with no interest
in granting the community power over any matters of school goverance,
was
eager to encourage community flailing of the Clinic.

Looking closely

at the original design of Clinic planners, it all seems quite predic-

table .
2)

Did community participation benefit the school?

Although the Clinic for Learning was totally inept in building
the kind of community- school bond they had intended, their efforts aroused
a storm of controversy among parents and residents of Beford-Stuyvesant.

The film brought JHS £7 an

unprecendented degree of notoriety.

In the

process, a large number of parents came to the defense of the school ad-

ministration.

Far more parents and community residents began to view the

school with increased interest.

This parent and community response was

not foreseen by either the Clinic or the school administration, and it

would be difficult to argue, that the Clinic succeeded in spite of itself.
Nevertheless, in broad terms, the Clinic for Learning did result in more
—

i

f
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community participation in the school.

Most parents and community peo-

ple were glad to see the Clinic go; a few grieved;
but, in all, a rela-

tively large number of people were involved.
•

#

•

There is little evidence to suggest that this kind of
increased

community participation benefitted the school in any measurable ways.

Reading scores did not improve; attendance remained the same; suspensions
.remained high; discipline remained the central problem.

Many teachers

argued that by the time the Clinic's seventh grade reached ninth grade,
in 1968-69, they were the worst ninth grade in the history of the school.

School administrators agreed.

Most parents agreed with the School Board

Chairman that, when the Clinic left the school, "they left it in a mess."
The community Evaluation in February, 1968, found the school in a state
of "continuous disruption."
Aside from the fact that the community's ire was directed at

ousting the Clinic, and not at improving the school, there is another

underlying reason why the community failed to upgrade the school: they

had no formal organizational channel to express their sentiments and no
formal organizational power.

The vested educational interests

—

the

teachers' union, the administrators' union, the Board of Education ad-

ministration, the state legislature, etc.

—

had not granted parent and

community groups responsibility in the schools, save as members of the
Parent Teachers Association.

The Clinic for Learning was obviously in
K-

no position to grant the community any more responsibility.

Because of the in-

fr
eptness of the Clinic and the powerlessness of the community, we are barred here

*See Chapter

7,

below.

0
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drawing any concisions
about th. efficacy of

comity

participation in

For, in fact, there
was no real community
participation.

The impact of coarnmnity
involvement as generated by the
Clinic on JHS 57
must be the subject of
another study which wc»ld
properly include the
events of the intervening
years. We will offer a brief
sketch of events
following the end of the
Clinic (see "Afterward" below),
but conclude on
this note of uncertainty.

Afterward
In the summer of 1968, after
the Clinic had left JHS
57, the
Principal resigned to become Principal
of a Long Island junior high school
As reasons for this "unplanned"
move, he cited school location, other
per-

sonal considerations, and the fact
that he felt "it was time for some of

the white administrators to step down."

Many people connected with the

school felt that his departure was a result
of his experiences with the

Clinic for Learning.

H e was replaced by an Assistant
Principal who was

also English Department Chairman.

In the fall of 1968, the tumultous

teachers strike over the community controlled demonstration
district in
OceanHill -Brownsville lasted almost until Thanksgiving.

All of the black

staff members of JHS 57, about one-fourth of the total, attended school

every day during the strike.

were on strike.

Over ninety percent of the white teachers

The school operated in chaos for the remainder of the

year as students were required to come to school forty-five minutes
earlier to make up striking teacher’s salaries.

In the summer of 1969,

the acting Principal sought and received a transfer to another New York
*

City school.

;

1*,

Another assistant Principal, who had been the liason
Q

between the school and the Clinic for Learning
was made acting Principal.
In 1969 the New York State Legislature
passed a decentralization law
setting up thirty-one Community School Boards,
with limited but identifiable powers in matters of hiring and curriculum.

In 1969 and 1970,

the community agent (with children in Queens) working
for an educational

action group in Brooklyn, wrote two handbooks for parents,
entitled "The

Parents Guide to Student Rights," and "The Parents Community
Guide to

Educational and Legislative Change."

Community School Board.

In 1970 she was elected to the

In 1969-70 and 1970-71, new, more vocal parents

association officers were elected.

Incidents involving parents increased

in frequency and intensity; talk in the teacher's lounge turned to dis-

cussion of protection for teachers.

In the summer of 1971, the Community

School Board conducted a nationwide search for qualified black teachers.
In the fall the number of black teachers in major subject areas had ino

creased five times.

In the fall of 1971, the acting Principal was removed

by the Community School Board and a lower administrator from another junior high school in the district was brought in as his replacement.

This

man lived in Bedford-Stuyvesant.

Within a month, the entire "tone" of

the school had been transformed.

Year old bulletin boards displays were

replaced; each student was required to carry four text books, a notebook,

and pencils in order to gain admittance to the school in the morning;

teachers were constantly being observed by the Principal; the hallways

were quiet.

Many teachers resented the increased pressure: One teacher

said:

"The Clinic for Learning came and went; this guy will come and go

too.

We'll still be here."

of the school.

Other teachers rejoiced in the ’Stabilization

When white teachers resigned, they were replaced by black
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teachers identified by the Community
School Board.

At one point, Puerto

Rican students complained that the
school administration put too much
emphasis on Afro-Americans, not enough on
Puerto Ricans.

Comparative

reading scores have shown slight improvement,
though it is too early to
discern a trend.

Student morale appears to be high.

Teacher morale is

both very high and very low.
f.

Implications
The virtues of community control can be neither argued nor proven
here.

Yet we have seen that as a movement it possesses a measure of

historical continuity and credibility.
faith

—

We can proceed only on an act of

that increased community participation is a bona fide objective

of educational reform.

We trust that future studies will present evi-

dence to support this tenet.

From this, the central question which emer-

ges here is, how can outside reformers spur community involvement in the

Some obvious dicta emerge from the shambles of the Clinic for

schools.

Learning.
First, reformers can provide a vital communications link between

schools and communities.

There is abundant evidence that before 1966 a

very large number of parents had no idea how poorly JHS 57 served their
children.

The simple process of exposing the actual conditions of the

school, through community agents, and through the film, aroused a large

number of parents and community residents.

More and more of them came

to feel that the manner in which the school was run was a disgrace to
the community.

With concerted intent reformers can provide parents with

many avenues of access to the schools

—

places to meet, issues to dis-

cuss, information about school programming.

Ellen Lurie has made us all
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aware that informed and angry
parents can make a difference.

Secondly, outside reformers must do
more than pay lip service to
the "needs of the community."* In many
cases the community will perceive

its needs in terms far different from
the professional reformer.

The

right of parents, for example, to demand
discipline and homework and
authority for their children must be respected.

I have no doubt that

most Clinic staff would cringe if they knew
that in 1972 children must
carry four books to gain admittance to JHS
57.

But there is also no

doubt that this pleases far more parents than it
displeases.
I am

Essentially,

suggesting that reformers must expunge "subtly authoritarian"
de-

signs and listen to the community.

Thirdly, innovators must recognize the heavy political overtones

that accompany the rpest for community involvement in the schools.

In

essence, increased community participation involves a transfer of power

from those who have it to those who want it.

~

A cursory understanding of

American history reveals that such transfers are seldom achieved without some kind of conflict or confrontation.

Hence, reformers who shy

away from a conflict change model are unlikely to succeed.

Machia-

vellian power politics is not nearly so out of date as some change agents
i

would have us believe.
Fourthly, it should be clear from our investigation that Clinic

planners had to rely on far less objective guideposts in charting their
efforts to bring change on the community level.

It is nearly impossible

for the innovator to isolate enough variables to approach the question

of an improved school -community bond from a scientific framework.

Simi-

larly, in evaluation we have stepped to the edge and outside of the de-

fined limits of social science.. Clearly, organizational change theorems
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illuminate the Clinic's struggles;
yet the theorems appear to have

limited reach.

Building a substantial school -community
relationship

involves not so much a change within
the organization as it does a
change in the way the organization
relates to its environment.

Hence,

our shift from social science to
sociology, from the narrowly defined
to the more general, has matched the
shift in Clinic goals, from pre-

cise and measurable learning objectives to
imprecise and subjective re-

alignment of certain power relationships.

planners understood this distinction

—

It is not clear that Clinic

between educational goals and

the shifting of power; for future reform such
understanding would seem

absolutely vital.
Finally, outsiders have to recognize the limitations on their

effectiveness.

The weight of any community movement must be

those in the community.

bom by

And unless the community residents recognize

the need, there is no movement.

comes a pointless visionary.

A reformer without a constituency be-

The movement for community control of

schools must be led by parents, and the outsider, no matter how sincere,
is likely to be seen as excess baggage unless he performs at their

reouest.

^Interview, Community Agent 3, August 2, 1972.
p

Interview, School -Community Coordinator, July 13, 1971.

^Community paper, "Report of the Community Committee,"
February 8, 1969* p.2.
^Interview, Community Agent

1,

January 28, 1972.
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Interview, Community Agent

1*,

August 19, 1971.

Interview, Community Agent
3, August
7

2,'

1972.

Interview, Community Agent h, August
19, 1971.
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Community paper, letter, E. Ortiz, May 3,1967.

9

Community paper, letter, R. Green, May
3, 1967.
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Community paper, letter, V. Alston, May

New York Times
12

,

1967 .

November 26, 1967, p.1.

Interview (phone),

13
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J.

Mayer, August 25, 1971.

Community paper, letter, A. Felder, May

3,

1967.

^\/ritten Communication, B. Grant, July, 1972.

^Interview, Community Agent

1,

January 28, 1972.

^Interview, Assistant Principal, June 25, 1971.
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^

New York Times

,

November 26, 1967, p.1.
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Clinic paper, "PACE Report," p.25.
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I

Chapter

Proposition

#1*:

7

±on
t0 be effective, where it is now
f®
ilmrr
ineffective,
the total environment surrounding
the child must be affected in
a positive way.

^

Proposition #ha:

The public school can act as a
tool for changing
the total environment.

h ls have never Provided avenues
of upward mobility
?
for
1
classes. A child's success in school
is a function
of the parent s success in the society,
not the reverse. The
total environment of the child, then, lies
at the very root of
his chances for success in school. Of
more interest is Proposition Ua, that the public school can act as
a tool for changing the
total environment, or put another way, the
public school can be a
mechanism for social change. Peering more closely
at the Clinic
for Learning experience, we will argue that
public schools as
educational institutions cannot influence social
policy and are
relatively powerless to affect economic and political
arrangements in the society. On the other hand, schools as
social and
political institutions may have some potency in furthering
socially desirable ends.

The Clinic for Learning, as an effort to remake American educa-

tion corresponds in fundamental ways to most of what passes in the com-

mon liturgy as "educational reform."

At its heart the Clinic repre-

sents the design of humane, egalitarian men and women to erect a more
just and responsible societal order by influencing changes in the public
schools.

The Project Director and his staff were aiming ultimately at

the "eventual eradication of the slum,

"

to compensate for, as he said,

"centuries of brutality and injustice," to build an equality of educa-

tional opportunity grounded in fact as well as principle.

Yet as a

growing number of revisionist educational historians are showing, public
U

<

—

t

I

137

138

education has traditionally
done more to perpetuate than to
ameliorate
social and economic class
differences, and has served more as
a tool of
the upper classes for social
and economic control than as a
stepping stone
for lower class aspirations.
-The fundamental dilemma of
the Clinic was
that educational reform is,
and always has been, impotent to
further the
ends of social justice, and the
reoccurrent furor surrounding educational reform movements has only
served to obscure the inherent inequality

of the public schools.
..

In

Irony of Early Sc hool Reform . Michael
Katz (1968) relies

Ifre

on primary source material to argue
that the spread of public education
in Massachusetts in the mid-nineteenth
century, far from being a humani-

tarian endeavor to dispense the virtues of
Education to the commoners,

was an essentially conservative movement led
by the richest and most

influenctial segments of the communities and aimed largely
at unruly, undisciplined, often immigrant working class youth.

The spread of public

schooling was not, as is the popular myth, due to the eagerness of the

lower classes to reap the bounties of upward mobility which public education offered, but was due rather to mandatory state and federal attendance laws passed by those with vested interests in social stability.

Colin Gree n, in Cobweb Attitudes: Essays on Educational and Cultural

Mythology , (*969; 1970) has presented evidence that "the public schools
have always failed the lower classes

—

black and white."

Since the

1690' s, he argues, increased compulsory attendance in public schools

has only given rise to increased rates of failure in most of the nation's

major industrial areas.

In New York City in the 1930's, only forty per-

cent of those in ninth grade graduated from high school; in Boston the
figures stood at barely fifty percent.
\

.

Blacks, Greer writes, "have

i*)

always epitomized the inexorable relationship between success and failure
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inside and outside school."

Industrial expansion during the Second

World War brought millions of southern
blacks into the cities of the
north, but after the war ended, as
the economy cooled, as automation

advanced, as the number of unskilled jobs
dwindled, and as the next

generation matured, blacks were told by society
at large that the reason they were unemployable was their lack of
education.
.

Recently, the

revolution of black consciousness has exacerbated social
tranquility.
Greer writes:

We could afford failure in schools as long as the
economy had room for unskilled workers and as long as the
lowest classes accepted without protest what appeared to
be their inevitable place. Now, however, there are practically no jobs left for the unskilled and even if there
were the black lower class is no longer willing to accept
only that kind of opportunity
not, in a society in
which real wealth is increasing so fast.
(1969, p.102.)

—

Lauter and Howe (1971) have extended the thesis of Katz and Greer,
that schools have never served as avenues of upward mobility for the

lower classes, into the present urban school systems by showing that

carefully devised "tracking systems" which separate the "less able"
from the "more able"

act to solidify social and class distinctions:

Thus, just as the establishment of high schools in the
nineteenth century promoted the interests of middle -class
parents, so ability grouping has become an elaborate mechanism for ensuring those same interests. In this respect
the track system has joined with "the ordinary operations
of educational institutions," which, deliberate discrimation
aside, by themselves tend to deny, poor and working-class
children equal opportunities for social mobility, (p.77.)

They conclude pessimisstically:
The systems of tracking are so closely tied to those
who control American education and to the qualities of
American schools that it is hard to imagine their replacecertainly not by a system which would
ment altogether
permit children to develop according to their own needs
(p.8Ii.)
and abilities.

—

McMillan (1972) has argued that urban
communities today are far
more sophisticated in dealing with the
obvious discrimatory effects of

public education than their working class
predecessors:

Urban communities and some urban educators are
"educated"
aware, and politicized to the extent that they know
that reform in schools, as it is traditionally thought,
that is, reform as an effort to guide or mould society's values
by introducing alterations in the way schools function, is a frustraalmost endless task. Communities apparently have
seen that it is political, not educational, reform that stands
the best chance of impacting on the American value system.
(p.£.)
Hence, as we saw in the previous chapter, urban educational reform move-

ments have become more rightly "political reform movements."
In perhaps the most penetrating statement of the revisionist stance,

Michael Katz (1971) has written:
An official idealogy that emphasizes the importance of free
enterprise and shuns state intervention has limited alternatives
with which to approach major social problems, such as poverty.
Massive income redistribution or broad scale intervention in the
economy generally has not been acceptable. Education on the
other hand, has aDpeared to be an immediate and effective solution to social problems. There is a surface logic, which remains
immensely appealing: Equipping children with appropriate skills
and attitudes can cause the problems of unemployment and poverty
to disappear
The illnesses of society become diagnosed as
simply a lack of education, and the prescription for reform becomes more education. The prescription, for one thing, unleashes
a flurry of seemingly purposeful activity and, for another, requires no tampering with basic social structural or economic
characteristics, only with the attitudes of poor people, and that
has hardly caused a quiver. The problem... is that this approach
(p.lUI.)
to social reform simply has not worked, (emphasis added.)
.

Current facts to support these contentions are not lacking.
Patricia Sexton

( 1

961

)

in her landmark study of educational opportunity.

Education and Income , found consistent evidence that economic disparities

between parents were invariably reflected in their children's performance
in school and in the liklihood that the children would never overcome

the adverse effects of early educational failure.

Children of poor

11*1

parents did more poorly in school, and because
they were educationally
"unqualified" their poverty was assured for
another generation.
Gutherie, (et al, 1971) in a study of schools in
Michigan, has shown

that schools attended by children of low socio-economic
background receive lower quality services, less state money and
resources, and produce students with little post-school chance for success*

Eleanor Leacock (1969) in Teaching and Learning in City Schools
has broadened the indictment of public schools by corroborating scien-

tifically the voluminous anecdotal evidence that teachers are the often
unwitting purveyors of racist, discrimatory, and demeaning messages to
lower classs children.

What she observed in eight second and fifth

grade classes of differing socio-economic and racial composition was
"not the attempt to 'impose middle-class goals' on the children, but

rather a tacit assumption that these goals were not open to at least
the vast majority of them.

The 'middle-class values' being imposed on

the low-income Negro children defined them as inadequate and their pro-

per role as one of deference."

(emphasis in the original.)

(p.312.)

One would surmise that aspiring middle-class teachers have always com-

municated such values to lower class children, but a century ago children were not required by law to soak up the disdain of the dominant

culture until the age of sixteen, or seventeen, or is it to be eighteen.

A century ago, one who rejected "middle-class values" as defined in
public schools was not ordained to a life of crime or public relief.
Finally, Gerald Levy in Ghetto School (1970) has leveled a raspown
ing attack on the soceity which hypocritically and wilfully, for its
children.
safety and benefit, supports the systematic desecration of ghetto

L

1U2

sPf'r

-t:;;

" .T. y aware oi the
ghetto school would
UXU liv«
J-LKe +r>
to blame the school's
failure nn
163
nadequacies
>
personnel diffWties
’

,

,

,

.

j

xxssvthe
itv

ss^stjs-

A

rican society would complicate
T hls
of
hum anity and moral superior-

d

idea
?
Tho middle -class
liberal is committed to viewing
SeUo
ll: ati
+
aS
fd±
e to jjnPleme nt his liberalism
and
nothing
more
One a lternative
l+
he fail s to consider is that the oh P t.t.n
b \ °
~
thg SGrvice not ° h
morality but of h is
soci^and eco nomic interest s. He Ra nn is
n t~ a ff^
th
the Rhett ° SCh ° o1 ha 3~not failed...
6
Can SOCiety is unPrepared to absorb
its
1 owe r-cTa
y
the middle “ clas
ghetto
school
^
6
ose of not training its children
Sr
^
for middle-class nlife,
(emphasis added.)
(p.173.)

?

^

^

"

^

^r\

^e^mL^ se^^h

V

^

The Clinic for Learning clashed with
the most basic fact of

educational life suggested by each of the
authors above:
reflects, it does not manipulate American
society.

education

In a ghetto, one

finds "ghetto education": in a prosperous
suburb, public schools produce prosperous offspring; the wealthy enroll
their children in private
schools; a depressed rural community breeds educational
depression.

JHS

$7 reflects the "reality" of Bedford-Stuyvesant: it reflects a "black

ghetto," with over 450,000 residents, decayed housing, astronomical (or

non-existent) insurance premiums, few job openings, exorbitant borrow-

ing rates, prefunctory sanitation services, costly and lax public transportation, absentee landlords, absentee retailers, political disenfranchisement, economic isolation, welfare, drugs and crime; across one river

is located the most gargantuan hoard of wealth known to the world, else-

where on all sides are property owners, who hold jobs, have elected
representatives and friends in higher places, whose children will become
wealthy, and because of this whose children will succeed in school.

Bed-

ford-Stuyvesant is not a pleasant reality, but it is reality, and it is

ito

underpinned not by inadvertence or
'’mindlessness" or by accident but by
closely guarded economic and political
interests.

"Dropouts," a term

uhich was not coined until the late
191,0's, are stigmatized as "failures" and often never

'

av«n enter the job market. Semi-skilled and
unskilled

jobs decrease daily and those who hold
the jobs blacks and Puerto Ricans

would aspire to,
(Houghton, 1970.)

primarily union members, have conspired to exclude
them.
The disenfranchisement of black and Puerto Rican

parents over such matters as hiring and curriculum
in the schools only

reflects their isolation in the broader political arenas.
Until 1968,
v

Bedford -Stuyvesant was gerrymandered into five separate
Congressional
districts in which blacks and Puerto Ricans were in the minority, hence
no one represented them on the national level.

State legislative dis-

tricts on the fringes of Bedford-Stuyvesant were drawn by the Republican

controlled state legislatures to minimize the political impact of the
black voters.

The public schools add another

the overall malaise:

solidifying dimension to

they guard it for future generations.

Public

schools have become selecting devices which stamp unmistakable brands

of poverty and deprivation to insure that at least most of those who are
poor and deprived stay that way.

And as Levy and others have pointed

out, the schools have not failed in this task.

(See, for example, J.

Kozol, 1971.)

These realities confronted and defeated the Clinic for Learning;
though the staff was resourceful it never so much as dented the armor of
the status quo.

Though they believed that educational change would, in

some small way, lead to social change, they were misguided.

For the

public school was an unwilling tool of broad social reform; an intractable

ally of social reformers.
red:

1)

There were four basic reasons why this occur-

the attitudes and political interests of
the regular JHS 57

staff made it unapproachable to outsiders;

2)

the attitudes and econo-

mic interests of the Clinic planners and staff
rendered their missionary
zeal hollow and defenseless; 3) the total
powerlessness of the community

to affect the school made meaningful change impossible;
and

U)

the total

-powerlessness of the Clinic to affect the school cast the entire
effort

into an absurd and irresponsible position.

As these reasons should make

clear, we are now expanding the boundaries of social science

to include

the all-encompassing fields of social, economic and politcal
organization.
1)

There is little reason to doubt that the attitudes of regu-

lar JHS 57 teachers matched those in the Leacock and Levy studies re-

ferred to above, both of which were based in New York City.

The small

percentage of teachers who arrived at the school with idealistic or
humanistic notions about teaching were quickly forced to adapt their

behavior to the chaotic school milieu.

For most, teaching became sole-

ly a process of controlling the students, and in many cases this was
not an easy task.

For the children knew better than their parents or

the teachers or the administrators that they were the ones who would

bear the heaviest burden of the school’s failure.

A most common inter-

change between students and teachers went like this: Student: You never
teach us anything.

Teacher: Go ahead and misbehave, I get my paycheck

even if you don't learn anything .

The students heard this retort from

the first grade through the twelfth, if they last that long, and most
don't.

Students knew that teachers live in Queens or Flatbush or Man-

hattan, the few who live in Bedford- Stuyvesant
are usually home econo-

mics or typing teachers.

The yearly bludgeoning most students received

at the hands of standardized reading tests left
them with no conclusion

but that they were marginal, their success was not
important, and their
goals, therefore, should be uniformly lowered.

Teachers felt compelled

to participate in this human sacrifice, which left them
in a precarious

moral position.

In one sense, they did "the best they can," and were

imprisoned by the system which provided them their livlihood.

On the

other hand, most teachers recognized that for most of their students,

public schooling is a lost cause.

As one teacher blurted out in the

final staff meeting between Clinic and school, "The best thing we could
do would be to close this school down and put the kids in the street.

They would be better off."

To willingly continue to teach required one

to compromise or obliterate any notions of sincerity or dedication or

selflessness.

One of the more secure, pro-Clinic teachers reflected:

"In the beginning, I thought it would work.

But I wasn't aware of the

limitations of (the teachers) I was working with."

A Cluster Coordina-

tor commented on the teachers' position:

When you try to find out why people don't like the Clinic,
it's very hard to put your finger on it; they come up with all
sorts of reasons that you know and I know are phony, because
they don't hold water. One of the basic reasons for this is
that we put them into a position unwittingly where the faults
of the system and the phoniness of what is going on is brought
to light, and they had to admit it (emphasis added.
.

Teachers struggled to maintain their self-respect.

One teacher violent-

ly insisted that "the Clinic was really a case of non-professionals
coming in telling professionals what to do."
going to work right from the start."

3

Another "knew it wasn t

In large numbers they sought refuge

in the Teachers

1

»
Union,, whloh
which in
in ioa<
1966 was at its apex in JHS
$7.
,

The

union became their tool to
drive out the intruders, to
assure them that
they vere doing an adequate
job and that no charges of
incompetence from
New York University people
would influence their retention
in the school.
Union representatives confidently
explained that legally, constitutionally they were protected from
all attackers, Clinic staff,
parents, news
media, disruptive students. They
were secure, safe, and invulnerable;

they had only to punch in at
8:U0 a.m. and punch out at 3:00 p.m. to
receive their paychecks. Their
position
of political and legal strength

left them impervious to the reformers
from N.Y.U.
2)

The reflections of the Project Director
fully three years

after the closing of the Clinic speak
unmistakably of its benevolent

missionary flavor:
6n We ^ ook
°ut, it always worked.
everytime
the kids went back to the school they entered the
same maelstrom. We weren't smart enough to understand and
keep them
out.... You We got 1,500 kids who have been brutalized
and
hurt and denied.... Obviously they don't have basic skills.
The reason why is because of what we've done to them. It's
so clear, you don't have to fight that one.^

^

. .

“There was a mild benevolence in some of my staff," said the Project

Director, "but no blatant racism."

Yet the early insistence on branding

Bedford-Stuyvesant a "culture of poverty" set the Clinic staff up as
8e lf appointed saviors.

There was an implicit but ever-present assump-

tion that the community of Bedford-Stuyvesant needed "help," could not
in fact help itself without outside intervention.

The Clinic staff did

not hide their intention to uplift the indigent subculture; "The parents
of disadvantaged children asserts the original project proposal,"....

clearly need more attention from the school than they now receive."

1U7

The "outsiders" were white, the "helpless"
were black; what may have

appeared in 1966 to be undertones of mild benevolence
become blaring

indictments of racism in 1972.

As we have seen,, this missionary pre-

disposition was most crystalized in the film, "The Way It
Is," and the
parents and community of JHS 57 responded bitterly.
To the teachers as practitioners this kind of moralistic,
noblesse oblige posture, whether called racism or liberalism or humanism, has always been anathema; those who confront noisy, irascible

students daily are not easily swayed by the idealogies of humanistic

educators who ruminate in university corridors.

To be vigilantly "under-

standing" and "responsive" to student needs, always the nostrum of the

evangelists from N.Y.U., appeared to teachers in JHS 57 to be a superhuman feat.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the regular staff of

the school came to view the Clinic as an ivory tower hybrid with little
to offer.

It is also not surprising that the Clinic staff came to view

itself as morally superior to the "narrow," "self-serving" teachers, and
to view its own educational scheme as better than that which existed.

But it seems likely that the regular teachers understood the power

arrangements that undergird ghetto education far more than the university zealots; and moral rectitude seldom triumphs over bitter self-

interest.

What the Clinic staff was saying about irrelevant curriculums

and unresponsive institutions may have been right, but it was also threat-

ening and alarmist and quite plainly not useful on a day to day basis.
The teachers' reality included forty minute periods and thirty-five students per class and lesson plans and reading tests and periodic observasystem
tions by department chairmen; maintaining their equilibrium in the
ir\

1U8

was enough, "reforming" the system was beyond hope.

The Clinic failed

to comprehend that the practitioners disposition is
not an open and re-

ceptive one; and like many who fancy themselves to be on higher
moral
ground than their clients, they never considered that those whom
they

were helping might know more than they did.
The Clinic staff was vulnerable as well because their moral
stance was subverted by certain economic truths which became widely

known to the regular staff at JHS £7.

One Cluster Coordinator mentioned

that "it's always hard to hire good people, because peoole don't leave

their jobs for one or two years.
people from other projects."

So you're stuck with hiring rebound

Not unexpectedly, this Coordinator was

the only one who had a full time job before the Clinic.
•

Most of the

others were graduate students with instructors' stipends, or simply looking for work, or recently arrived in town.

To admit that they too were

"just working for the buck" took some of the edge off their implicit

claim to moral superiority.
cause of its credibility

Teachers felt that the Clinic staff, be-

with powerful financial interests, that is,

because of its "grantmanship" ability, was simply living comfortably
off the largess of the educational establishment, undergoing little of
the rigors of actual teaching yet glibly promulgating the "wisdom" of
the profession.

Further, teachers realistically surmised that "Staff,
i

Clinic for Learning" would make an attractive resume entry, and that
the Clinic experience was a useful stepping stone up the professional
ladder.

When the first Cluster Coordinator left after four months to

their worst
accept a college teaching position in a school of education,

suspicions were confirmed.

Of seven Cluster Coordinators, six went on

to hold teaching positions in various
schools of education,

In a very

real sense, then, the Clinic staff was
motivated by self-interest at

least as much as the teachers whom they
supposedly served.
3)

Clinic planners suspected they would have to ally
with the

community in their attempt to reform the school.
second year had a solid grasp of this tenet.

The Director the

But not only did the Clinic

.fail to enlist the community in support, it failed
to see that the com-

munity, like the Clinic, was operating from an essentially powerless
position.

The Community Advisory Board was formed to oversee the Clinic

for Learning, but it had no formal or informal power of its own in rela-

tion to the school.

Even at its height of influence in 1968, the Ad-

visory Board had only enough authority to throw the Clinic out.
Local School Board as well had only advisory powers.

The

The administration

of the school, vulnerable on all sides, found itself in an enviable
haven; outside, the parents blamed the Clinic for what was most certainly
the school administration's fault; the Clinic was forced into confronta-

tion with the community, seen originally as its most radical ally.

The

Clinic and the community battled openly while the administration, being

under no real pressure to reform, simply ducked.

Had the Clinic planners

understood basic economic and political facts, they would have known
that spreading good will in the community, visiting parents and encouraging them to get involved would not have the slightest impact on the
fundamental operations of the school.

Although as we have suggested,

enticing the community may have had an eventual payoff in demands for
community control, there is nothing to indicate that the Clinic saw its
role as community whipping boy.

Rather, their relations with the com-

1
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munity seem to represent another gross
misuse of their humanitarian zeal.
Given the scanty experience that most
Clinic staff had living and work-

ing in a black community, their misguided
behavior is not surprising.
U)

At the summer camp in 1966, Clinic planners
succeeded in

erecting a model utopian community that
exemplified perfectly their ulti-

mate goals.

The camp appeared as undeniable proof that the
humanitarian

-dream of peace and brotherhood for all was
still possible.

For a brief

time they had changed the total environment of
the child, and the child

had responded vigorously.

Now the task was to extend this environment

into the school, into the ghetto, and into the society; as long
as they
persevered, they "could not be defeated."

Yet the camp's end also marked

the end of the dream, and the camp lingered at best as an unreal, undup-

licatable event.

Long on humanism but short on realistic understanding,

the Clinic staff spent two fruitless years trying to make the school

more like the camp.

After the first year of operation, the Project Director had no
illusions about the outcome of this struggle.

"We got the hell kicked

out of us by the situation," he told a newspaper reporter in the fall
of the second year.
system."'*

"It's a defeat for the university and the school

But he was not easily repressed, and he embarked with one

of the original community agents on a new series of proposals to reorient
the Clinic for Learning.

In an evaluation paper submitted to the Ford

Foundation entitled "It Just Didn't Happen," written in the fall of
1967, the Project Director shows formidable insight in analyzing the

situation:

The perspective of priorities at the time of Initial

£
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Implementation of this project was centered around
the
notion that the school could be a springboard
into the
major problems presented to the country as a whole
by
the socio-economic unit called the "urban ghetto."
In
the first few months of trying to pin down the
specific
sociological and psychological attitudes concerning
school as the agent of social change we saw that this
notion is not viable in Bedford-Stuyvesant and at most
is used as an issue dramatizing the physical manifestation of alienation. As our thinking and experiences
developed we clearly saw little sense or rational behavior coming out of additional inputs of resources
into a situation that to begin with is non-rational and
non-responsive. .
This type of thinking led us to
shifting from a school-education orientation to a socioeconomic -education-community orientation
Along
with the shift away from associational ties with a
bankrupt socio-economic system in terms of the "ghetto,"
we came into a direct creative conflict situation with
a small group in the community £at the weekend retreat
with community leaders^ who saw us as a reinforcement of
that bankrupt system. The resolution of this conflict
and the knowledge of what social change means, resulted
in the present perspective on priorities.
.

.

He goes on to outline some of the fruits of this new orientation: an
economic development plan between Bedford-Stuyvesant small businessmen

and the N.Y.U. Graduate School of Business, a businessman's internship

project with private industry, a program training youth to become movie
producers, and a program to pay and train community residents as para-

professio nals.

Little ever came of these proposals, but the fact that

they were made and some submitted in proposal form to funding sources
speaks well of the adaptability and resourcefulness of the Project Director.

Yet by any measure these efforts came too late.

The Clinic had

chosen to associate with the school and it had fallen into community
disrepute; there was little hope that renewed struggle would resurrect

the loss and bring the community and the reformers from N.Y.U. into
alliance.

And even if they had allied, there was little hope that they,

two powerless entities, could have changed the school.

The Project
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Director "kept trying," but the enemy
was too fierce.
In short, the Clinic for Learning was
facing a brutally entrenched manifestation of American society:
with but few exceptions, public

schools have acted to perpetuate, not assuage,
the lower classes.

By

tinkering with the manifestation, the Clinic sought
to eradicate its
source.

f

By trying to "make schools work," they simply
overlooked the fact

that schools do work

—

to select, and certify, and eliminate, and to

prepare the losers to play a marginal role in the society.

By surround-

ing the child with "caring and supportive adults," by "saturating" the
school, they hoped to alter the basic life reality which faced the school

children of JHS 57

.

By showing that they cared, they sought to impress

upon the community that the segment of society from which they came
white, middle-class, educated, powerful -- also cared.
tasy.

—

But this was fan-

The odds against which they were dealing were insurmountable, and

this was their most fundamental and debilitating oversight.

Implications

What then is to become of educational reform?

If it is true that

ghetto education represents the firmly entrenched reality of second citizenship, what is to become of the humane, egalitarian men and women who,

like the Clinic staff, struggle for change?
indeed, there may be no "answers."

There are no simple answers,

But, hopefully, this study will lead

educational reformers to new insights about the tasks confronting them.
In addition to the two provisoes of the second year Director

—

that ex-

pectations be small, and that the behavior and needs of children be

understood

—

there is one basic perception that must guide reform efforts

institutions
in the future, that is, that public schools are not solely
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of education.

Instead, public schools serve social functions, by teach-

ing obedience and conformity, by keeping children off the street, by

certifying some and eliminating others thus keeping labor markets free
fl*om

inundation by millions of "qualified” but unemployable persons, by

inculcating a belief that high reading scores will lead to success, and
that more, ever more education will solve social problems.

The public

schools serve a political function, by providing a power base for millions
of teachers, administrators, boards of education, central school bureau-

cracies, and local politicians.

To be sure, the public still views its

schools as seedbeds of Learning, purveyors of Education, the first plat-

eau of the American Dream.

But educators have argued for years that the

knowledge and communication explosions have rendered the old curriculum
of basic skills archaic, and sociologists have long known that with the

exception of the Jews no American immigrant group has successfully used
the public schools to move up the social and economic ladders of the society.

(Glazer and Moynihan, 1963 .)

On the one

hand, the thousands

of hours of television "instruction" has left the teacher in a secondary

position; on the other, the academic skills taught in school are not and

never have been useful "on the job."

Today's urban poor, in short, are

being asked to do what almost no immigrant group has done before it; that
is, advance in the society by succeeding in the schools, precisely at a

time in which schools are becoming relatively less important in educat-

ing the young.

The most recent chorus of educational reform

school a place where kids "learn how to learn"

contradictions.

—

—

to make

is testimony to these

For in the inner city, "learn how to learn" reflects

poor children to
the humane intent to relax some of the pressure on
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achieve academically, and to make success in
school a little less dependent on reading scores and a little more dependent
on a child's ability

to cope with his environment.

But "learn how to learn" is not something

that one learrshow to do in school; one learns it in
life, if at all.
And so, "learn how to learn" becomes just another
euphimism for "good
citizenship" or the "well-adjusted" student.

Meanwhile, the tests and

qualifying scores and state requirements continue to select and certify
some while eliminating and rejecting others.

The problem with this lat-

est reform, and with all new curriculums and techniques and resources,
is that they have no impact on the society, and if social change is one's
goal , the public schools are weightless levers.

The furor surrounding

educational fads clouds the basic issue of educational inequality: ghetto

children are not succeeding in the society.

Just as Katz has charged,

educational reformers by advancing the notion that their ideas, their
"liberalism," will allay the impact of unequal education, have obscured

the reality of the ghetto.

The real target of those who abhor the ghetto

school must be the ghetto itself.

Seen in this light, the ghetto school becomes a social and political tool for societal change, not an educational front.

As a social in-

stitution, the school can play a critical part in raising the awareness
of the community, it can become a seedbed for community interaction, a

platform for budding reform.

Children can be taught the "truth" about

their American heritage, a heritage so brutal and maligned that it can
scarcely fail to erupt in radical consciousness.

They can learn that

"poor reading scores"are not keeping them impoverished, for if miracuisolated
lously all poor readers became excellent readers, they would remain
v
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from the mainstream of society.

The school as social institution can

provide a haven of strength for children who know by the age of five that

their black skin marks them different, subtly inferior in a white man's
country.

James Baldwin

( 1

970) has written eloquently about the poten-

tialities of the public school as a social institution:

Now if I were a teacher in this school, or any Negro
school, and I was dealing with Negro children, who were in
my care only a few hours of every day and would then return
to their homes and to the streets, children who have an
apprehension of their future which with every hour grows
grimmer and darker, I would try to teach them, I would try
to make them know
that those streets, those houses, those
dangers, those agonies by which they are surrounded, are
criminal. I would try to make each child know that these
things are the results of a criminal conspiracy to destroy
I would teach him that if he intends to get to be a
him.
man, he must at once decide that he is stronger than this
conspiracy and that he must never make his peace with it.
And that one of his weapons for refusing to make his peace
with it and for destroying it depends on what he decides he
is worth.
I would teach him that there are currently very
few standards in this country which are worth a man's respect. That it is up to him to begin to change these standards for the sake of the life and health of the country
(pp.290-1 .)

—

.

/

This is not revolutionary rhetoric, and to any educated adult who knows
the facts of African-American history, who has any sense of what has
happened, this is the truth, decisively.

Nor are Baldwins

white, or anti-change agent, or anti-professional educator.

words anti-

There is

wide latitude here for outside reformers to raise the social consciousinequalness of black children; but not reformers who insist educational

ity is the fault of teachers

,

or of principals

,

or of "middle -class"

mismanagement.
curriculums, or of insufficient funds or bureaucratic

Be-

educators have
cause many middle-class white, and black, professional

it is not likely
vested economic, interests in Baldwin's "conspiracy,"

basic reform.
that they could or would participate in

Like the staff of

r
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the Clinic for Learning, most professional educators
are moving up the

career ladder, away from the schools, away from the societal
malaise,
away from the contradictions that highlight hypocrisy.

For those who can

accept Baldwin's truth, who can participate in its dissemination,
there
is ample room for school reform

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the public schools are

latent political institutions awaiting the force of inner city communities
to wrench them free.

in hand.

Social awareness and political control must go hand

Political control of the schools by black and Puerto Rican

parents can have far reaching implications for social change.

With power

to hire and fire teachers and administrators, communities can guarantee

that children are not led to believe blindly in the power of the school

to grant them upward mobility.

mands social change.
cultural values.
.

They can introduce a curriculum which de-

They can set standards which will reflect their

With power to spend money, they can contract with black

o

construction companies, black textbook manufacturers, black desk makers.
They can consult with black psychologists, black social workers, black
doctors.

Nor would they need to be all black, for again, the black

struggle is waged "for the sake of the life and health of the country"
and is far from being separatist.

Eventually, communities could control

mandatory attendance laws, the distribution of reading tests, the certification of teachers.

The task is not small, and the resistance from

powerful teachers unions and administrators unions and Boards of Education would be immense, but for educational reformers with serious intent
there are ways to proceed.
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Interview, Cluster Coordinator
3, August IS

Interview, JHS 57 teacher
7, June 5, 1971.
3

Interview, JHS Si teacher
8, June 17, 1971.

h

interview, Project Director, July
16 , 1971.
'’New

York Times

.

November 26, 1971, p.l.

Clinic paper, "It Just HLdn't Happen,"
pp.1

1971.
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Chapter

8

REFLECTIONS ON EDUCATIONAL REFORM

The reform objectives pressed by the Clinic for Learning span
a broad range; we have considered them on three levels.

First, the

project planners aimed at improving the quality of life in the school.

They reasoned that through their efforts the level of teaching could be
improved, the relevancy of the curriculum could be raised, teachers and

administrators could grow more confident and gratified, and more students couldreap the benefits of individualized instruction.

Based on

theorems of organizational change, we have tried to pinpoint the reasons why they failed in these attempts.

We have argued that the Clinic

staff failed to implement reform because of their failure to involve

teachers in the single most far reaching decision they made

—

to

adopt Clusters, because they were ineffective at capital^^s^.P^the

substantial decision making capabilities of the Clusters, and because
•

their leadership was inappropriate, inconsistent, and contradictory.
The case study approach has allowed us to test two organizational

change theorems in an actual situation and we have used this forum to
suggest some new theoretical extensions.

Specifically, we have pointed

to the situational variables and advanced a theory which accounts for

differing subordinate maturity levels, specific subordinate value
systems, and uniaue organizational climates.
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In short, we have reached
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conclusions that bear hope for this kind of reform
in the future:
proper involvement of teachers and adaptive use of
leadership skills,
as well as more careful planning and diagnosis,
can result in the

improved operation of the school, for students, teachers,
and administrators.

Secondly, the project sought to make participation in school

affairs by parents and community persons a reality.

In evaluation, we

have cited reasons for failure that both include and go beyond the

theories of organizational change.

Focusing on the polarities of re-

sponse represented by two community agents, we have pointed to the

dynamic interplay of school, community, and societal variables which

caused most parents to rush to the defense of the school, but which
later resulted in a perceptible movemont among parents toward asserting their right to decision making responsibility.

We have argued

that the film, "The Way It Is," still widely recognized and disseminated in 1972 , crystallized much of the interaction between the community

and the Clinic

first, by reflecting the subtle racism that char-

acterized the school as a "battleground" and which led the Clinic staff
to exalt in its self appointed mission as saviors of the school; second,

by forcing the community into a defensive posture, rejecting the film,
and the Clinic, as an affront to its dignity; thirdly, by illuminating
the resourcefulness of the school administration in eluding the well

deserved finger of blame; and finally, by forcing the community, however incensed, to deal with the obvious and shocking realities which
the film exposed.

In seeking to isolate reasons for failure, we are

and the
impressed at least as much by the intractability of the school
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fundamental powerlessness of the community as we are by the naivete or

inabilities of the Clinic staff.

No doubt skillful application of all

relevant organizational change theorems

—

e.g. involving the community

in planning, leadership and decision making strategies adapted to the
situation, in depth diagnosis

better.

—

would have served the Clinic effort far

Yet the larger lessons emerging here point to more caution by

future reformers, not more organizational competencies.

Based on the

struggles of the Clinic for Learning, it appears that the intent at

community involvement in the schools is a political conflict, having
less to do with the educational life in the classroom than with who holds
the positions of leadership, who gets the contracts for services, and

who makes final policy decisions.

The Clinic played an almost unwitting

role in sparking this political consciousness; but, reviewing the evidence, one wonders if the rubric "educational reform" even applies.

Clinic
As we argued in Chapter 6, there is serious doubt whether the
impact on
under any circumstances could have made more than a marginal
JHS 57.
the extent of parent and community involvement in

build a more
Thirdly, the Clinic sought to use the schools to
leading to the "eradication
socially just and humane society, eventually
of the ghetto."

groundless.

and
We have argued that these intentions were utopian

economic realiWe have stressed rudimentary political and

Clinic for Learning plan was
ties as a basis for asserting that the
even a reform that failed.
really not an educational reform, nor

Point-

the
the teachers and administrators,
ing to the political strength of
fundaduplicity of the Clinic, and the
economic dependency and moral

community and the Clinic, we have
mental powerlessness of both the
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attempted to highlight the seemingly infinite shortcomings of the Clinic
design.

To know the society, we have asserted, is to see not that the

Clinic failed but that in a very real sense it never even existed.

This part of the Clinic was never more than a paper dream, never more

than an extension of the messianic zeal of the Project Director.

In

short, we concluded that as an educational venture there was no way for

the Clinic to succeed in this objective.

There were no organizational

skills, leadership techniques, or participation strategies which could

have helped, or which future educational reformers might have access to.

We are talking here about societal change, not educational change, and
the means of the educational profession, utilizing the theorems of organ-

izational change, do not nearly match the demands of the political, economic, and social biases of the society.
Still, we have not reached a wholely pessimistic conclusion, and

have suggested that the public schools can be diverted to serve non-

educational ends which can have a broader social impact.

Specifically,

the public schools as social and political institutions may have con-

siderable potential for furthering societal reform.

We have stressed the separateness of the three levels of change
educational
on the basis of a single belief: the overarching failure of
the inability
reform in inner city schools in the past decade rests in

implications and the
of professional educators to recognize both the

limitations of their reforms.

Compensatory education, curriculum reform,

behalf of "culturally disadvantand teacher retraining, administered on
educational techniques deaged" children, were not simply valueless
children; they were net consensigned to make life a little better for
at large to improve teaching
sual innovations mandated by the society
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and learning.

»“

On the contrary, they were conceived as the antidote for

social oppression, and were pitted against the effects of centuries of

economic

and cultural isolation ;as was the Clinic for Learning.

Viewed

in terms of classroom health, or of reading and math scores, these are

legitimate educational reforms with legitimate hope for success.

Viewed

in terms of social inequality, they are nearly meaningless, the inflated
premises of would-be social saviors.

For, as we have argued, public

schools reflect societal reality, they do not challenge it; schools
act more to stabilize than to upset the status quo.

To be sure, improved

life in the classroom is a bona fide objective of educational reform,
and for children on a day to day basis it is often the only meaningful

objective.

But when educational reforms of this kind conceal social,

economic, or political value orientations which conflict with dominant

convential values, they fail, almost inevitably.

The difficulty arises

because many reformers, like the planners of the Clinic, never realize
the full implications of their innovations and never accurately antici-

pate the ferocity of the resistance.

This dynamic, of educational reforms that supersede by implication the boundaries of education, is best illustrated on the classroom
level.

Allowing children, for example, to leave a classroom at will to

go to Room 103 suggests the intention of allowing children to have more

responsibility in determining their own activities in school; which in
of
turn suggests that professional educators are not totally capable

of the
making those determinations; which impugns the professionalism
extreme, runs
educational profession; and, if carried to its logical
authority, training
directly into conflict with the ideas of teachers'
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of teachers, necessity of administrators, etc.; and finally forces the
question, Why should students go to school at all, if they don't want

to?

The political and economic ramifications of that inquiry are of

tremendous proportions.

Another example: arguing as did the Clinic

j

that tests should not be the primary measure of evaluation suggests the

belief in the importance of non-academic skills, affective skills, human
^

relations skills, etc.

That these skills are not measurable in any

precise way suggests the lowering in importance of grades; which in

turn places less emphasis on diplomas and certification

standards;

which challenges the use by employers of diplomas as preliminary selection devices; which in turn undermines the importance of striving hard
and competing to get good grades to get a good job; which flies squarely

in the face of the capitalist ethnic, which underpins the entire fabric
of the soceity.

Innovations of this type can be implemented and theorems of

organizational change can be eminently useful.

Yet success is predicated

on at least two important factors -- first, that the innovator understands the potentially threatening ramifications of his reform, and
I

second, that the innovator presents his case in cautious, modest, and ap-

parently value free terms.

For if there is a failure in understanding,

that is oound to
there will be no preparation for the bitter resistance
speaking of the "ruthcome; recall the Clinic' 3 Director of Evaluation
"unsophisticated" and "quite
less undermining'' of their efforts, their

but wiped out" In the
defenseless" posture, and that they "were all
first U-6 weeks.

to rhetorical
And if inflated expectations give rise

educators dwell on the importance
arrogance, if for example, humanistic

f
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of community over competition, the resistance will emerge in response

not to the substance of the innovation but to the "style" of the innovator.

Thus did a number of regular JHS 57 teachers argue that the

Clinic was simply a case of "non-professionals" telling professionals

what to do.

For these teachers the real substance of the Clinic plans

for reform was almost never the real issue.
I should like to further illumine the hidden and undermining

ramifications of certain educational reforms, and the lack of perception
of certain educational reformers, by focusing on another educational

change project, reported by Gross et al in Implementing Organizational

Innovations

(

1971 ).

In this case study, the authors rely on organiza-

tional change theory in citing five reasons why an innovation purportedly
on the classroom level

"to redefine the role of the classroom

teacher"

in an inner city elementary school was not successfully

implemented:

1)

teachers' lack of clarity about the innovation, a fail-

ure in involving teachers in planning;

2)

teachers' lack of necessary

skills and knowledge, a failure in diagnosis;

needed materials, a failure in planning;

U)

3)

the unavail_ ability of

the incompatibility of or-

ganizational arrangements, a failure in diagnosis; and

5)

lack of staff

motivation to implement the innovation, a failure in leadership.

But a

perticursory reading of the appendices of the book, which contain all
was not
nent documents, shows that the innovation to be implemented

was something
simply "redefine the role of the classroom teacher," it

closer to redefining societal values.
teachers not be inConsider: 1) part of the innovation was that
"prepared for Classical
terested in "test scores" and getting students
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I submit, that all parents and most teachers, no matter how in-

volved they were, would view this as regression, not innovation.

2)

Gross admits that to carry out this innovation teachers needed not
simply new knowledge and skills but a "set of new educational attitudes
and values and a new way of viewing the phenomenon of schooling."

This

sounds more like organizational psychotherapy than organizational change,
not to

mention the problem of changing the "educational attitudes and

values" of the society at large.

3)

Not only were necessary materials

unavailable, Gross found, they were largely non-existent.

To what ex-

tent is an innovation that relies on materials that don't exist really
an innovation?

1*)

The organizational arrangements cited here we re the

continuation of report cards and bells, there was no mention of superintendents, school boards, budgets, the certifying and selecting func-

tions of schools.

5)

Most teachers decided that the innovation did not

represent the best way to teach students to read, write, figure, etc.,
so they decided to resist its implementation.

ideology, not leadership.

failed to

The failure here was in

Innovators, and evaluators, in this case

recognize the obvious social, economic and political impli-

cations of the innovation which finally brought it to its knees.

evaluators
for

For

to cite the five reasons above as the definitive explanation

was
failure is to exhibit the same gross lack of understanding as

exhibited by the planners of the Clinic for Learning.
fundamental socie
The more explicitly an innovation challenges a

tal value the less likely it is to succeed.

The implications of the

level of reform, the
Clinic's design to effect change on the second

clearly radical in
community level, are less obscure and more

nat-ure.
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The promise of building a ’'community school"
immediately confronts the

central power arrangements of the public schools, whereby
the decisions

which affect the lives of children for six hours per day
for twelve years
are made by the traditional interests

—

i.e., the state legislature,

the Board of Education, the teachers, administrators,
etc. -

by parents and students.

—

but not

"Community control" by parents presents a

radical and fundamental departure from the conventional view of public
education, in which schools are viewed as surrogate parents, instilling
the values of hard work and conformity and compensating for the perceived

deficiencies of the home.

It is not surprising that such efforts illicit

strong resistance.
Finally, when educational reformers overtly challenge societal

norms their liklihood of success approaches zero.

The debilitating impli-

cations of the third level of reform advanced by the Clinic with neither

understanding nor tact need no explication.

Clinic planners asserted

that their efforts would result in the beginnings of a basic restructuring of the political and economic foundations of our society.

was folly.

But that

Their sincerity and dedication, no matter how great, were

incapable of dealing with the proverbial "system."
It is to the credit of the Project Director that he came to

understand fundamental conflicts inherent in the project and began
"shifting from a school-education orientation to a socio-economic -education

community orientation."

He began to view the public school not simply as

»

*
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the purveyor of academic skills but as a power base for economic and

political action.

Yet he had little strength with which to bring the

reorientation about.

The entire project was founded on vague misunder-

standings, and the entire project failed on this account.

Had project

planners understood earlier, they would not have aimed at eradicating
the ghetto, in any terms; they would have mustered more than good will
and communications links in bringing the community into a position of

power in the school; and finally, they would have sensed the overall
ramifications of their proposed classroom innovations and focused all of
their professional competencies on this task, which had the greatest

possibility of fulfillment.

We have argued that the theorems of the science of organizational
change could have been useful primarily in implementing, and explaining,

this latter category of reform.

In this light we have argued that or-

ganizational change theorems aid in explaining the failure of the Cluso

ters;

Our research verifies the critical nature of proper teacher in-

volvement and situationally

defined leadership skills.

And though we

have clearly not suggested that poor teacher involvement and unskilled

leadership were the only Clinic shortcomings, this approach has lent a
measure of scientific credibility to our inquiry.
the

At the same time, on

other two levels of change, we have essentially bypassed the organi-

zational change approach.

Admittedly, if we could point, as did the

scientific reasons
Gross study, to a number of concrete and ostensibly

more weight.
why the Clinic failed, our conclusions might carry

It

Clinic for Learning
would be convenient, for example, to argue that the

because the community was
failed to achieve community involvment solely
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not included in designing the project, or because the original community
agents were not recognized community leaders.

It would leave us more

sanguine if we could conclude that reform at JHS

.57

could have had some-

tiny impact on the eradication of the ghetto if the planners had only
diagnosed the situation better, or had clarified their goals, or had
really delivered the services of New York University.

No doubt these are

•important observations for evaluators to make, no doubt their rectifica-

tion will aid future projects, but they are far from explaining why the
Clinic for Learning failed on these latter two levels of reform.

The

Clinic failed, very simply, because it cut too roughly across society's
grain: it threatened the jobs and political security of too many people;

it questioned too specifically the value orientations of too many powerful groups of people.

In short, we have found organizational change theorems to be of
little use in explaining the interaction between organizations
JHS 57
exist.

—

i.e.

and the political and economic environments in which they

W e recall that Bennis and Argyris

and Likert developed their

strategies in industrial settings, they made it their goal to "humanize"

individuals in private enterprise, but their writings evidence little
doubt about the wisdom of the ends of private enterprise.

Increased

they
production and profits are as much a goal of the "change agents" as
are of the Boards of Directors whom they serve.

still productive way to reach the same end.

They offer only a betx-er,

The goals of public educa-

heritage, teach
tion traditionally have been to transmit a cultural
socialize for adjustment to
fundamental skills of reading and writing,

will become law abiding and
society’s norms, and produce students who
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industrious contributors to the economy.

*

For those who seek a better way

to reach those goals the strategies of organizational change are crucial.
For those who want the schools to perform a different function, putting

them into a fundamentally different relation with basic economic and
political institutions, organizational change theory loses all its vitality.

For the Cluster Coordinator who said, "We told them we wanted to

help them do better what they were already doing, but that was not why
we were there, at least not why I was there," organizational change

strategies might have forestalled his eventual clash with the school,

but they would not have fulfilled his goal.

Leadership and decision

making and diagnosis and linkages and goal setting in a non-coercive environment would have "greased the machine," as another Coordinator said,

but they would have done little to affect the final product of ghetto
education.

Predictably, our discussion of the latter two levels of re-

form becomes less precise, less verifiable, more sociological, and as a
result, our conclusions are less prescriptive.

The measure of success

in these broader areas will be not only in the knowledge that we promulgate but in the questions that we have raised.

In Conclusion
of a
Education is an important and valuable process in the life
child.

measure of
That we equate "schooling" with "education" is only a

how deeply mired we are in the myths of Horace Mann

that universal

for knowledge. In
public education is necessary to assuage man's thirst

equate the two; electronic communica1972, it is essentially absurd to

with the knowledge transtions media are in never ending competition

mitting capabilities of public schools.

And yet, as a nation, we are

ft
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decades if not centuries away from dismantling the system of compulsory

public schooling which moulds the lives of future generations.

Until

this occurs, we bear a heavy responsibility to those children, who

through no choice of their own find themselves at the mercy of the Insti-

tution of Public Education.

Making schools more humane, more individually

fulfilling, and more educational are legitimate hopes for educational
.reform.

In this study we have explored a not uncommon phenomenon of

educational reform: professional educators acting on the belief that the

solution

to most, if not all, of society's problems resides somewhere

in their chosen field.

A common failing to be sure.

The wild hopes of

the Clinic for Learning Project Director, who, starting in one school

with a handful of graduate students, could consider as one of his ultimate goals the dimunition of the ghetto, are not nearly so wild when
placed alongside the multitude of reform projects that have succeeded
the Clinic.

Educators still talk cavelierly of "compensating for the

disadvantaged," or "providing equal opportunity for all," or "having an
impact" on society.

But, on the basis of- both the evidence of the Clinic

debacle and a broader sampling of sociological opinions, we have con-

cluded here that these objectives conceal nearly insurmountable barriers
educawhich far outweigh the traditionally defined competencies of the

tional profession.
society, as
Schools and universities have their place in the

intellectual and sociomechanisms of socialization and seedbeds for

emotional development.

These processes can be facilitated^ teachers

heighten the self-esteem and
can teach better,' new techniques can

m-
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terest of the learner, the growth of the mind can be stimulated, and the

socialization process can be made not quite so restrictive.

More stu-

dents can learn more things in a more curious way by virtue of the wis-

dom of the educational profession and its pursuit of constructive change.
But educational reform must have its boundaries.

Those who remain with-

in this sphere maximize their impact on the intellectual and emotional
•

growth of our young, and in so doing they perform a valuable and impor-

tant function for the society.

Those who profess to be educators but

with
aspire to be social reformers are sadly out of touch both'the tools of

their profession and the demands of their aspiration.

*

l
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